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His Highness Tui Atua Tupua Tamasese Ta’isi Efi
Prelude:  
Climate Change and the Perspective of the Fish
Fundamentally the problem of climate change is a problem of arrogance and greed. If 
we want to seriously address the critical issues that face our world today we have to 
come up with something that is bold enough to allow us to say the unsayable. In other 
words, what is constructive in this search for answers is also what is most hard to say.
Arrogance and greed are human vices that speak to the weaker side of ourselves; 
to our vulnerabilities as humans. The arrogance that pervades the modern psyche 
is an arrogance that compromises the soul: that of a people, person, leader, parent 
or child. Arrogance and greed while seemingly easy to identify, are difficult to make 
transparent or even to avoid. Arrogance is the condition of presuming unfettered 
dominion over our environment and all living things. It is the ability to rationalise 
and believe that what is wrong is right.
Greed is the unhealthy preoccupation we have with profit, i.e. the accumulation 
of pecuniary or material gain for individual benefit at the unreasonable expense of 
others. Modern technology, industrialisation and mercantilism have allowed us to live 
a life of comfort literally at our fingertips. But this has come at a cost to our natural 
environment and spiritual health.
The dialogue on climate change is therefore not easy. Not just for the technicalities 
of understanding atmospheric changes and rising sea levels but equally, if not more 
so, for the soul-searching questions it forces us to confront about ourselves and our 
pursuits of wealth. The paradoxes of our modern economic philosophies come to light 
in this debate. The rationality of modern liberal economics finds as Raymond Aron 
points out, a “pessimism that sees, in politics, the art of creating the conditions in 
which the vices of men will contribute to the good of the state” (1957: 284). Recent 
comments on CNN about climate change and the world credit crisis puts it this way: 
“It is about having clean air and water” on one hand and “saving the United States not 
polar bears” on other. Climate change and the credit crunch graphically illustrate the 
crazy complexities of these paradoxes.
The nub question for me is how can I contribute to the conversation? In doing so let 
me own up that the biggest hurdle for me is to summon the courage to say something 
meaningful about climate change in the company of such eminent authorities. I come 
to these issues and questions with a heart full of anxieties, yet am buoyed by the 
belief that in the ultimate we have a common origin and destiny and are entrusted to 
search for insight and perspective, and hopefully for solutions, to the worst problems 
to have faced man.
His Highness Tui Atua Tupua Tamasese Ta’isi Efi, Head of Independent State of Samoa 
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X   Prelude: Climate Change and the Perspective of the Fish 
A Different Paradigm
In this common search, I offer the insights and perspectives of my Samoan 
indigenous reference or faasamoa. Within it is a worldview that privileges not just 
the perspective of other men, but of other living beings—of trees, animals, oceans 
and stars. It is a worldview or life principle that demands humility, sacrifice and 
respect of our sacred origins. This paradigm comes alive through the poetry, nuances 
and metaphors of our Samoan language, its legends, rituals and song chants. It tells 
of the importance of the principles of tapu, equivalence and affinity to overcoming 
arrogance and greed.
Tapu and Sacrifice: The Story of Sina and Tuna
The legend of Sina and Tuna is core to Samoan culture and is about the sacrifice of an 
unrequited love. An eel (Tuna) pines for Sina (a human girl) without avail. Unable to 
win her he eventually wills himself to death. His parting words to his beloved were: 
When I die cut my head off and bury it in the earth, it will grow into a tree whose 
leaves will weave mats and shutters; whose milk will sustain your thirst; and whose 
flesh will give you food. Every time you dehusk the nuts from this tree you and your 
descendants will see my face. And, every time you drink the milk from my mouth it 
will remind you of my undying love.
According to Samoan mythology this is the origin of the coconut tree, which is 
an essential feature of Samoan agriculture and spirituality. Today the leaves of the 
coconut tree are still used to weave mats and shutters for houses and to make food 
baskets. The coconut milk is still the principal beverage in Samoan society. And the 
flesh of the coconut is still staple food in our Samoan diet. The flesh is often grated 
and strained using sinnet to obtain cream and make oil. The cream provides flavour 
and taste to food; the oil can be used for massage and ritual blessings.
The metaphors of this story emphasise sacrifice. Arrogance is self-indulgence; 
greed is self-aggrandisement. Both are inimical to sacrifice. Tuna, despite being 
rejected, was able to rise above anger to leave a legacy of grace and humility. The 
coconut is tapu because it is reincarnation and when we eat the flesh of the coconut 
that is communion. Tuna as eel and as coconut tree demands a psychology whereby 
fish, plant and human are treated as co-inhabitors of the planet and actors in a 
common culture, where their desires and destinies are intertwined. When Tuna’s 
head is buried in the earth there is connection with mother earth. Tuna’s sacrifice 
brings blessings. The message is that what is good, decent and wholesome is spawned 
by sacrifice.
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Affinity and Equivalence in Ritual Performance and Language
In the village of Solosolo there is respect and public affinity between man and dog. 
The funeral ritual of Solosolo is honorifically named le maile i.e. dog. The people 
of Solosolo believe that the dog, when baying at the moon, is communicating with 
the cosmos and the gods. During the le maile funeral ritual performers transform 
themselves into dogs. They take on the persona of a dog through action, articulation 
and psyche. In behaving like a dog Solosolo connects “dogspeak” with “humanspeak” 
and celebrates affinity and equation between animal, cosmic and human life. 
Here man finds mystical connection between dog and moon reflective of a sacred 
relationship, a va tapuia.
In the village of Asau, the tautai or the head fisherman consults with his god 
about when to receive the tamasoaalii (honorific reference to the fish, i.e. mackerel). 
The relationship between the tautai and his god is tapu. On the designated day, early 
in the morning, the head fisherman, on his own, paddles his canoe to what is known 
as the ava o atule (literally, the entry of the mackerel).
Afio maia oe le manaia  Welcome to you the manaia—the honorific for the 
head of the untitled men’s group
Afio maia oe le tausala   Welcome to you the tausala—honorific for the 
belle of the village ladies group
O lea ua talisoa le aiga o 
Tautaifau ma le au taliuta  The fishing guild and the village await you
O loo faatali Aiga ma Salafi ma 
lo latou maopu The village of Asau await you
Afio mai oe le tamasoalii  I welcome you, the man who is the aide of the 
chief
The language used to address the mackerel is not common parlance or slang, it is 
chiefly language. In fact, here the head fisherman treats the mackerel as chiefs, 
evidenced by his specific use of chiefly honorifics. This is high praise. After the chant, 
the mackerel in reciprocal courtesy would follow the head fisherman into the net. This 
deference between man and fish underscores a mystical bonding that is celebrated 
by the Samoan saying: “le ia a le tautai e alu i le faalolo,” meaning the fish defers to 
the will of the head fisherman. This mystical bonding speaks of a sacred affinity and 
equation between man and fish.
By today’s reckoning the act of becoming a dog or addressing fish as chiefs can 
counteract man’s arrogance as pre-eminent being. The sacred bonding between dog 
and moon or fish and tautai or head fisherman reflects a spiritual culture or a va 
tapuia (sacred relations) between humans, animals, cosmos and the gods. There is 
inherent respect for the sacred equivalence and affinity between them.
XII   Prelude: Climate Change and the Perspective of the Fish 
Respecting the Sacredness of Trees by Seeking Pardon
In the debate on climate change the role of the trees and the forest as the “lungs of 
the earth” is critical to the production of clean air. In our Samoan reference trees have 
a life and soul and so are divine creations. Trees catch airborne pollutants by their 
leaves and bark, and through their root systems are able to cleanse ground water. 
They allow us to breathe clean air. In the Samoan indigenous context, if a tree was 
to be cut down, a prayer chant or faalanu is performed. The word used to describe 
the cutting of a tree is oia, which derives from the word oi, meaning to cry in pain. 
This presupposes that a tree suffers pain. The faalanu is performed to seek pardon for 
causing pain.
In the celebrated story of the canoe-builder Lata (or Rata in other parts of the 
Pacific), when failing to seek pardon from the spirit guardians of the forest for taking 
the life of a tree, he was denied use of the tree. In this story Lata was baffled to find 
that after felling during the day a tree from the forest in Savaii to build himself a 
canoe, that the next morning when he rose to start working on carving the canoe, the 
tree trunk was restored to life in its original place. On the third night of this happening 
Lata decided to hide during the night to see how the tree came back to life. After 
felling the tree he hid. Late into the night he saw female spirits encircling the tree, 
restoring it to life. He approached the spirit guardians and asked why they did this. 
They told him that he had disrespected them by failing to seek pardon before he fell 
the tree. Lata apologised and sought pardon. When he awoke the next morning the 
spirit guardians had carved him a beautiful canoe. The relationship between man and 
his environment, between man and his co-inhabitors is based on a spiritual culture 
that finds affinity and equivalence, balance and harmony, between them. In taking 
from the environment we are accountable to the environment.
Conclusion
The relationship between trees, animals, ocean and mother earth is one of balance, 
where boundaries are respected and protected. This is captured in the Samoan saying: 
e le laa le uto i le maene pe sopo le tai i le eleele (lit. the floater cannot intrude on the 
function of the sinker, as the ocean cannot encroach on the boundaries of the land). 
In our arrogance and greed, we have encroached the boundaries of what is right and 
just. As we search for solutions we must be open to the wisdom of others. What has 
happened over the years as man has become more knowledgeable through science is 
that that very knowledge has given us a much greater capacity to abuse the elements 
and forget the need for harmony.
What we need in our search for balance and harmony is a culture of humility and 
sharing where arrogance and greed are openly admitted and addressed. This is the 
first step to healing. Man must have the courage to rise above himself and restore his 
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fatumanava, i.e. the earth in his heart, and to find ways to connect (metaphorically) 
with the fish. I say the fish because I wish to end with a famous story from Robert 
Benchley, who while a student of International Law at Harvard University, made a joke 
about the perspective of the fish. The story goes that in a final examination Benchley 
was confronted with the question: Discuss the arbitration of the International 
Fisheries problem in respect to hatcheries protocol and dragnet and trawl procedure, 
as it affects (a) the point of view of the United States; and (b) the point of view of Great 
Britain. In addressing the question Benchley wrote desperately: “I know nothing 
about the fisheries problem; and nothing about the point of view of the United States; 
and nothing about the point of view of Great Britain. Therefore, I shall discuss the 
question from the point of view of the fish.”
Humour aside, for the climate change debate there is poignancy here in searching 
for the perspective of the fish. For Samoans, there is a sacred essence, equivalence 
and affinity between man and fish. To find solutions to our current environmental 
problems we must ask ourselves what it is to be a fish. To do this you must be prepared 
to enter the mind of the fish, to become them, to live as them, and experience the 
sacrifice they might have to make in order to survive. To protect the environment, you 
need to be able to respect the environment. The relevance of the viewpoint of the fish 
is embedded in the wisdom of Robbie Burns: 
Would some power the gift to give us
To see ourselves as others [the fish and trees] see us.
Soifua.1 
1 Presented to the Stars of Oceania Summit, University of Hawai‘i, 9-12 April 2009.

Tony Crook, Peter Rudiak-Gould
1  Introduction: Pacific Climate Cultures 
As an instrument for reducing emissions and slowing global warming, science has failed. As a 
source of definitive prescriptions about how communities should deal with a changing climate, 
science alone is inadequate...a purely technocratic approach is likely only to exacerbate the 
climate crisis because it ignores the dynamic psychological, cultural, social, economic and 
political systems that affect climate impacts.  
(Finucane, 2009: 2) 
1.1  Living Climate Change in Oceania
Cultural concepts and ecologies are vitally inseparable, mutually constitutive and 
made living through each other. Pacific philosophies understand oceans, lands 
and skies as agentive, malleable living forms participating in, constitutive of and 
responsive to cosmological and kinship-based relations capable of encompassing the 
perspectives of fish and the relational qualities of people. In this vein, the Prelude 
diagnoses climate change as the consequential, unbalanced, manifestation of human 
“arrogance and greed.” In this vein too, the Afterword depicts the “inter locks” of vital 
energetics to convey the reciprocal mutuality of living climate change. What we coin 
here as “living climate change” in Oceania then, entails rather more than simply living 
with climate change - as though it were merely a matter of making an accommodation 
with a troubling, separate and adjacent realm or some distinct natural domain 
only legible to science and a technocratic approach. Climate change amplifies and 
makes manifest human natures, conceptual ideas, relational practices and their 
consequences, and this volume explores the registers, forms and actions through 
which Pacific peoples are living climate change as diverse cultural concepts and 
ecologies newly combine. Changing climates and changeable cultures in the Pacific 
make manifest and make known the constitutive relations and reciprocal exchanges 
amongst various life-forms in a shared and living realm of responsibility which has 
no end of forceful motivating currents. The relations and effects drawn forth through 
“climate change” have in this sense always been a part of life itself in the Pacific, and 
are increasingly influential and dominant currents amongst many others. As much 
as distinctive forms of reciprocity inform and support these inter-locking relations, 
distinctive forms of reciprocity are also shaping the climate mediated encounters 
through which Pacific peoples are living climate change - adapting through their 
own means, and adapting climate change to their own ends. We might as much point 
to “climate” or “culture” as concepts expressing aspects of mutually constitutive 
relations, yet must remember that such Eurocentric terms are poor substitutes for 
Tony Crook, University of St Andrews; 
Peter Rudiak-Gould, Cathexis Consulting, Toronto
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2   Introduction: Pacific Climate Cultures 
particular Oceanic conceptualisations, and merely proxies for specific indigenous 
references and philosophies. Different forms, sources and registers of knowledge 
are being brought into new relations through climate change, and combined and 
made living in particular ways. As described below, discourses of “climate change” 
in a scientific register are being dynamically adapted, combined and appropriated 
into narratives and genres which are also home-grown. Pacific climate cultures as 
depicted here, then, draw attention to diverse cultural forms which are registering, 
expressing and responding to the emergent properties, effects and possibilities 
of “climate change.” Grasping these interconnected and reciprocal relations at the 
outset opens up the possibility for apprehending new ethnographic objects, of asking 
new questions, of offering new descriptions and new analyses, and of formulating 
language for new forms of pro-active response—and this also affords the basis for 
a different paradigm and a distinctive Pacific contribution. Pacific Climate Cultures 
aims to bring Oceanic philosophies to the frontline of social scientific theorization. 
It explores the home-grown ways that “climate change” becomes absorbed into the 
combined effects of globalization and into a living nexus of relations amongst human 
and non-humans, spirits and elements. 
Pacific peoples have their own explanations for the causalities and wider effects 
of “climate change,” and their own interpretations of the broader cultural changes 
entailed in the diverse encounters and manifestations of climate cultures across the 
contemporary Pacific. We need not imagine that climate change is entering from 
beyond Pacific worldviews as if they were somehow separate domains impinging 
upon or having to adapt to each other. Reciprocity is an important principle and 
social mode: it involves a sophisticated aptitude for discovering new possibilities in 
resources of all kinds, and an equally adept skill in accepting external interests and 
turning them into home-grown initiatives. As a cultural principle, combining mutual 
enactments enables distinctive forms of social and knowledge exchange. It creates 
a ready-made space in which different sources of knowledge can be combined, and 
a ready-made mode through which multiplicity can be accommodated. Of course, 
this reciprocal mode of combining and exchanging interests operates in diverse 
ways across local and global scales, and so disrupts any simple picture of internal 
and external. Pacific peoples have a long and distinguished history of meeting the 
peoples of other regions of the world on their own social and cultural terms, and of 
engaging with outsiders through their own economic and political interests (Thomas, 
2010; Matsuda, 2012) and can be relied upon to creatively respond to climate change 
through the cultural resources of their own life principles. 
The renaissance and contemporary importance of Pacific voyaging, and its role as 
a compelling home-grown response to climate change, illustrates the point. In saying 
that “Pacific indigenous navigation is a powerful metaphor for Pacific leadership,” 
His Highness Tui Atua Tupua Tamasese has in mind guidance “to find yourself in 
your cultural histories and indigenous references before tackling the references of 
others,” “for our own [national] development moving into the future,” and for the 
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challenges of 21st-century global politics (Tamasese, 2010: 1, 3). The Pacific Council 
of Churches’ formulation of the “Island of Hope” (2001) envisions navigating a way 
towards sustainability based on life-centred Pacific ways. Since the 1970s through 
to the current Mālama Honua Worldwide Voyage (2013-17), the Polynesian Voyaging 
Society’s double-hulled voyaging canoe, Hōkūleʻa, has inspired the redesign of 
a new sail plan for humanity.2 The Third UN SIDS Conference in 2014 transformed 
the meeting hall into, and portrayed the outcome document,3 as a double-hulled 
va’a or voyaging canoe (Crook, 2016); and Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner’s address at the 2014 
UN Climate Summit invoked Marshallese canoes in calling for a “radical change of 
course.”4 Besides motivating the enhanced geopolitical presence of the Pacific on 
the global stage, climate change has had an important regionalising effect across 
the Pacific, providing a new basis for emphasising common cause across a range of 
scales, and a point of contention and division with some traditional geopolitical and 
development partners, most notably Australia, through the “new Pacific diplomacy” 
(Fry and Tarte, 2015).
Pacific peoples are on the frontline of climate change: recognised as among the 
first affected by the changing nature of sea-level rises and global weather systems 
(Farbotko, 2010; Lazrus, 2012), and yet curiously absent from the front line of early 
climate change debates. Whilst the dichotomy of the universal character of IPCC 
guidelines (Barnett 2001) and the specificity of Pacific contexts (Pernetta, 1992) was 
recognized right from the outset, the Pacific region is gaining increasing scholarly 
attention (e.g. Mortreux and Barnett, 2009; Jacka, 2009; Lazrus, 2009; McNamara and 
Gibson, 2009; Barnett and Campbell, 2010; Rudiak-Gould, 2011, 2013a). Prophecies 
about the inevitability of displacement due to climate change create spaces in which 
ideas such as migration lose all proportion and reality (Kempf, 2009), and become 
driven by policy development rather than by material circumstances (Mortreux and 
Barnett, 2009). They do not necessarily reflect experiences (Lieber, 1977), local plans 
and wishes (McNamara and Gibson, 2009), “multistress” contexts of environmental, 
social, and political changes and pressures (Becken, 2005) or local perceptions of 
potential political and economic advancement (Connell, 2003).
Pacific peoples’ receptions of and responses to the physical effects and prophetic 
narratives of anthropogenic climate change (such as the “end of the Pacific,” Nunn, 
2 Nainoa Thompson, “Redesigning a Sail Plan for Humanity,” http: //www.huffingtonpost.com/nai-
noa-thompson/redesigning-a-sail-plan-f_b_10374096.html
3 “This week we have all helped to build a great SIDS va’a or voyaging canoe, the SAMOA Pathway. 
We have also equipped it with the many paddles necessary to move it forward, through the many 
partnerships we have celebrated and launched here in the Pacific. We are departing on a journey 
and charting a course together towards the many multilateral negotiations awaiting us.” (Tuilaepa 
Lupesoliai Sailele Malielegaoi 2014).
4 https://www.un.org/climatechange/summit/2014/09/watch-marshallese-poet-kathy-jetnil-kijiner-
speaking-climate-summit/index.html
4   Introduction: Pacific Climate Cultures 
2013) are beginning to shape international priorities, policies and practices (e.g. 
Kelman, 2010). Scientific prophecies are absorbed and heard within the frame 
of religious and cosmological interconnections, and prompt internal reflections 
and critiques of localised community affairs (Rubow and Bird, 2016). Rather than 
simply a question of physical and tangible changes to natural systems that require 
technological and material remedies, climate change in the Pacific is altogether more 
complex, and yet altogether more straightforward from a social science perspective. 
Climate and weather are barometers, so to speak, that manifest and express the 
qualities and changes in social relations—peoples’ dealings with one another and 
with other beings in their lifeworlds (cf. Strauss and Orlove, 2003; Lefale, 2010). 
Hence the limitations of assuming that the motivating cultural concepts are the 
same as those informing international climate discourses, and the limitations of 
assuming that the scientific account of global warming is shared as an explanation 
of the causalities at work (Salick and Byg, 2007; Jacka 2009). In the Pacific at least, 
it is equally important to look at where the effects of climate change wash up—as a 
cultural idea, an environmental discourse, a global prophecy, a political ideology—in 
the social thinking of Pacific peoples and the particular places and communities in 
which they live. 
Place-based ethnographies of “traditional ecological knowledge” (TEK) (cf. Crate, 
2011) do well to avoid viewing TEK as an indigenous equivalence to science (Leach 
and Davis, 2012). Pacific knowledge-practices are composite, relational, combinatory 
and highly inter-personal, and characterised by the importance of places and persons 
and hierarchical relations. For example, Borofsky’s study in the Cook Islands (1990) 
shows how pedagogy involves a willingness to learn for hierarchical advancement 
rubbing against an unwillingness to appear hierarchically subservient; Harrison’s 
(1990) and Lindstrom’s (1990) studies in PNG and Vanuatu respectively, show how 
knowledge requires the verification of another person; Crook’s work in PNG shows 
how knowledge is regarded as a bodily capacity that relies on combining rationales 
and relational sources for efficacy (2004, 2007a). Technocratic and bureaucratic 
cultures of knowledge and practice often rub up against and combine with local 
modalities of knowing—as new relational sources and rationales—and, thereby, 
disrupt any easy reading or questioning as to whether they might be commensurate or 
incommensurate. Yet, creating pathways for including alternative modes of knowing 
into official assessment and reporting processes are far from unproblematic (e.g. 
Magistro & Roncoli, 2001; Nakashima et al, 2012).
Advancing the theoretical understanding and practical interaction of different 
systems of knowledge-practice are critical features of social science contributions in 
response to climate change, and provide key pivots for the emerging “cultural turn” 
(e.g. Adger et al, 2011; Hulme, 2009; Rudiak-Gould, 2011; Urry, 2011). Engagement 
with scientific paradigms and the terminologies of international policy agendas 
may be a premise for anthropological engagement (Crate and Nuttall 2009, 2016), 
but we need not assume that these international terms and causal connections also 
 Living Climate Change in Oceania   5
provide the premise for Pacific perceptions of climate changes. Nor should we assume 
in a distinctively Eurocentric vein that climate cultures are merely diverse social 
constructions of the same natural facts (cf. Pettenger, 2007). Anthropologists wishing 
to avoid the limitations of such a “social constructionist” position, are learning that 
when it comes to climate change it is insufficient to assume and ascribe the scientific 
account of the causes of global warming—and to only then look to culture after 
the fact as a resource for adaptation or else a basis for vulnerability. Instead, their 
predisposition is to look beyond this Eurocentric folk-model and academic convention 
and to anticipate that Pacific peoples will have shifting and multiple explanations, 
deriving from and addressing specific aspects, and analysable in terms of cultural 
concerns that reflect the interconnections between dimensions of the world which 
all nonetheless fall within a distinctly humanised and cosmomorphic vision of life. 
The Pacific continues to exercise an important and disproportionate influence 
on the intellectual development of social science disciplines, including social 
anthropology. Social anthropology has a long tradition of studying indigenous 
perceptions of ecological relations in the vernacular terms of traditional cosmologies, 
but its specific engagement with the issue of climate change can be traced back to 
a conference organized by (erstwhile Pacific anthropologist) Margaret Mead in 1975, 
‘The Atmosphere: Endangered and Endangering’, which brought together scientists 
and social scientists across a range of disciplines, and set precedents as much for 
subsequent research as for policy engagement (Kellog and Mead, 1977; Baer and 
Singer, 2014: 23-24). Mead was involved in the first Earth Day in 1970, and in the years 
leading up to the conference had clearly recognized the emergent idea of “our shared 
atmosphere” (1972) as a powerful cultural idea that all people shared equally, which 
served to dissolve national differences and which echoed President Kennedy’s vision 
of the atmosphere as a unifying political entity in which “we all breathe the same air” 
(1963).
A Pacific contribution to debates seeking to theorise climate change, then, could 
well be fashioned from juxtaposing metaphysical connections made by peoples 
across the region and drawing notions of mutability to set against commitments to 
immutability, and vice versa: that is, to critically point out cultural distinctiveness 
and to productively deploy conceptual divergences. Indeed, following the Prelude to 
this volume and drawing upon Samoan indigenous reference we might well look to 
a worldview or life principle that “privileges not just the perspective of other men, 
but of other living beings” and respects their “equivalence and affinity,” as a source 
of insight which unsettle prevailing assumptions in the understanding of climate 
change.
As much as the contributors to this volume put forward examples and analyses 
from a range of venues across the region to convey how Pacific peoples “make what 
they would” (Bolton et al, 2013: ix) of climate change, they share a concern to speak 
beyond a suite of Pacific exemplars illustrating common cause, to contribute what 
amounts to a Pacific vantage point on anthropological and wider social science 
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assumptions and theorisations of climate change. Beyond a collection of small-scale 
case-studies from across a large-scale region, the materials and analyses here speak 
to how scale and relations of adaptation, combination and appropriation appear to, 
and are approached by, particular cultural logics, and moreover, speak to prevailing 
orthodox understandings of climate change, and thereby challenge these hegemonic 
understandings from a Pacific perspective. 
Alongside the temptation to read these Pacific examples as multipliers of the 
ways that many cultures make what they would of the same facts of nature, or as a 
collective exhibition of a region’s responses to a shared experience, or as evidencing 
the confirmation of a theoretical perspective, comes an invitation tempting readers to 
engage the contributions that follow as an opportunity to re-work and re-frame any 
underpinning cultural and ideological commitments of their own. As much as the 
descriptive enrichment and analytical enhancement that might be derived from the 
Pacific ethnographies that follow, the volume also offers insight into why the problems 
of climate change are difficult to make transparent. Here we touch upon distinctively 
Eurocentric interlocks, interconnections and conceptual separations by which the 
disjuncture of representations from that which is represented provides a corollary 
of the disjuncture between nature and culture or different social constructions 
of a shared real world. Whilst the relational iteration of cultural interlocks may be 
universal, the character of the interlocks and what is being connected are, of course, 
not. Pacific climate cultures provide a vantage-point on folk-models and cultural 
assumptions of our own.
It is instructive that His Highness Tui Atua Tupua Tamasese’s forthright diagnosis 
of the problem of climate change in terms of “arrogance and greed” in the Prelude to 
this volume should be a necessary preliminary and instrumental means to finding 
a way to be “bold enough to allow us to say the unsayable.” Conventions need to be 
knocked off balance to reveal both old habits and new possibilities, and in this way 
too His Highness’ provocation is a fitting Prelude to the ambitions of this volume. 
Pointing to the problem of arrogance and greed might be hard to say because of the 
“soul-searching questions it forces us to confront about ourselves,” and because of 
the resistance to acknowledging presumptions of “unfettered dominion over our 
environment and all living things” and an “unhealthy preoccupation” with “material 
gain for individual benefit at the unreasonable expense of others.” Offending delicate 
social protocols makes these things hard to say, no doubt, and acknowledging their 
traces in one’s own actions and in one’s view of oneself is uncomfortable. Beyond 
etiquette and honesty, the impasse appears to be a problem of representation: that is, 
of collapsing the disconnect between the ideal world as represented through cultural 
models and the real world as reproduced through social actions. Representational 
strategies embody and reiterate certain assumptions: representation necessarily 
involves a separation or detachment, and suggests a corollary in the very separation of 
human ideas and systems from environments taken as causal factors in anthropogenic 
climate change. So, the wider question and larger point to be taken here is that, from 
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this Samoan perspective, why should the obvious disconnect between the reality of 
the world and the social actions that manifest it, be so “difficult to make transparent”? 
Questions of “change” summon notions of prior and normative states. 
Similarly, that social, economic, political and cultural changes accompany climate, 
meteorological, ecological and environmental changes summons a prevailing order of 
things, for example, in how one register is implicated in and represented by the other. 
In addressing this question, we might look to adapt or combine some older cultural 
and intellectual resources of our own. The view that order is the proper and normative 
state, and that the order of nature provides a model for society, such that changes 
in one are represented by changes in the other, reveals particular cultural origins 
and corresponding problems or “totemic illusion” with analysts discovering “social 
control” (Strathern, 1985: 116) and “society” in parts of the Pacific (1988). Indeed, 
Pacific socialities provide vivid counter examples of the “familiar and predictable 
lifeworlds humans create for themselves” (Hulme, 2015: 293). In respect of Pacific 
materials, Wagner counter-intuitively suggests we resist the temptation entailed in 
“constantly trying to [bring] things into an ordered and consistent relation”: we should 
instead grasp the motivation as “constantly trying to change, readjust [and] ‘knock 
the conventional off balance” ([1975] 1981: 66), or ‘the more disputes are settled, the 
more they erupt’ as Strathern puts it (1985: 127). “Change” holds a different position 
and quite alternative effects in such different views: starting points carry definite 
corollaries for analytical stances, theories and motivations. For when Strathern 
suggests that in one view “parts of social life are seen to offer commentaries on other 
parts, much as the social scientist’s job is to offer commentary” (1985: 112), this is 
a question of representation that pertains as much to a tradition of social science 
as to the social traditions these disciplines emerged from, and we should grasp the 
parallels between our social and methodological positions. The question of why it is 
so hard to see the disconnection between the world as it is ideally imagined and the 
world as it is lived is fundamentally a problem of representation: as such it goes to 
the heart of social scientific description which relies on a separation or disconnect 
with its object into order to make it describable in the first place. The Pacific is a 
provocative place from which to confront these questions.
There are different ways of understanding social relations, and alternatives to 
assuming that it is relations between differentiated domains that call for explanation. 
Roy Wagner’s depiction of Scientific and Papuan conceptualisations of the innate, 
spells out the consequences of stances that take either “relating the perceptibly 
differentiated” or “differentiating the perceptibly related” as their epistemological 
starting points (1977). For example, the honorific words the Samoan chief addresses 
to the fish confirm their relatedness in an equality of status, a mutuality of respect—
albeit further differentiated in a culinary hierarchy. Of course, these stances and 
starting points derive from cultural commitments to the metaphysical ways that ideas 
participate in each other, and we stand to learn from Pacific people’s own cultural 
and social representational strategies—not least whether they are representational 
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in quite the same way. As Hulme observes, these are matters of agency: “as new and 
not-so-new political interests find multiple uses for climate change, our material, 
social, and imaginative worlds become subject to its powers” (2015: 297). Agency is 
also evident in analytical stances and starting points for description, and also evident 
in the corresponding location of realms of human responsibility and of innate realms 
taken for granted.
As much as any utility derived from counter examples to the conceptual 
differentiation of nature and culture or human and non-human, the ethnographic 
materials in this volume can be read as affording counter examples to a 
representational strategy able to “describe one’s social world as apart from the 
actions which constitute it,” by which “Life is understood in terms of a split between 
representations (descriptions) of it, and as it really is” (Strathern, 1985: 128). But 
as we have seen, there are real problems with assuming that this particular social 
representational strategy is universal: “however useful the concept of society 
may be to analysis, we are not going to justify its use by appealing to indigenous 
counterparts” (Strathern, 1988: 3). The all too familiar representational strategy we 
know as “society” provides endorsement for relations between individual members 
and collective groups, and provides a corresponding means of differentiating dual 
registers: just as it is possible to describe a social world as apart from constitutive 
actions, so it is possible to speak at the individual or society level without the need 
to speak at both levels at the same time, for in their differentiation they also invoke, 
and provide a rationale for, each other. In terms of climate change, the articulation 
between dual registers endorses the possibility of speaking to the problems of climate 
change in one register and of speaking to personal participation in those problems 
in another register. And the tongue twister of articulating differentiated separation— 
when to speak of one evokes and relies upon the other—makes transparency difficult 
and a diagnosis almost unsayable. Perhaps this also informs what His Highness Tui 
Atua Tupua Tamasese observes as “the ability to rationalise and believe that what is 
wrong is right.”
Climate change in the Pacific is indistinguishable from the constitutive ideas, 
actions and responses, and thus adaptation and appropriation are not bridging a 
representational gap between differentiated registers: instead the focus falls on 
reception by knowledges which are relational and combinatory, and on apprehensions 
and actions which are mutually constitutive. If the parts do not index or represent or 
offer commentary on other parts, then what happens to the corresponding position 
for analytical representation and commentary? If order is not the motivation and 
if change is not disruptive to convention but rather a means of revealing it, then 
cultural appropriations crafting analogies through climate change begin to appear 
as techniques of knowledge by which to apprehend the capacities, affordances, 
possibilities and constraints of the world anew. Climate change affords a venue 
for multiple ways of knowing in a changeable world, and a method of discovering 
insights into re-worked possibilities. In other words, it begins to appear as a revelatory 
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technique, a means of finding ways of saying what was previously unsayable about 
the world and the conventions of its constitution. This volume questions whether 
and how climate change in the Pacific is being “used to stand in for a wider set of 
human concerns about their changing cultural, political, moral, and physical worlds” 
(Hulme, 2015: 293). In doing so, the volume offers both ethnographic and analytical 
insight, and both regional and theoretical provocation, in which aspects of the 
region’s epistemologies share an equality of status with the region’s experiences as 
contributions that enrich understandings of climate change. In this way, the volume 
aims to put the Pacific closer to the frontline of social science theorisations of climate 
change, and the combinatory character of knowledge itself here creates space for a 
new narrative, reiterating the volume’s contributions in new narrative terms.
1.2  Discourses of Climate Change in the Pacific
A spectre is haunting Oceania: the spectre of climate change. It is indeed spectral, not 
quite real, because like “modernity,” “democracy,” “decolonization,” “development,” 
and many other mega concepts of our age, it describes both a present reality and an 
imagined future that is still in the process of materializing. “Climate change,” like the 
other concepts mentioned above, is by its very nature not an endpoint but a process: 
moving from a past of familiar (and often assumed to be stable and benign) climates, to 
a present of perturbed and “weirding” climates, towards a future of possible climatic 
catastrophe. Much has been written about climate change in the Pacific: impacts, 
forecasts, responses. Less has been written about “climate change” in the Pacific: 
a discourse and steering concept which itself has the power to cause change. The 
inverted commas around “climate change” imply a postmodern detachment or irony, 
and could easily be lampooned for treating as unreal what is actually a very real, very 
serious, anything-but-ironic threat. But for the social scientist or humanities scholar 
there is nothing unreal about climate-change-as-discourse: it is really out there, doing 
real work, channelling real resources, inspiring real action, as this volume intends to 
show.
What is done in the name of this phrase? In the Pacific, probably as much, or 
more, than is being done in response to actual physical manifestations of climate 
change (Hermann and Kempf, this volume). Islanders are responding to the idea as 
much as to the thing, the future as much as the past or present—the very definition 
of Beck’s “risk society” (Beck, 1992). The Pacific is a special place to investigate 
the reception and appropriation of “climate change” concepts, because here the 
discourse takes some of its most arresting and intense forms. The Pacific Islands in 
general, and low-lying coral atolls in particular, have found themselves portrayed—
by foreigners, and now sometimes by their own inhabitants!—as places of inherent 
and overwhelming vulnerability, facing mighty challenges at best, evacuation and 
disappearance at worst (see Connell, Hermann and Kempf, and Struck-Garbe in this 
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volume; also see Mortreux and Barnett, 2009). This is environmental alarm-sounding 
at its most sensational register, sometimes verging on “climate porn” (Lowe, 2006). 
These hyperbolic predictions can rob agency from islanders (Farbotko, 2010; Barnett 
and Campbell, 2010), but they can equally open the door to the invention of new sorts 
of agency, as all of the case studies in this volume illustrate. Connell’s case study 
raises the intriguing possibility that islanders can strategically appropriate doomsday 
discourses for their own ends.
The result is an interesting tension: on the one hand, we have extreme predictions 
and pronouncements, on the other hand, in most Pacific communities, a more 
moderate physical reality. Some Pacific Islanders have indeed been overwhelmed 
and displaced by (what has been called) the impacts of climate change—the classic, 
though simplified, examples are the Carteret Islands (see Connell’s and Struck-
Garbe’s contributions to this volume for widely different takes on this emblematic 
example), and Takuu atoll—and many other communities are experiencing increasing 
socio-ecological distress partly due to changing and destabilizing climates. But by 
and large, for now, life goes on in the Pacific Islands, and climate change exerts its 
influence as much as anticipatory idea and conceptual resource as it does through 
saltwater intrusion, eroding graveyards, cyclonic winds, and bleached reefs.
A fascinating dynamic result. When Pacific Islanders hear about “climate change” 
and “global warming” (which even those of limited education now do on the radio, 
in classrooms, at workshops, and elsewhere), for many it is not simply a restatement 
of what they can plainly see unfolding in front of them, but rather an intriguing set of 
forecasts and claims, sometimes appearing to be a sort of “prophecy,” as in Hermann 
and Kempf’s chapter. The scientific discourses of climate change do not merely 
confirm what Pacific Islanders already know, but in many ways, diverge from their 
experiences of the world. The scientific and media presentations of the issue may be 
narrowly “environmental,” while islander understandings are typically interwoven 
with moral and cultural concerns, making no stark distinction between natural and 
cultural change (Rudiak-Gould, 2012a). The messages may emphasize particular 
environmental changes that islanders deemphasize, and vice-versa: foreign media 
accounts privilege sea level rise as the overarching existential threat, while some locals 
may be more concerned at the moment with the mundane but important impacts of 
droughts and coral bleaching. The messages may have a different temporal focus: 
media accounts tend to be preoccupied with possible scenarios for the century’s 
end, while islanders may be more interested in what responses can be taken on the 
ground now (Veitayaki and Holland, this volume). They may differ in the exuberance, 
or wideness, of attribution—islanders may attribute many things to climate change 
that scientists would hesitate to, or even reject entirely (Rubow, Newell, and Nolet, 
this volume; also see Rudiak-Gould, 2012a); conversely, islanders may be intensely 
concerned about certain climatic changes, such as shifting seasonality, that media 
outlets rarely emphasize. The message received may evince intense anxiety about the 
future, while locals are more sanguine (Mortreux and Barnett, 2009). In other cases, 
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exactly the opposite difference is found (Connell, 2003). Climate change impacts and 
predictions leave some islanders frightened, others excited, others entirely unfazed, 
creating opportunities as well as dangers, as Rubow’s case study in the Cook Islands 
shows.
As many of the case studies in this volume show, islanders are now attributing 
a great variety of local changes to “climate change,” or to its recently translated 
equivalents in Pacific languages. This is a relatively new phenomenon, which in 
many Pacific societies began in the last five or ten years (Rubow, this volume). A key 
question, as we see it, as what exactly happens, what exactly are the consequences, 
when an environmental change becomes understood in this way. The contributors 
offer some answers to this question. A variety of different issues—water stress, 
migration, marine pollution, fisheries—are, for good or ill, gathered together under 
a single heading, and thus seem to demand an integrated, perhaps even a single, 
response (Newell, Connell, this volume). It becomes all too easy to assume that all of 
these issues will follow the same trajectory—steady intensification, worsening—even 
though the reality is more complex, as we see in Rubow’s chapter. The widely varying 
experiences of different Pacific societies are similarly grouped together—all are now 
“on the frontlines of climate change,” “facing climate change,” “vulnerable to climate 
change,” and so forth, even though among Pacific Islanders are enormous differences 
of wealth, power, positionality, and attitude to climate change (Rubow in this volume; 
Hughes, 2013). It is a bridging concept that rallies disparate Pacific societies around 
a central concept that looms over them all (Kelman and West, 2009). The discourse 
of climate change also builds bridge between the Pacific Islanders and the citizens of 
high-income, industrial nations, some of whom now conceptually relate to islanders 
almost entirely through the idiom of “sinking islands” (Connell, this volume). Certain 
opportunities are unlocked. Funding earmarked for climate change work becomes 
available for climate change education, adaptation, and mitigation projects (Veitayaki 
and Holland, Bingeding, Rubow, Newell, this volume)—indeed for any kind of project 
that can be plausibly labelled with that extremely marketable phrase, for many 
officials of Pacific NGOs lament that nowadays every project must be said to relate 
to climate change lest it not be funded (Newell, this volume), such that communities 
may express all of their disparate concerns in terms of climate change (Rubow, this 
volume). Pacific environments become emblems and evidence, Pacific communities 
become victims and witnesses (Connell, this volume). Western journalists suddenly 
become intensely interested in the movements of small, marginal, usually ignored 
populations (Farbotko, 2005, 2010; Farbotko and Lazrus 2012)—it is unlikely that 
media outlets would have given much attention to the looming relocation of fewer 
than two thousand Carteret Islanders from their eroding islands, if not for the fact 
that it could recognized, or spun, as an “impact of climate change,” thus making the 
migrants “climate change refugees” (Connell, this volume).
Still other changes may take place when islanders come to see local changes as 
climate change impacts. Guilt, but with it responsibility, is taken away from local 
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hands, for if something is “an impact of climate change,” locals are neither to blame 
for it nor are able to solve it (Newell, Veitayaki and Holland, this volume). Complex 
local processes and histories that contribute to vulnerability are thus ignored 
(Connell, Nolet, this volume). Many small local problems become a single global 
mega-problem that may seem solvable only by the world’s most powerful states 
(Newell, Veitayaki and Holland, this volume). This disempowers at the same time 
that it, more positively, discourages unnecessary self-flagellation and victim blame 
(see Struck-Garbe in this volume). By giving an account of the causation of climate 
change, tracing it to particular industrial artefacts, it suggests ways of participating 
in mitigation, for those societies that see it as worthwhile (see Veitayaki and Holland, 
Bingeding, this volume; also see Rudiak-Gould, 2014a). The science also warns 
people that changes they see around them are not the apogee of a cycle, but part of 
an upward trend that will continue for decades or centuries. Things will not return 
to normal, but will continue to become stranger, and worse (Nolet in this volume). 
This is a call to arms, but also for some Pacific Islanders an invitation to anxiety and 
despair (Loughry, 2010); Hermann and Kempf’s chapter in this volume shows that the 
two reactions can co-occur. Putting local changes under the label of climate change 
may also scientize, make technical, local processes that before seemed amenable to 
the vernacular, leading to the disempowering perception that local knowledge has 
been rendered obsolete (see Veitayaki and Holland, this volume). Just this process 
appears to be occurring on some of the atolls of the Federated States of Micronesia, 
where the idea of climate change, by itself, is making a once-familiar environment 
seem unknown and unknowable (Pam and Henry, 2012).
So, climate change can change minds. But it should equally be noted that this 
“momentous” narrative can seem banal and obvious to some Pacific Islanders. Some 
of anthropogenic climate change’s central premises have been standard ontological 
premises for many Pacific societies for centuries. The entanglement of nature and 
culture, which Cecilie Rubow points out in her contribution is inherent in the idea 
of anthropogenic climate change, is no surprise to societies that have never stressed 
the distinction. The dynamic, uncontrollable nature of the climate system is hardly 
a surprise to those who have had to creatively adapt to its vagaries for centuries 
(Robertson, this volume). The idea that humans can influence the weather, that 
people’s wrongdoing can be registered in the environment, is not news at all to the 
many Pacific societies with long traditions of weather magicians, chiefs, and deities 
who bring good and bad weather depending on public deference (Newell, Robertson, 
this volume). Even the idea of inundation and disappearance is not novel to some 
Pacific Islanders: Marshall Islanders have long worried about being swallowed by 
the waves, living in a country where typhoons can remove entire islands from the 
reef (Rudiak-Gould, 2013a; also see Hermann and Kempf, Newell, this volume). The 
idea of forced migration is sadly familiar to the Bikinians, Eniwetokese, Rongelapese, 
Banabans, and many other Pacific Islanders who have already faced wholesale 
displacement to make way for phosphate mining, nuclear testing, and other 
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destructive practices (Lieber, 1977). The perceived loss of identity and tradition was 
looming over many islanders long before Western journalists and activists declared 
that climate change migration will kill culture—it has long been seen to be under 
threat from colonialism, immigration, voluntary abandonment, and much more 
(Newell, this volume; Keesing, 2000). The apocalyptic narratives that often form 
part of climate change rhetoric are not new to Pacific communities with pre-existing 
eschatologies of doom (Rubow, Nolet in this volume). The idea that something is 
rotten in the state of industrial modernity is an affront to committed modernists (Žižek 
2010), but hardly a revelation for the many Pacific Islanders who have, through their 
rediscovery and celebration of traditional culture (or “kastom”), already launched a 
powerful critique of blind modernization (see Newell, Nolet, this volume). We may 
sometimes overestimate the impact and the novelty of climate change; it may be most 
surprising to Westerners whose ideologies and ontologies made it so hard to accept 
and recognize.
While much of the preceding discussion has implied a kind of binary between 
locals/non-scientists and foreigners/scientists/journalists, this is a dangerous 
oversimplification. Locals may themselves be the scientists in question, as well as 
the journalists and science educators (Rubow, this volume). The understandings that 
result are “hybridized knowledge” (Soselisa, 2007): coming from two distinct sources, 
perhaps, but ultimately melding into something that blurs the line between science 
and local knowledge.
Despite this potential for productive collaboration and hybridity, often the 
lines remain too starkly drawn, with scientific assessments side-lining local voices 
(Finucane, 2009), turning the dialogue into a monologue. On the other side, advocates 
of local knowledge may also value only one side of the dialogue, portraying science as 
useless, oppressive, or redundant to local knowledge (Robertson, this volume). While 
this argument is valuable as a corrective for the overweighting of scientific authority 
in climate policy, it too risks precluding productive dialogue. Climate science may be 
of help to Pacific Islanders just as Pacific Islanders are sorely needed to contextualize, 
localize, humanize, moralize, and complicate the grand pronouncements of climate 
science. A key question is therefore the following: what exact aspects of climate 
science, communicated in what way, can be helpful to Pacific communities in their 
efforts to respond to climate change? and what exact aspects of local knowledge 
could be usefully incorporated into scientific understanding? Pleas for this sort of 
collaboration (Kelman, Mercer, and West, 2009) are a step in the right direction, 
but are often stingy on details. We hope that the chapters of this volume begin to 
offer more specific answers to these questions. At this point, only tentative answers 
can be offered. What can science offer Pacific Islanders? It can provide long-term 
predictions of climatic events decades in advance—uncertain predictions, of course, 
but still useful for planning, and something local knowledge can rarely provide, since 
it rarely claims to forecast events decades in the future (Hermann and Kempf, this 
volume). Climate science can offer an account of causation that absolves locals of 
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much of the culpability (see Veitayaki and Holland, Connell, this volume), inspiring 
some Pacific representatives to act as the conscience of the UNFCCC negotiations 
(Barnett & Campbell, 2010: 101). Climate science, by grouping local problems under 
the travelable, saleable cause célèbre of “climate change,” can be of practical value by 
providing a steering concept with which local climate activists can attract attention 
and funding (Newell, Veitayaki and Holland, this volume). Climate science can call 
attention to certain environmental changes that are not yet salient to locals, but which 
promise to pose enormous problems in the future (Rudiak-Gould, 2014b) (for instance, 
ocean acidification is rarely a local concern at the moment, but promises to become 
among the most damaging impacts on Pacific communities in the future). What can 
local knowledge offer to science? It can localize the science, providing on-the-ground 
specificity of impacts and adaptation strategies (Kelman, 2011). It can suggest to 
climate scientists relatively overlooked climate impacts (Finucane, 2009)—a good 
example being the changing seasonal timing of rain, wind, harvests, and so forth, 
which is of great concern to many communities around the world, but an impact of 
climate change that has not been much emphasized in scientific reports (Jennings 
and Magrath, 2009). It can render the science more holistic, perceiving the multiple 
drivers of vulnerability and change, of which global warming is but one (Veitayaki 
and Holland, this volume).
A variety of theoretical resources in anthropology and the wider social sciences 
and humanities lay a solid foundation for understanding climate science reception. 
Any ethnographically sensitive discipline would see the “receivers” of discourses 
not as empty vessels to be filled, but creative agents who reconstruct and reinterpret 
the message as they receive it (Rudiak-Gould, 2011). Climate change is, among other 
things, a discourse of risk in the anthropological formulation of Mary Douglas (1992) 
and colleagues (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Verweij et al, 2006) which suggests 
that individuals and societies will select and respond to risks in such a way that key 
ideological commitments are upheld. Those pressing for radical change will find 
apocalyptic risks credible and seek radical solutions to them; those defending the 
status quo will downplay risks and advocate, at most, conservative responses to them. 
Sometimes a discourse seems so threatening that the response is to disavow it entirely; 
in the Pacific this often takes the form of dismissing the idea of climate change on the 
grounds that God promised Noah never to flood the earth again, an argument that 
people in Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands make, and probably elsewhere 
as well.
In the process of ideologically domesticating climate change, some parts of the 
scientific and media discourses are discarded, ignored, or forgotten; other, novel 
parts are grafted on; and the result is a new understanding of the issue, different 
from any other understanding but still recognizably a discourse in the climate 
change genre (Rubow, this volume). Though scientists often feel that inaccuracies 
are introduced in the process—and they are probably right—the net result is not so 
much bastardization or adulteration as it is reinterpretation. The scientific discourse 
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of climate change by itself hardly engages people—it is too geographically disparate, 
too technically esoteric, too invisible in its mechanism, too value-free, too focused on 
global climate and not focused enough on local weather (Jasanoff, 2005): “climate is 
recorded, weather experienced” (Ingold and Kurttila, 2000: 187). By refashioning the 
idea of climate change, islanders make it engageable and actionable (Veitayaki and 
Holland, this volume).
This is a particularly Pacific brand of a more general process occurring in societies 
nearly everywhere, where climate change discourses are being “appropriated in 
support of a wide range of ideological projects” (Hulme 2009: xxviii).5 None of this 
requires scientific dishonesty or denial, for the science of climate change is such 
an enormous text that “those holding different value perspectives may see in the 
huge and diverse body of scientiﬁc information relevant to climate change different 
facts, theories, and hypothesis relevant to and consistent with their own normative 
frameworks” (Sarewitz, 2004: 389), and thus remake it in their image. This volume 
aims to explore this process in a particular region of the world.
A wide body of scholarship on the Pacific Islands by anthropologists, historians, 
geographers, and others lays the ethnographic foundation for this volume. The 
reception of climate change is a process not quite like any other that has previously 
occurred, but many aspects of it are reminiscent of previous knowledge encounters 
in Oceania, and research on those historical precedents sheds a great deal of light on 
the current situation of climate change communication. Pacific Islanders have many 
times before been told that their well-being is better understood by foreign experts 
than by themselves, creating feelings of scientific scepticism as well as reluctant 
dependence; a prime example comes from nuclear testing (e.g. Dibblin, 1988). Pacific 
Islanders have been told many times before that their homelands are tiny, remote, 
and inherently vulnerable; this is not an invention of the climate change era, but a 
longstanding colonial trope that has merely been reinvented and reinvigorated in 
today’s environmental narratives (Barnett and Campbell, 2010; Farbotko, 2005, 2010; 
Hau’ofa, 1993). It is essential also to consider previous work on Pacific Islanders’ 
practical, social, and spiritual attachment to land (Campbell, 2010), now a key 
influence on their approaches to climate change (see Newell, Hermann and Kempf, 
Struck-Garbe, Nolet this volume), as well as pre-existing discourses of decline and 
progress, decaying culture and increasing sin, missionary salvation and virtuous 
modernization (Tomlinson, 2004; Rudiak-Gould, 2010), which are now being used 
to understood climate change (Newell, Nolet, this volume; Rudiak-Gould, 2012b). We 
must also take guidance from previous scholarly documentation of islanders’ great 
5 “Our discordant conversations about climate change reveal…all that makes for diversity, creativity 
and conflict within the human story—our different attitudes to risk, technology and well-being; our 
different ethical, ideological and political beliefs; our different interpretations of the past and our 
competing visions of the future” (Hulme 2009: xvi).
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environmental knowledge, gained through gardening, fishing, sailing, and sheer 
curiosity, now undergoing processes of both decay and invigoration (Johannes, 2002), 
both of them partly as a result of climate change.
This volume is the result of a session entitled “Appropriating Climate Change: 
Pacific Reception of a Scientific Prophecy” at the European Society for Oceanists 
2012 conference in Bergen, Norway. The contributors include both Pacific Islanders 
and Westerners, from a variety of academic and professional backgrounds, reporting 
from urban and rural communities in Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Cook Islands, 
Samoa, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea, as well as the halls of the United Nations. Two 
presentations at the session, by Mark Stege, and by Hans Thurlstrup and Jennifer 
Rubis, are not included in this volume, but provided important illustrations and 
provocations. Stege discussed Climate Education Week, an outreach program held in 
the capital of the Marshall Islands, which communicated discourses of climate change 
and saw students planting the ocean shore of their school with native plant species 
traditionally used to protect against salt spray, wind damage, and erosion, thus 
“planting resilience.” Stege made clear that it would be misleading to see this purely 
as a “climate change adaptation” or “climate change outreach” program. Thurlstrup 
and Rubis discussed the enormous value of indigenous ecological knowledge 
and traditional techniques for climate change adaptation through the UNESCO-
coordinated Climate Frontlines initiative (see UNESCO, 2012), and demonstrated 
that Pacific Islanders can quite easily take up climate change discourses: while the 
greenhouse effect is new, changes in climate and the necessity of responding to them 
are certainly not, and in that sense, climate change hardly needs to be appropriated at 
all, as its central premises are already built into indigenous cosmologies.
1.3  Pacific Climate Cultures
Elfriede Hermann and Wolfgang Kempf’s chapter takes us to Kiribati, where scientific 
narratives of “climate change” have been received not only by government officials 
but by locals of many walks of life and levels of formal education. These “prophecies” 
of sea level rise and other existential threats to the country are understand to have 
power in themselves—“the power of anticipation,” as the authors put it—to create 
despair and inaction as well as hope and engagement. While noting that I-Kiribati 
respond to climate change with diverse attitudes ranging from scepticism to intense 
concern, Hermann and Kempf focus on the way in which locals have managed to 
appropriate the discourses in empowering ways through song. Traditionally, I-Kiribati 
songs are used to declare intentions and to make binding promises: prophecies in 
themselves that help to shape the future rather than merely anticipate it. More recent 
musical compositions exercise their power through the evocation of emotions—vis-à-
vis climate change, the dominant emotions are love, fear, and sadness. Hermann and 
Kempf analyse a particular song, “Koburake!” which was written before discourses 
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of global warming and sea level rise were in wide circulation, yet remarkably 
contains a prophetic reference to the I-Kiribati homeland disappearing under the 
ocean. The song, both in its original intended postcolonial meaning and its newer 
reinterpretation as a song of climate change, illustrates the confluence of agency and 
disempowerment that discourses of climate change foster: a sense of powerlessness 
in the face of a global process that no one country can stop, combined with a call to 
arms for airing islanders’ plight to the world.
Cecilie Rubow shows how Cook Islanders came to understand a series of damaging 
cyclones as “impacts of climate change.” Rubow uses cyclones ethnographically to 
examine the discursive appropriation of climate change by Cook Islanders, and also 
more generally to symbolize our postmodern condition, in which nature and culture 
are messily hybridized, categories become tangled and ambiguous, and global 
processes refract in innumerable locally specific ways. She emphasizes the diversity 
of local responses to climatic hazards and discourses, which include dismissal as 
well as opportunistic embrace, excitement as well as fear, and which are expressed 
in religious, scientific, and political registers. At the same time, her case study 
demonstrates how a particular discourse—that of climate change—bundles together 
numerous processes into a single super-category. In the Cook Islands, issues as 
disparate and multiclausal as invasive species, damage to coastal infrastructure, and 
water pollution are being recast as sub-issues under the climate change umbrella. 
While climate change impacts rip apart, climate change discourses tie together.
Maria Louise Bønnelykke Robertson’s case study from Kiribati approaches 
climate change through the lens of predictability and unpredictability. For many 
Westerners, anthropogenic tampering in the climate system raises the fear that the 
weather will no longer be stable and knowable, while also raising the hope that 
with improved forecasting and modelling the weather will become more knowable 
than ever (and, through geo-engineering, perhaps controllable as well). But, writes 
Robertson, Pacific Islanders rarely conceive such hopes or fears when they hear of 
anthropogenic climate change, because they have always understood the climate 
as partly predictable, partly unpredictable; climate change is no surprise at all. 
Robertson draws a detailed portrait of the I-Kiribati navigator Teueroa, who dismisses 
scientific narratives of climate change despite her close observation of a changing, 
dynamic local environment. Media discourses of climate change sometimes imply 
not only that the climate is changing but that the fact that the climate is changing 
constitutes a change from the (stable) past; Teueroa rejects this reasoning. Robertson’s 
study demonstrates that local acceptance and rejection of climate science does not 
hinge entirely on the first-hand observation of confirmatory local changes, but on an 
exegesis of the moral and ontological underpinnings of Western notions of nature and 
the decision to accept or reject those underpinnings.
Emilie Nolet explores the reception of the 2012 floods in Nadi, Fiji, and surrounding 
villages, showing how differing causal interpretations of the disaster are linked 
to differing political commitments and policy preferences. National government 
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and media have predominantly attributed the floods to “climate change,” with the 
implication that the hazard will intensify in the future and therefore relocation of 
poorly-positioned settlements will become necessary. Other voices have pointed the 
finger at local development activities, including the impacts of intensive tourism, 
suggesting very different policy outcomes. Still other Fijians interpret the floods as 
a divine sign of coming Judgment Day, meaning that the best response is fatalistic 
resignation; or as God’s punishment of indigenous Fijians for their imitation of 
Western ways, implying that the best response is to reclaim traditional lifeways and 
to oppose political leaders who weaken the authority of indigenous Fijian chiefs. The 
conversation on climate change is thus also a conversation on culture, development, 
power, rights, and ethnicity. As Cultural Theory would predict, the idea of climate 
change is being used to justify and push forward political preferences.
John Connell takes a critical look at the media and activist application of climate 
change discourse to the Carteret Islands, on the fringes of Papua New Guinea. Causes 
of environmental change on this atoll include not only climate change-induced 
sea level rise but also tectonic change and the local construction of seawalls and 
removal of mangroves. Carteret Islanders’ response has been a complex series of 
migrations to and from nearby Bougainville Island, driven not only by environmental 
threats on their home atoll but also by economic considerations, negotiations with 
landowners on Bougainville, and Bougainville’s civil war. This complex story, 
writes Connell, has been collapsed by journalists, filmmakers, and NGOs into a 
simple story of climate change-induced exile; they have appropriated the Carteret 
Islands as proof of, and an emblem of, climate change. Some sources even report, 
very much erroneously, that the islands have already been entirely evacuated and 
scientists had predicted the complete submersion of the islands by 2015. However, 
in an intriguing twist to Connell’s account, some Carteret Islanders themselves 
have embraced this simplistic and misleading narrative: they have performed the 
role of “climate change refugee” and played into Western assumptions of needy 
noble savages in order to obtain assistance for a relocation that they were planning 
anyway. As Connell writes, they have turned the problematic narrative of “climate 
change exile” into a weapon of the weak.
Jennifer Newell’s chapter notes the relatively high awareness of climate change 
discourses in Samoa, to the point that some Samoans feel oversaturated with the 
message. According to Newell, this stems not from Samoa’s vulnerability to climate 
change impacts but from its positioning as the Pacific region’s hub for administering 
climate change-related funding. This opens the door to cynical manipulation 
of the climate change aid game, in which damages from local development are 
opportunistically recast as “climate change impacts,” thus absolving local developers 
and leaders. It also opens the door to a productive discussion on continuity and 
change, on which aspects of Samoan tradition should be maintained and which 
should be adapted or abandoned in order to navigate a changing world. Communal 
care, what a social scientist might call “social capital,” is considered favourable for 
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climate change adaptation. But other Samoan traditional practices are ambiguous. 
Are open-walled Samoan house structures an asset during extreme weather, or a 
liability? Does ancestral attachment to land foster environmental stewardship or 
simply prevent people from seeing the need to relocate inland? Newell’s case study 
shows that climate science does not enter a vacuum: it is taken up into a complex field 
of pre-existing debates, shaping them as it is shaped by them.
Marion Struck-Garbe explores Papua New Guinea artists’ use of visual media to 
depict, make sense of, and to challenge, climate change. Their works have addressed 
the threat of land loss (and the cultural losses that are seen to stem from it) on low-
lying communities; coral bleaching and the resulting decline in marine resources 
for shoreline communities; and deforestation (a cause of climate change, not merely 
a consequence of it) by industrial logging. It is abundantly clear that these artists 
are responding not only to local climatic changes, but also to media stereotypes and 
scientific discourses of climate change: depictions of the Carteret Islands must owe 
part of their inspiration to the media narrative that John Connell’s chapter explores, 
and artwork that is intended as a protest against the greenhouse gas emissions 
of industrial nations clearly builds on scientific and media accounts of global 
anthropogenic climate change.
Joeli Veitayaki and Elisabeth Holland’s chapter draws on their experience with 
facilitating resource management planning by means of a home-grown sustainable 
development community programme on Gau Island, Fiji. As such, their contribution 
also voices a wide-spread in-between space precisely where local peoples are 
mediating and portraying vernacular concerns in the lingua franca of scientific 
terminology, and through modernist policy document and funding cultures—an 
important interface that can entail eclipsing indigenous terms and disguising the 
“bottom-up” character of initiatives (Crook 2007b). For example, Veitayaki and 
Holland show that Pacific Islanders can respond proactively and positively to climate 
change forecasts, but only if communicated properly: the forecasts must be made 
to speak to existing local concerns and to acknowledge the many other drivers of 
change. According to Veitayaki and Holland, the English phrase “climate change” or 
a vernacular translation should not even be used in the initial phases of the project; it 
should be introduced later, once the community has already shown interest in drafting 
a community resource management plan. The value of the phrase “climate change,” 
suggest the authors, is its potential to help secure funding and to communicate local 
resource management plans in a way that outsiders can relate to. The Lomani Gau 
project, as it is called, does not attempt a clumsy separation of “climate change” 
issues from “environmental” issues more generally or from “economic” issues; all are 
integrated. Veitayaki and Holland reject the assumption that tradition is a panacea 
for climate change adaptation. On Gau, the customary exclusion of women and youth 
from formal decision-making bodies is detrimental to climate change adaptation. On 
the other hand, the tabu system by which traditional leaders may declare particular 
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resources off-limits is of great value for conserving particularly important resources 
and for encouraging compliance without outright enforcement.
Nalau Bingeding critically examines the response of Papua New Guinea, 
especially its government officials, to discourses of climate change. Bingeding’s 
central argument is that the country’s climate change agenda is externally driven, 
beholden to the requirements of donor organizations rather than citizens. The 
result, writes Bingeding, is that while numerous government programs are branded 
as “adaptation” or “mitigation,” little if any benefit has been seen on the ground. 
Adaptation is pursued piecemeal, without coordination, or ignored entirely; the 
destruction of the country’s carbon sinks—its forests—continues despite promises to 
curtail commercial logging; delegates are sent without any clear agenda to UNFCCC 
summits; REDD is pursued without adequately addressing the issue of green 
grabbing; and enormous potential for renewable energy development is recognized 
but not acted upon. Bingeding’s case study is a sobering reminder that the embrace 
of climate change discourses is a far cry from a real conviction to reduce vulnerability 
and culpability. Climate science is a tool that can be used in many ways, as both a 
weapon of the weak and an act of symbolic violence by the powerful.
Elfriede Hermann, Wolfgang Kempf
2  “Prophecy from the Past”: Climate Change 
Discourse, Song Culture and Emotions in Kiribati
2.1  Introduction
Pacific Islanders frequently perceive discourses about climate change and what 
this is going to mean for the Pacific region as imbued with power—especially when 
statements to that effect involve projections into the future. They clothe their responses 
to such discourses in various expressive forms. This holds too, in fact especially, for 
the inhabitants of the State of Kiribati, which is situated in the Central Pacific and 
often referred to as an atoll state—since the overwhelming majority of its islands are 
made up of low-lying atolls or reef islands. In the course of contesting the diverse 
formations of statements about climate change and its consequences for Kiribati, the 
inhabitants of these islands—the I-Kiribati—have come up with discourses of their 
own that are accompanied by emotions; some of these discourses find expression 
in the lyrics of newly composed songs or in contemporary interpretations of the 
poetry of old songs. In light of these responses, we argue that songs and emotions 
represent modes of agency vis-à-vis climate change discourses in and about the 
Pacific atoll state of Kiribati. Songs in Kiribati culture are instruments for exercising 
power, which is why we now find them implicated in contexts of local debate over 
climate change. Their agency is especially strong when they evoke emotions able to 
mobilize audiences. In this context, songs and emotions help to manage a feeling of 
powerlessness, transforming this into an ability to induce change. In order to illustrate 
this cultural understanding, we examine a song text of outstanding interest, one long 
known but now reinterpreted to articulate such emotional discourses on coping with 
climate change. The efficacy of this song, linked as it is to emotions, stems from the 
fact that local discourse ascribes to the song a potential for anticipation—making it, 
from one I-Kiribati perspective, a “prophecy from the past.”
Discourses circulating in Kiribati about climate change as an ongoing physical 
process derive partly from external and partly from internal sources. The external 
discourses have reached Kiribati, more often than not, via visiting representatives 
of other states, internationally sponsored projects initiated by Kiribati’s government, 
foreign scientific bodies, international NGOs, internationally networked churches, 
foreign media as well as experts and private individuals who bring to Kiribati relevant 
knowledge from their travels. The internal discourses, which have resulted from 
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taking over the external ones, are mainly circulated by Kiribati government officials, 
national politicians and committees, members of local churches6 and NGOs, Kiribati 
film production and radio, newspapers published on the main atoll Tarawa, local 
experts, teachers, travellers, and anybody with a particular interest in the topic. 
These diverse discourses usually point to the availability of scientific knowledge 
on climate change on the international level; yet discourses of this kind offer 
information of variable complexity on global warming and its projected implications 
for Kiribati. The more nuanced discourses state that diverse scenarios of climate 
change impacts do exist. Chiefly cited among the projected consequences is a rising 
sea level, but other outcomes are also canvassed—such as an increase in the annual 
mean air temperature and a greater incidence of extreme weather events, with grave 
implications for available drinking water. The government of Kiribati, headed by 
President Anote Tong, has decided—within the framework of the internationally 
financed Kiribati Adaptation Program (KAP), phase I of which began in 2003—to 
launch a cautious initiative, the aim being to communicate an objective perspective 
on these possible consequences and to champion adaptation as a realistic option. 
The less detailed discourses are, however, predicated on dramatic developments as 
real as they are inevitable and unstoppable. They dwell chiefly on the existential 
threat facing Kiribati—a rising ocean that causes more and more land to be flooded. 
Since all these climate change discourses are ultimately based on findings by natural 
sciences considered to be objective and authoritative and legitimized by international 
and national policies, these discourses have taken on a hegemonic status, demanding 
consensus.
Since these external discourses of climate change first reached Kiribati via the 
English language, it happened that the term “climate change” was taken over into 
the vernacular. In the course of the Kiribati Adaptation Program, this and other 
related concepts were then translated into that same vernacular—thus “climate 
change” became bibitakin kanoan boong, which is literally rendered as “change of 
contents of days.” This neologism itself needed further explanation, if the Islanders 
were to make any sense of it. “Sea level rise” became rikiraken iabutin tari (literally: 
“increase of high tides of the sea/rising of the sea”).7 When the people of Kiribati, 
the I-Kiribati, encounter the content of such discourses, they interact with them 
differentially, processing them and interlacing them with their own commentaries. 
In the early years of climate change discourses, when these first began to circulate, 
a number of Islanders contested such discourses, citing environmental, religious, 
political or cultural counterarguments (cf. Teuatabo, 2002; Kuruppu and Liverman, 
6 On the role of Pacific Christian churches in connection with climate change, see Kempf (2012).
7 See Rudiak-Gould (2012a: 46-7) on the fact that translating climate change vocabulary necessarily 
involves a shift of meanings and has implications for local perceptions of a threat in the Marshall 
Islands.
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2011). Those who did accept the primary message of anticipated sea level rise, were 
greatly worried as a result and voiced fears for an uncertain future (cf. Kaiteie and 
Hogan, 2008: 17; Kempf and Hermann, 2014: 197, 201, 203). Yet many of the latter could 
not bring themselves to accept the contention, found in less differentiated climate 
change discourses, that Kiribati’s very existence was in doubt. Often the I-Kiribati 
discern, in the one or other kind of climate change discourse, claims to knowledge 
that seem to them laden with power, and that in two respects: first, because it is 
knowledge about powerful and threatening consequences flowing from climate 
change; and second, because it is knowledge about the future. In view of the claims 
to truth conveyed by these diverse discourses, but also in view of the changes that 
I-Kiribati have observed and interpreted in the context of climate change discourses, 
a sense of powerlessness is now evident among them (cf. MacKenzie, 2004: 4).
Several recent studies examining the reception by local populations of discourses 
about present-day climate change have drawn attention to the factors of power and 
knowledge. Thus, Barnett and Campbell (2010: 2) have shown that a chief effect of 
the dominant discourse about climate change and Pacific island states consists in 
generally denying agency to local actors. Accordingly, they combine their critique 
of the hegemonic construction of this discursive formation with a plea for more 
attention to be paid to what the people of the Pacific region actually think, say and 
do (their problem awareness, their knowledge and value systems, the solutions they 
propose). While a number of anthropological studies have drawn attention to diverse 
forms of knowledge in local populations and how these are related to climate change 
(see Lazrus, 2012: 290-5), a general consensus exists that more research into the 
matter is needed. If we too, in this present study, embrace the maxim of focusing 
on the culturally specific discourses and practices of the Pacific Islanders, it is in 
order to analyse the potentials these possess for knowledge and power when dealing 
with discourses on and ramifications of climate change. Addressing the as yet little-
noted thematic fields of songs and emotions holds the promise of considerable 
analytic gains. For purposes of examining songs, our operative assumption is that 
they are constituted by culture-specific discourses and are interpreted in context-
specific fields of power and knowledge. And in our approach to emotions, we pay 
close attention to how these are articulated, not only in “emotional discources” and 
“discourses on emotion” (Abu-Lughod and Lutz, 1990) but also in an “embodied” form 
and even in practices. In any case, we shall be considering the practice of social actors 
and their specific agency. In adopting such an analytic perspective, we are backing 
up, we would claim, other anthropological studies dealing with climate change that 
have called for no less (e.g. Hastrup. 2009: 20, 28; Lazrus 2009, 2012). The concept 
of agency deployed in this analysis was originally developed by Sherry Ortner (1999: 
146-7; 2006: 129-53). Ortner insisted that what actors do and bring about through their 
acts has to be seen in a field of postcolonial power relations and in a field of cultural 
meanings. This approach asks us to consider the subjective meanings, as perceived 
by the actors themselves, i.e. to what extent their acts are intended (or authorized) 
24   “Prophecy from the Past”: Climate Change Discourse, Song Culture 
and to what extent these acts can be effectively unfolded. From this perspective, we 
wish to point out that the inhabitants of Kiribati‘s islands use songs and emotions to 
articulate cultural knowledge that has significant potential for agency.
In order to illustrate facets of agency, as unfolded by I-Kiribati, we will present 
one of those songs that come with a long pedigree attached, but are now being recast 
as commentaries on the projected consequences of climate change and sea level rise.8 
This particular song was composed by Tom Toakai and is known to many I-Kiribati 
under the name of “Koburake!” “Koburake!” can be translated as “Rise up!” In this 
imperative, we may see something of a counter movement, opposing the scenario of 
inundation and disappearance that is frequently invoked by those climate change 
discourses that are externally derived and rather less differentiated.
2.2  Song Culture in Kiribati
If our interest is chiefly drawn to songs, it is because we construe them as being poetic 
concretions of local discourses. We are thereby acknowledging that songs and dances, 
but also dramatic pieces, play a significant role in contemporary Kiribati culture. 
The contemporary practice of creating songs and dances is approached in two ways, 
which, despite being clearly different, do exhibit basic reciprocities. Essentially, 
these two approaches are different ways of responding to whether the I-Kiribati, in 
creating their songs and dances, can invoke culturally specific power-knowledge 
or not. Thus we can distinguish two categories of songs: the first are those many 
songs composed using ritual power-knowledge of a kind only available to selected 
experts. Composers with such access, who in Kiribati represent different, often 
competing schools, are usually referred to as te tia kainikamaen. The word tia means 
“performer”; te kai is “the stick” or “the twig”; and kamaen means the domain of 
ritual composition (cf. Lawson, 1989: 183). What these ritual experts share is that they 
need to complete a specific training, which will then let them enlist the help of spirits 
in composing songs, arranging dances, even healing sicknesses (see Bataua, 1985: 
126; Hughes, 1957; Kempf, 2003; Kirion, 1985: 48-51; Lawson, 1989: 185, 264ff). All of 
these things—the training, the handed-down kainikamaen knowledge, the necessary 
ritual practices of the experts—are nonetheless, in present-day Kiribati, exposed to an 
ongoing process of change, from which highly differential degrees of specialization, 
practices, convictions, and representations result (see Lawson, 1989). The important 
point is that the efficacy of these ritually composed songs, i.e. the words used in them, 
are based on a concept of stipulating and projecting goals—goals to be achieved in 
the future. The specific and powerful poetics of the songs contributes, according to 
8 W. Kempf, ‘Climate Change and the Culture of Song in Kiribati’. Paper presented in the session ‘Cli-
mate Change in Pacific Island Communities’, ASAO-Conference, Honolulu, Hawai‘i, February 2011.
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the composers, to enabling the convictions, viewpoints and goals enunciated in the 
songs to be implemented and actualized in future. It is this ritually empowered form 
of anticipation via songs that is of relevance for the account we offer below.
“Koburake!” to which we will turn in this contribution, belongs to the second 
category of songs—those composed without the aid of ritual power-knowledge. That 
this is so is mainly because Tom Toakai, the song’s composer, cannot reconcile the use 
of kainikamaen knowledge with his duties as pastor of the Kiribati Protestant Church 
(KPC). Instead, he can, and does, draw on the musical training he has received within 
the western tradition (especially notation and harmonics)—as is, indeed, customary 
within the Protestant Church of the land. “Koburake!” advanced over several decades 
from humble beginnings in a single church choir to become an integral part of the 
national song repertoire in Kiribati. Its recent linkage with climate change and sea 
level rise not only underlines its enduring popularity, but also paradoxically stresses 
what in its agency is primarily associated with ritual power-knowledge, namely the 
power of anticipation. We are inclined to the view that it is the context of the specific 
song culture in Kiribati that ultimately renders this articulation possible, thinkable, 
and plausible. Precisely the cultural knowledge possessed by the I-Kiribati about the 
power of songs is what lends “Koburake!” the anticipatory potential needed if Kiribati 
as a Christian nation is to rise up above the rising seas.
Before presenting this song, we wish to point out that songs in Kiribati are 
frequently, indeed typically, linked to emotions. The lyrics either contain direct 
emotive concepts—these can be expressed in the form of nouns, adjectives or verbs—
or they evoke emotions in the singers and the audience. The latter is the case with 
“Koburake!” and this will now be the object of close scrutiny. Therefore, the next step 
is to review those emotions that are especially significant in the context of climate 
change discourses.
2.3  Emotions in the Face of Climate Change Discourse in Kiribati
Emotions play an important role in Kiribati Islanders’ reactions to news about climate 
change and its projected consequences.9 Among the emotions articulated in such 
contexts, those which we gloss as “love,” “worry,” “fear,” “sadness” and “pity” occur 
fairly frequently, while “anger” and “indignation” are shown rather more rarely. 
The frequently expressed emotions of love, worry, fear and sadness refer not only to 
the people but also—often, not always—to the land on which they live. The land, in 
the cultural logic of the I-Kiribati, is no less properly addressed in emotional terms 
9 E. Hermann, “Emotions and Belonging vis-à-vis News of Climate Change.” Paper presented in 
the session “Climate Change in Pacific Island Communities,” ASAO-Conference, Honolulu, Hawai‘i, 
February 2011.
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than the people are, since these two ideas are linked conceptually and even seen as 
twin aspects of an indissoluble, ideal unity. This nexus finds memorable expression 
in the vernacular term te aba, which carries the double meaning of “land/people.” 
Even when one of these meanings preponderates, the other is never entirely absent, 
operating as it were in the background. One emotion that does stand out in discourses 
on climate change is the love that is felt for land and people. The vernacular term in 
question is te tangira, which signifies, at once, liking and wanting. Expressing love of 
one’s land (and people) attests to the existence of close ties with it—no matter whether 
it is land belonging to a particular family, or the island on which one lives, or the State 
of Kiribati itself. Statements of worry (raraoma) and fear (maku) express the fact that 
both land and people are seen as facing a looming menace. When the I-Kiribati react 
to worst-case scenarios of inundation by voicing sadness for the land and those on 
it, they do so because they feel attached to both. The vernacular term for sadness is 
nanokawaki, which refers to nano or “heart/feelings/thoughts” giving rise to sorrow 
and affliction. When speculating about what climate change will do to their islands, 
the I-Kiribati voice a further emotion that is affiliated with nano: nanoanga, which, 
translated literally, means “giving heart/feelings/thoughts” but can also be rendered 
as “putting oneself in the position of others,” or, more simply, feeling “pity/empathy” 
(Hermann, 2011). Often it can be heard that this pity is felt in equal measure for people 
and land. But the I-Kiribati are insistent that they should not be the only ones to feel 
this emotion; they call on other nations to show empathy too.
All these emotions are far more than mere descriptions of inner states: they are 
meaningful articulations within the relationships the Islanders maintain with each 
other and with their land, but also—indeed especially—with those they maintain with 
people from the outside world. For this reason, expressions of emotions are to be seen 
as practices that are often articulated with a will to act or, alternatively, with a call 
on others to act. It is in this capacity that emotions can unfold agency (Hermann, 
2004). In the process of interacting with external and internal discourses on the 
consequences of climate change and sea level rise, emotions have the potential to 
propel the Islanders to act and also to bolster their social resilience.10
2.4  The Song “Koburake!”
The particular song we single out in this paper has exemplary value; it will shed light 
on the general potential songs have for expressing knowledge and power (cf. Kempf, 
2011). This song features prominently in a recent documentary film. This film was 
produced by a Kiribati-based video company and NGO called Nei Tabera Ni Kai (2010). 
It tells the story of a side event held at the climate change conference in Copenhagen 
10 Hermann, “Emotions and Belonging.”
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(COP 15) in 2009 and organized by a government delegation from Kiribati. The 
event’s declared goal was to alert the international community to the specific ways 
in which this atoll state was at risk from global warming. Part of the documentary 
shows members of the delegation summarizing where Kiribati’s government stands 
on this issue; there is also a video clip of then President Anote Tong explaining his 
own position; and we are treated to scientists presenting various computer scenarios 
of the possible flooding of South Tarawa, the aim being to paint risks and outcomes 
that this most densely populated part of the island state will have to confront over the 
next century.
The last third of the film foregrounds representative segments of Kiribati culture. 
First, we watch a female dancer perform at the side event in Copenhagen that we 
referred to; then the film takes a mythical and poetic twist with the announcement of 
the “Song of the Frigate Bird.” This song is the corner piece of the film’s next section, 
lasting some five minutes, in which the metaphorical language is rather different 
from anything preceding it. The clip begins with two sunset scenes, giving way to a 
shot of a frigate bird in flight and multiple vistas of seemingly endless open sea. A 
background commentary suggests a link between the song and the likely implications 
of climate change for Kiribati: 
Ladies and Gentlemen. Kam na bene ni mauri and greetings. The frigate is one of our key national 
icons, the national bird of Kiribati. The song we will hear was written in 1978, many years before 
we knew anything about global warming, climate change and sea level rise. The story tells of a 
bird flying the ocean in search of food for its young. On her return she finds that her homeland 
has disappeared beneath the waves. This prophecy from the past reminds us of the uncertain 
future we face as a country and as a people. We are pleased to present the youth of Kiribati and 
the song of the frigate.
Then the song comes in. It is sung by a clear female voice in the Kiribati language. 
During it we watch a tracking shot of a frigate bird superimposed on an open seascape. 
These surreal sequences transport viewers into a dreamtime—or is it a vision of the 
future? Subtitles in English are given below: 
I a ukoukora mwengau I am searching for my home
ma n tiriwetea arana - Kiribati I call you by name—Kiribati
Ko mena ia? Where are you?
Ongo banan au anene hear my call—hear my song
Akea raou ae na buokai I have no-one to help me
A katukai boong ririki I have been alone for so long
Koburake! Koburake! Rise up! 
Ngkoe ae tunarin aonaba You the centre of the world
Routiko rake—routiko rake mai marawa rise up rise from the depths of the sea 
Ba a na nooriko ake amena i keraroa so you may be seen from afar
Koburake! Koburake! Rise up! Rise up!
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This song evokes a land that has vanished beneath the waves; an entire nation, 
symbolized by the frigate bird, is searching for its lost homeland. This motif is 
accompanied by a call to soar upward, to rise up, so that the land can once again 
be seen from a distance. Then, as the song is repeated, this time in a slightly altered 
version, the singer, a young Kiribati woman, appears on screen wearing a traditional 
dancing costume. Next, we watch typical scenes of Kiribati’s land, people and culture, 
intended to underscore the uniqueness of this nation; also interspersed (in the form 
of a montage) are images of inundations, drawing attention to the acute dangers now 
facing this highly specific culture and way of life. The song is now sung by multiple 
voices. Subtitles are dispensed with this time. In the following, we reproduce and 
translate the text of the song as performed: 
I a ukoukora mwengau I am searching for my home
ma n tiriwetea arana - Kiribati I call you by name—Kiribati
Ko mena ia? Where are you?
Ongo banan au anene hear my call—hear my song
Akea raou ae na buokai I have no-one to help me
A katukai boong ririki I have been alone for so long
Akea raou ae na buokai I have no-one to help me
A katukai boong ririki I have been alone for so long
Koburake! Koburake! Rise up! Rise up!
Ngkoe ae tunarin aonaba you the centre of the world
Routiko rake—routiko rake mai marawa rise up rise from the depths of the sea
Ba a na nooriko ake amena i keraroa so you may be seen from afar
Koburake! Koburake! Rise up! Rise up!
Koburake! Koburake! Rise up! Rise up!
Ngkoe ae tunarin aonaba you the centre of the world
Routiko rake—routiko rake mai marawa rise up rise from the depths of the sea
Ba a na nooriko ake amena i keraroa so you may be seen from afar
Mwemwerake! Kiribati Be lifted up and up! Kiribati
Mwemwerake! Kiribati Be lifted up and up! Kiribati
Tom Toakai originally composed this song in the late 1970s, at a time when the 
State of Kiribati was moving towards independence from the British colonial 
power. In those days, he was venting his scepticism about the new atoll state’s 
viability. He had composed the original lyrics, which are slightly longer than 
the segment in the film clip, because he was convinced that Kiribati was over 
the long run far too weak and small to survive without securing help from the 
outside. Of significance in this connection is the call “koburake.” As Tom Toakai 
explained to us, the literal meaning of “koburake” is “bubble up.”11 The picture 
he had in mind when composing was that of Kiribati being located at the bottom 
11 Our interviews with Tom Toakai took place on 9 September 2010, 3 October 2011 and 4 October 
2013.
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of the sea—a metaphor for the country’s remoteness. What he meant by using 
the idiomatic expression “koburake” was that Kiribati should rise up to the level 
of other countries in order to make itself known and so secure the help it needs 
from the outside world. In this sense, he affirmed, the term “koburake” may aptly 
be translated as “rise up.” It was this idea that the filmmakers had taken over, 
bringing the song—with the composer’s permission—into line with their own 
objective, which was to draw attention to the urgency of the threat facing Kiribati 
from climate change and sea level rise.12 Without concessions and solidarity from 
the international community, but most of all from the industrial nations, Kiribati’s 
future looks bleak indeed—this is the film’s central message, finding memorable 
expression in this song.
“Koburake!” a.k.a. “The Song of the Frigate Bird” is now known to many I-Kiribati 
as a result of a DVD released by Nei Tabera Ni Kai in 2010. Some in the audience 
recognized the song as one originally composed shortly before the Islanders had 
gained independence; others recognized it as the song that had won first prize in a 
competition between various Pacific states around about the time of the Millennium. 
Many knew the song already from a book about Kiribati songs (Teaero and Tebano, 
2008). To be sure, in the context of internal and external discourses of climate change, 
such recognition inevitably came with a new interpretation attached. Other I-Kiribati 
first encountered the song as part of the repertoire of a certain dance ensemble. Te 
Waa Mai Kiribati had choreographed the song for inclusion in a program on climate 
change that was staged in the United States in 2011.13
2.5  Anticipation and Emotions 
If, in the discursive context of climate change, the song “Koburake!” is so important to 
the I-Kiribati, it is because they are convinced that its words, written back in the late 
seventies of the 20th century, anticipated the future now projected for their homeland. 
In this scenario, their land is being threatened on a massive scale, requiring them to 
draw attention to their plight in the hope of securing help from the outside world. The 
second prong of this scenario is that their survival will depend on Kiribati “be[ing] 
lifted up.” In this articulated statement, they see evidence of anticipatory power. This 
finds expression in Nei Tabera ni Kai’s film (2010), especially in the pointed words 
of the female commentator, who as an I-Kiribati is fully aware of the cultural logic 
12 See the film clip posted by Linda Uaan and John Anderson on YouTube: “Kiribati—The Song of the 
Frigate” http: //www.youtube.com/watch?v=xOcMLWVNIms
13 The tour was part of the project “Water is Rising. Music and Dance Amid Climate Change. Artists 
from the Pacific Atolls of Kiribati, Tokelau and Tuvalu” Director/Producer Judy Mitoma. See: www.
waterisrising.com
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of her compatriots and also—this time in the role of filmmaker—displays a talent 
for summing up their predicament: “This prophecy from the past reminds us of the 
uncertain future we face as a country and as a people.” These words, let us add, are 
spoken in the opening sequence of the film section on the frigate bird. But we found 
that other interlocutors too had, independently of each other, taken to associating 
the song’s poetics with the future. Also, two composers who had been inducted into 
the ritual power-knowledge, acknowledged, in respect of Tom Toakai, that even at 
the time of composition he had been able to foretell the future. Tom Toakai himself 
modestly conceded to us, when we interviewed him, that he was no prophet. He had, 
he said, only expressed at that time what was on his mind. But he conceded that from 
a bird’s eye perspective (ranging widely across space and time) the song can be seen 
“as a prediction of what was to come after independence”.14 In this sense, the song’s 
message is equivalent to a prophecy or mamata (“the power of seeing through to the 
future”).
Emotions evoked by the song confirm the anticipation I-Kiribati discern in its 
lyrics. When the lyrics say “I am searching for my home,” they feel induced, from the 
“I” perspective, to look out for the land of Kiribati. When in a following question they 
are asked about the whereabouts of this land, sadness overtakes them, since they 
have to assume that what is frequently thematised in climate change discourses has 
actually now taken place: the land has been swallowed up by the waves. Many show 
this emotion by facial expression; some even have tears in their eyes, as with one 
interlocutor, who was prompted by this line to the following comment: “I always hear 
on the radio: ‘Kiribati will be no more.’” Others prefer to mention it explicitly, which is 
what a dancer with the Te Waa Mai Kiribati group did in conversation with us, insisting 
that this makes them all sad, or nanokawaki.15 When the words then ring out, “hear 
my call—hear my song, I have no-one to help me,” I-Kiribati interpret this as a cry 
for help coming from their innermost core and appealing to people from other lands 
to show pity, or nanoanga. These outsiders are asked to turn to the Kiribati nation 
with their heart/feelings-thoughts, or nano, i.e. to put themselves in their situation, 
to understand the threat facing the Islanders, and to render all possible assistance. 
That this appeal is genuine was confided to us by no less than the composer himself: 
“Yeah, that’s where our hope is”.16
The verses “Rise up! Rise up! / You the centre of the world / rise up, rise from the 
depths of the sea / So you may be seen from afar” are understood by the I-Kiribati 
as a clear summons to action. But the verses are more than that: they are also words 
of encouragement, or te kaunganano, as various interlocutors assured us. After 
having been moved to sadness, their next reaction is relief. Thus a young I-Kiribati 
14 Interview, 3 October 2011.
15 Ten T., 30 September 2012.
16 Interview with Tom Toakai, 3 October 2011.
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noted: “The last verse is an encouragement to fight against the problem!”.17 The 
encouragement the I-Kiribati draw from these verses confirms that the second half 
of the song is understood to be just as anticipatory as the first. Meaning that if it ever 
happens that the flooding arrives, then it will also be the case that Kiribati will rise up.
Nor is it the case that sadness and an appeal for pity (and encouragement) are the 
only emotions these verses evoke. Whenever I-Kiribati hear this song performed, they 
find other feelings for the land and its people also resonating. If the first questioning 
verses make them sad, this is also because they love their land, their community, and 
their nation, as witness numerous locutions in their everyday talk—and in their songs 
as well. Moreover, their sadness holds yet another dimension: pointing implicitly to 
the worry and fear engendered in them by discourses concerning the looming threat 
of climate change. Both the appeal for outsiders to have pity on Kiribati and the 
encouragement the I-Kiribati derive from a song like “Koburake!” also occur in more 
recent compositions dramatizing climate change, such as songs by Ten B. Rimon from 
the year 2010 and by Ten Nenem from 2009 (see Kempf, 2010).
In the I-Kiribati perspective, this song also evokes emotions among outsiders. 
Thus, it was reported by members of the delegation sent by the government of Kiribati 
to the climate change conference in Copenhagen (COP 15) that audiences watching a 
screening of the sequence of “Koburake!” (a.k.a. “Song of the Frigate Bird”) at a side 
event had been exceptionally moved by the experience. Also, members of the dance 
group Te Waa Mai Kiribati reported a similar reaction in audiences during their tour 
of America in 2011. A dancer who was in a position to know stated: “the audience 
really feel the song”.18 In his account, one woman was even moved to tears. What the 
I-Kiribati conclude from experiences like these is that external audiences do, in fact, 
develop empathy and will come to the aid of the land of Kiribati.
If audiences—I-Kiribati and others—are so moved by “Koburake!” this testifies 
to the song’s power and the emotions it is able to evoke. This assessment was also 
confirmed by a professional composer we consulted. In his view, everything alluded to 
in the song had already come true or else would in the near future. Leading members 
of Te Waa Mai Kiribati also saw the song in much the same light: “It says Kiribati is 
already protected by the ancestors. Kiribati could rise and not be affected by climate 
change”.19 These conclusions therefore reflect the logic of the song culture. If this 
song is able to unfold agency in the context of contemporary discourses of climate 
change, it is because—following the logic of Kiribati song culture—it is vested with 
potential for anticipation.
17 Ten F., 30 September 2012.
18 Ten F., 30 September 2012.
19 Discussion, 30 September 2012.
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2.6  Conclusion
“Koburake!” forms part of a repertoire of songs letting the people of Kiribati engage 
with globally circulating discourses of climate change and sea level rise, doing so 
on their own terms. As is true of other songs, both old and new, that are now being 
interpreted in light of the present debate, this song evokes emotions wrought in the 
same discursive context. The representation of the song “Koburake!” is based on 
acceptance of scientific projections holding out the prospect of massive imperilment 
to Kiribati as a nation due to climate change and sea level rise. What this song does 
is profile itself as an instrument in an official cultural politics, in which the global 
community is called on to act responsibly and treat Kiribati justly as a country and 
nation, respecting its sovereignty and securing its safety.
“Koburake!” well exemplifies how the lyrics of songs are able to evoke emotions, 
articulating, and effectively engaging with emotional discourses on one of the 
burning issues of our time. Songs and emotions alike, we have argued, shed light 
on the spectrum of agency unfolded by the inhabitants of Kiribati in reaction to the 
anticipated risks to land, culture, and society in this atoll state. “Koburake!” along 
with other songs in that vein, supply ample testimony that composers have seized 
the initiative in encouraging their compatriots to act. Kiribati audiences too—so 
much their comments make clear—reflect on their capacities and display a will to 
act. They do not wish to end up mourning their losses. On the contrary, they combine 
encouragement with such emotions as love, worry, and pity for land/people, not to 
say fear at the repeatedly thematicized consequences—and it is these emotions that 
mobilize Islanders to meet the upcoming challenges. Given the encouragement they 
themselves derive from the song of “Koburake!” singers, dancers and other I-Kiribati 
are helping to communicate the message to other nations, hoping the latter will show 
empathy and solidarity. As the local people see it, performing this song to external 
audiences has already been effective in terms of drawing a positive response.
Given that the externally derived discourses on climate change are of a hegemonic 
kind, “Koburake!” and its related emotions are therefore properly seen as counter 
hegemonic. Discursive formations about this song and its emotions express the fact 
that the I-Kiribati are not content to submit passively to such hegemonic discourses; 
they have opted for an active stance instead, mobilizing all available resources to 
strengthen their social resilience. What is abundantly clear is that there has long 
existed in Kiribati a knowledge of how important it will be in future to profile their 
country and to actively built a relationship between it and the outside world. The 
people of this atoll state can now self-assuredly say that a song by a composer in 
their midst had already anticipated what the future was holding in store for them 
and what could be done about it. Faced with external climate change discourses that 
have thrown their full weight behind projecting future developments, they are now 
doing what they can to recapture their future by drawing on powers of indigenous 
anticipation. In this connection, songs and emotions are helping to transform a 
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feeling of powerlessness into a capacity for exerting influence over themselves and 
others in order to bring about change.
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3  Woosh—Cyclones as Culturalnatural Whirls: The 
Receptions of Climate Change in the Cook Islands  
As noted by Mike Hulme, the idea of climate change is now to be found active “across 
the full parade of human endeavours, institutions, practices and stories” (Hulme, 
2009: 322). Hulme stresses that this should not make us think that a homogeneous 
climate change discourse has spread out evenly everywhere; the terrains are rugged, 
we believe in different things, have different concerns, and know different things, and 
moreover, the scientific accounts and projections are continuously changed, adjusted 
and improved. Furthermore, the reception in local communities is, as Rudiak-Gould 
has expressed it, not necessarily “treated as an obvious truth already plainly apparent 
to the senses, but as a prophecy whose truth or falsity cannot be taken for granted” 
(Rudiak-Gould, 2011: 11). 
In line with these observations, this chapter acknowledges that if it has ever been 
possible to understand society and nature as separate domains, then that is clearly 
no longer the case (e.g. Latour 1993). Climate change discourse and changes in the 
environment are continuously socialized and incorporated in social activities and 
human imagination, and the destabilization of known landscapes affects the sense of 
continuity. Thus, climate change is not just an object of study for the hard sciences, it 
is also a concern and a challenge for the humanities and the social sciences. 
This chapter takes us to Rarotonga in the Cook Islands to explore responses to 
both climate changes discourse and first-hand observed changes in local weather 
patterns. First, I dwell on how five cyclones in 2005 became decisive in the Cook 
Islands’ early response to climate change as an observable reality. Secondly, I explore 
how this reception co-articulates with the whirling force and quality of the cyclones 
in order to reach an understanding of wider culturalnatural processes and the more 
recent, and somewhat surprising, changes in the predictions of cyclone activity in the 
South Pacific.
3.1  Stormy Weather
In February and March 2005, the Cook Islands were hit by five cyclones. Developing 
north and east of Samoa, cyclones Meena, Nancy, Olaf, Percy and Rae proceeded 
southeast for several hundred kilometres on a collision course with populated areas 
of the island nation. Cyclone alerts were repeatedly released in the news. Briefs were 
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held, boats removed from the harbours, roofs secured, the preliminary movements 
reported in newspapers and the local radio, the expected wind speeds projected by 
the meteorological officer, and the public reminded of the location of safety centres. 
On Monday, 7 February, the Cook Islands News reported that “Meena misses main 
island” (Moeka’a, 2005a), namely Rarotonga. Nevertheless, in the following days the 
media brought news of extremely high waves, rocks and rubble swept onto streets, 
and widespread damage to buildings and vegetation. In Aitutaki, north of Rarotonga, 
most of the power lines lay on the ground, roads were littered with fallen trees, and 
fresh water had been contaminated. A positive side of the storm was also noted a few 
days later, since it had “cleaned the shoreline leaving sandy beaches clean and bright 
[...] the tourists will love this” (Kurai-Marrie, 2005). More ominously, there were also 
reports of two new low-pressure areas in the north (Moeka’a, 2005b).
Whereas Meena’s track wandered between the islands, the next two cyclones 
made landfall. Nancy and Olaf battered Rarotonga, ripped off roofs, washed small 
houses into the ocean, sent several hundred people to evacuation centres, and 
caused extensive damage to vegetation. It being the wet season—the time of year best 
suited to planting—the Ministry of Agriculture released an advertisement offering 
new seeds for a moderate price to “all the mamas and papas” engaged in home 
gardening (Aperau, 2005). At first Percy was assumed to pose no threat to the Cook 
Islands, but as it intensified, storm warnings were issued across the South Pacific. On 
28 February 2005, Pukapuka and Nassau, northern islands home to more than 600 
inhabitants, were lashed by Percy. Nearly all the houses were flattened, every means 
of communication was cut off, and a state of emergency was declared. Cyclone Rae 
formed closer to Rarotonga than the first four storms, releasing torrential downpours 
totalling 80mm within 24 hours (Greig, 2005). 
The five cyclones caused no casualties, but they left an indelible mark on the 
environment and people of the Cook Islands. Surrounded by the detritus of the 
storms, with the costs of recovery ceaselessly rising, locals began to circulate theories 
about what exactly had happened. Five cyclones, four of them reaching category five 
(the most severe), causing such extensive damage, one after another with little or no 
time for recovery—all of this was highly unusual.
This chapter will explore the ways in which Cook Islanders have made sense of 
the cyclones using the scientific concept of climate change, and, conversely, made 
sense of climate change via the cyclones. Central to this local appropriation of climate 
science is the notion of culturalnatural objects and whirls. Hence, I will show how the 
cyclonic activity in the Cook Islands took on the shape of a particular culturalnatural 
phenomenon. Using the cyclones as a “theory-machine” (Helmreich, 2009) and 
inspired by both Bruno Latour’s (1993: 51-5) conception of hybrids or quasi-objects 
as culturalnatural, real and fabricated, and Annemarie Mol’s “praxiography” (2003: 
31-3), the intention is to explain how the cyclones not only invaded the islands, but 
how they were “enacted,” and thus gained shape and strength in multiple ways. The 
main point is to show how the cyclones are not only something-in-themselves or a 
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pre-existing reality as weather systems, and to investigate how they come into being 
on the sea, at the shoreline and in human lives. The cyclones’ form, size and physical 
nature, of course, make them well suited for a totalizing gaze, and they no doubt look 
awesome on satellite maps as giant rotating cloud systems. On the ground, though, 
when the powerful winds meet particular roofs, boulders, people, and expectations, 
they become heterogeneous events. Thus, a single cyclone may be said to be enacted 
in multiple ways, endlessly many ways, as it becomes a part of lived history in the 
homes, gardens and offices of, in this case, islanders of the South Pacific. In the same 
way, the totalizing, God’s-eye-view discourse of “global climate change” appears 
grand and singular, but when that discourse is transmitted to specific societies and 
individuals, it becomes appropriated, interpreted, and enacted in different ways.
3.2  Climate Change Whirls
In the Cook Islands, among environmental NGOs and at the National Environment 
Service, one particular theory began to gain strength after the five cyclones of 2005. 
Since that time, an environmental officer told me in an interview in 2010, “climate 
change has been all over.” Her statement is confirmed by numerous reports issued 
locally and internationally over the following years. This particular set of cyclones 
quickly turned into a sign of global warming. A 2008 report from the Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations states: 
The Cook Islands has already experienced first-hand the adverse impacts of climate change and 
extreme events. In 2005, the islands were hit by five tropical cyclones within the space of one 
month, an event that has never been experienced in the history of the Cook Islands (FAO, 2008).
In the Cook Islands Second National Communication (NC2) to the United Nation 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2011, the link between 
global climate change and increased cyclone activity is also stressed and linked to 
expectations of future weather patterns: 
There is growing evidence from a range of studies that the early impacts of climate change 
will result from an increase in the frequency, intensity and duration of extreme events such as 
tropical cyclones, floods and storm surges. Wind intensities could increase between 5-10% by 
2050 and precipitation peaks could increase up to 25% (2011: 89).
These conclusions point to a remarkable shift. A decade earlier, in the Initial National 
Communication to the UNFCCC, it was noted that “the Cook Islands has encountered 
a significant increase in the number of tropical cyclones, seasonal around November-
April, over the past decade” (2000: 38). Significantly, however, the higher frequency 
was not linked to global warming, and links between global warming and local 
fluctuations in rainfall and sea level were only very cautiously suggested. Rather, the 
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earlier report stressed that it is “recognised that development and social changes have 
placed pressure on sensitive environmental systems and sectors of the Cook Islands” 
(2000: 5). In other words, local impacts on the environment, such as overharvesting 
and the building of infrastructure, are emphasized, while global climate change is 
accorded only an uncertain and secondary role as a reinforcer in the future: “adverse 
impacts of anticipated changes in climate and sea level rise will further exacerbate the 
stress on these systems if they do eventuate” (2000: 5). NC2 in 2011, on the contrary, 
foregrounds global climatic processes. Now, a decade later, more than twenty socio-
environmental issues had become framed as “climate change vulnerabilities,” 
among them coral bleaching, invasive species, drought, floods, crop diseases, food 
insecurity, coastal erosion, damage to coastal infrastructure, disruption of education 
and social services, and water pollution.
On a general level, the cyclone exegesis resembles the physicists’ account of 
the gathering of a rotating wind system. First, a jumble of random movements 
accumulates gradually. In the beginning the movements are few and small; later they 
may develop into large coherent whirls. To take a familiar example, this is the same as 
what one observes in a cup or in a bathtub. Social interpretations may gain strength in 
the same fashion, I would suggest. Theories, scientific and public, sometimes develop 
into giant rotating, intensifying discursive systems, stretching out in large networks—
not necessarily because they are particularly coherent systems of explanation from 
the outset, but because they become persuasive by the assemblage of many different 
forces, voices and elements. Today, practically every environmental NGO in the Cook 
Islands writes within the idiom of climate change discourse when they seek funding. 
Years ago, land degradation, forestry or gender were steering concepts; now climate 
change forms the forceful discursive framework that summarises and reinforces every 
sort of environmental vulnerability. In that sense, climate change truly is “all over.” 
But our story has a twist: since 2005, against expectations, cyclones have been fewer, 
and the scientific predictions concerning the frequency of future storms have been 
adjusted downwards. I will return to this. 
The point I hope to bring home is that this resemblance between discursive 
formations and waxing/waning weather systems extends further into an 
understanding of the opportunities and problems it poses for Cook Islanders as 
they attempt to navigate a potentially catastrophic future. The whirl-like character 
of the cyclone’s culturalnatural activities embraces something more comprehensive. 
When the cyclones hover over the islands and waters, the perspective that is brought 
to outsiders and insiders through the media is maps of cyclone tracks and satellite 
images of a grand white whirling weather system with the characteristic dark eye in the 
centre. We are thus placed above the atmospheric heat engine circling its way over the 
warm sea where it gains power. In contrast, a local on-the-ground perspective leads 
us to the coasts and hills along the paths of the cyclones that are notoriously difficult 
to predict with the precision desired by coastal authorities and dwellers. Here, the 
turbulence is less ordered, and the course of the wind less stable as it interacts with 
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roofs, people and plants. The noise of the gusts of wind sometimes peaks in shrieks, 
causing both mental horror and physical devastation. But as we shall see, there is also 
a more edifying potential when the winds and water shake the islands up and down. 
3.3  A Double Cyclogenesis
Cyclogenesis is an extremely complex physical process with more factors at play than 
is presently understood (Terry, 2007: 1). Generally, though, cyclones originate when 
warm ocean waters meet colder air temperatures. Given certain favourable wind 
patterns, a powerful cyclone can develop from the condensation and convection of 
water vapour in the unstable and rising tropical air masses, a process first described 
scientifically as a total weather system in the 19th century (Emanuel, 2005: 7). What 
starts as a disorganised area of disturbance may form a low-pressure centre that 
begins spiralling as a result of the Coriolis Effect (caused by the rotation of the Earth). 
This physical weather phenomenon is captured neatly in the satellite images that 
afford us a “global perspective” on the environment. Here we see an example of what 
Tim Ingold has persuasively characterized as a visual, distant, literal, exogenous 
spectacle (2000: 209-18) in whose wake efforts can made to take calculated risks, to 
plan for disasters and issue warnings, to forecast and tally damages, and so forth. 
As valuable as this perspective may be, it is not the only one: there is, Ingold says, a 
complementary approach, the “spherical perspective,” in which the environment is 
experienced from the surface and depths of things, partaking in the natural lifeworld 
by resonating and listening to its cycles and rhythms (Ingol, 2000). There, on the 
ground, when sea and atmosphere evolve into a grand air and water pump, winds 
whip the waves white and force them into powerful cyclical movements that can 
reach 20 meters or more in the open ocean. Sea spray batters vegetation, rips foliage 
off trunks and branches and deposits them like a thick brown plaster on windward 
walls. In the low pressure on the ground, cars, roofs, stones, sand, windows, trees, 
doors and people enter an extreme, shaking state of culturalnatural hybridity in the 
Latourian sense in which humans and things are inextricably connected (1993). It 
may be possible to hold a “modern” or “global” perspective on things on a fine clear 
day, and at a distance to see a cyclone as a discrete weather-object. But when the loud 
howling noises, the invading waters and crushing boulders enter one’s house, the 
hybrid mess of things and humans is impossible to overlook. 
In the Cook Islands a particular description of a cyclone passing Suwarrow Atoll 
stands out as this kind of smashing, clashing heaven-and-earth drama. American 
writer Robert Dean Frisbie, in the autobiographical The Island of Desire (1944), travels 
the northern islands with his four young children. During a stop-over at Anchorage 
Island in Suwarrow in 1942, together with two visitors from a small yacht in a tree-
house measuring six feet by eight, a cyclone passes over the island. Frisbie describes 
“the ungodly roar,” reaching to shrieks, of the “almost supernatural” winds, thick 
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salty rain driving horizontally across the lagoon, a jungle in convulsions, towering 
combers crashing and devouring the land.20 At night, he ties his children to large 
tamanu trees, offers them a splash of rum, and finds himself shifting between dumb 
horror and fascination with the uncanny forces in the inky blackness. With almost no 
belongings left in the morning, “we experienced something there is no name for in 
the vocabulary—a sort of insane exhilaration”: 
For three hours we ceased to live on the familiar Earth; and perhaps that is why I find it so 
difficult to describe the wind, the sea, our own emotions. Vocabularies were built around the 
things of everyday life; this thing belonged to the frenzied life of delirium (Frisbie, 1944).
Nevertheless, the winds did die down. The jungle and several islets had been swept 
away—a ghost island is all there was left—but Frisbie notes that atolls “are living 
islands: it rebuilds the land the sea has destroyed.” The vegetation will spread again, 
and new islets will grow, new sand cays will build up; bush and trees will appear 
again. Cyclones rearrange the environment, tear it down, and build it up too, as they 
deposit tons of sediments.
The atoll island and its tiny population of frigate birds and coconut crabs were 
caught in a whirling and howling cosmos, as two intertwined spirals suspended in 
constantly intensifying movements. After the storm, Frisbie writes, “[w]hen a fern leaf 
springs up from the barren sand we hold a pagan holiday,” giving the sense of horror, 
relief and the unfolding hope, perhaps alluding to the fern as koru—the spiral, which 
according to Anne Salmond is a Maori carving motif often taken to represent the 
unfolding of new life in “double dynamism that moves into and out from the primal 
centre” (Salmond, 1985, cited in Henare, 1999: 52). Taking the meaning of the double 
spiral even further, Salmond locates it at the centre of Maori cosmology, as we may 
say, a double cosmological cyclogenesis: 
Beginning with a burst of energy and thought, the exchanges that generate cosmic elements—
winds, planets, the ocean, animals, plants and people—alternate between gift giving, amity and 
union, and quarrelling, enmity and exclusion, working towards equilibrium—although this is 
always temporary and contingent (Salmond, 2012: 121).
Aside from these perhaps speculative resemblances between spiralling forces and 
states of relative equilibrium, what societies in “normal” state of things try to keep 
in place—cars on the roads, trees rooted in the ground, and boulders placed for 
protection in harbours—is with cyclones dramatically shaken. The force seems 
otherworldly, Frisbie tells us, yet we may note that his lack of words for the extreme 
state of hybridity resemble the silences of the hybridities that are already there. 
20 Frisbie, 1944: [n.p.]. Available at Project Gutenberg Australia: http://gutenberg.net.au/
ebooks01/0100261.txt
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Trees have already been planted, tended, cut down and turned into partly human 
artefacts by processes of production; mangos have taken part in people’s metabolic 
processes and new mango trees in processes of reproduction. Nature and culture 
are continuously dragged, wired and whirled together as composite objects. In that 
sense, every kind of weather is a culturalnatural event, a fact which has become 
obvious in the era of modern global warming discourse. People all over the world 
have always known it in their way, through keen observations and extended 
mythmaking, historically, the Pacific abounds with hybrids. The literature is rich 
in evidence of entities that are both person and animal, spirit and substance, and 
connections between actions and the quality of relations and particular effects on 
the landscape and weather. During cyclones, this truth becomes visible anew: “all 
are shaken” in these cyborg storms. 
3.4  The Cyclones Multiple
Some are, of course, more shaken than others. Where Meena’s main punch was from 
high waves on the north coast of Rarotonga, Nancy struck primarily through strong 
winds. With waves averaging 14 meters, Meena strewed rocks onto the coasts and 
almost completely destroyed some buildings—in the case of a prominent harbour 
front restaurant, only the shell was left standing. The roof of Matavera church on 
Rarotonga, further to the south-east, was less severely damaged, but what Meena 
left unfinished, Nancy completed by lifting off the entire roof (Padgett & Clarke, 
2005; Moeka’a, 2005c). Reports by the news media, at dedicated cyclone webpages, 
and by diverse disaster management organisations, collected in various databases, 
swell with eyewitness accounts.
The socio-economic impact of the cyclones is well documented, and cannot be 
understated. The national economy of this small island state is under severe pressure, 
and personal losses are great. However, as Daniel Defoe long ago remarked in “The 
Storm”—an account of the great storm in England in 1703, to which I will return 
later—the price of tile spiked just afterwards, a fact he noted because of his recent 
bankruptcy which most unfortunately had forced him to give up his share in a tile 
factory. A cyclone is a loss to many, and business for some, and perhaps surprising 
for outsiders—to many plainly an exciting experience. Thus, in the margins of official 
reports, and at the centre of islanders’ personal stories, there are positive accounts of 
the cyclones that point in more favourable, if twisted, directions. 
After Nancy, the Cook Islands News printed a remarkable photograph of boys 
playing in explosive sea waves, with a caption that read: “Foolish children take 
risks with the waves at Avarua harbour” (Moeka’a, 2005, 16 Feb.). In interviews with 
Rarotongans in 2010 and 2011, I was struck by the many perhaps not so foolish, but 
perhaps rather adventurous children dotting the stories of damaged houses, people 
rendered homeless, and hard work. “We always tried to sneak out during storms 
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and cyclones” a woman told me, “we were rafting down the streams on one-off 
rafts and we surfed on the waves on old tyres that we secured with ropes.” When 
they did not manage to escape the admonitory parents, many people had childhood 
memories packed with the warm atmosphere of large families gathering in safe 
houses, sharing foods, songs and worries while securing all sorts of stuff and news 
from neighbours, friends and the extended family. Risks and warnings eventually 
transformed into memories of humour, intimacy and other positive emotions. 
Former prime minister Sir Tom Davis describes some of these hybrid sentiments 
in his autobiography when he recalls 1987’s Cyclone Sally, one of the strongest 
cyclones ever to strike the main island. After the first coming, the centre of the 
cyclone passes over Rarotonga, and a peculiar still life unfolds in the silent eye: 
In the belief it was all over, people came out to take in the sights. They wandered around 
downtown examining the damage and picking up damaged goods on the way. The youth 
were in great prominence and, for most of them, this was their first bad hurricane. They were 
obviously enjoying the experience as were most people… Only the moderate hiss of the surges 
from the ocean rippling through this conglomerated mess, the crackle of a motor cycle wading 
its way through the debris, and the sudden outburst of giggles and laughter from wandering 
bands of children and teenagers broke the silence… (Davis, 1992: 324-8).
The cyclones multiple are, in praxis, always events in consecutive, situational 
here-and-nows. The jumble of things, the mixed feelings of fascination and fear, 
make it impossible to neatly summarize the event unless oneness and certainty are 
artificially manufactured. This was also a point expressed by Daniel Defoe when he, 
after England’s great storm of 1703, collected, commented and printed first-hand 
accounts from all over the country. Defoe does not seem to have viewed the storm 
as an object of whirl-like coherence, a total cyclonic object that originated from 
the West Indies or off the coast of Florida. On the contrary, while acknowledging 
the grandness of the storm, in order to make an account of it as a writer he relies 
on “varied voices and multiple points of view” (2005: xiv). In a Latourian sense 
we might say that Defoe’s writing is not (yet) quite modern, mixed as it is with a 
hybridity of exact measurements, supernatural explanations, and wholly disparate 
viewpoints. 
In the Cook Islands many more versions too are enacted. Tourist resorts and 
agencies beg customers not to overestimate the risk of cyclones and the severity of 
their effects; they work out emergency plans and evacuate guests, and in some cases 
the visitors are even praised for their help during and after a cyclone as in Aitutaki, in 
2010, after cyclone Pat. As mentioned earlier, the remarkable clean-up that cyclones 
perform in lagoons and at beaches is also noted. The overtopping of high waves 
may flush out lagoon waters very effectively, thus sweeping out algae blooms, and 
dramatically rearrange tons of sand, creating both new islets and severe erosion. 
Prayers are whispered, and in some cases grand theories and fears of End Times are 
preached, and critically discussed as “inappropriate and anachronistic” as by an 
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outsider involved in emergency service (Taylor, 1999; see Rubow, 2009). Traditional 
leaders contribute with pre-Christian ecological knowledge and traditional means 
of protections and prediction (see Rubow, 2013). Thus, personal beliefs, church 
teachings and memories may merge in celebrations of the Lord’s great powers, or 
in fabulous storytelling about cyclones and their smaller cousins, the whirlwinds. 
In an interview, a local Christian minister confided that, astoundingly, he had once 
been caught in a whirlwind in the middle of a large lagoon and gently taken to 
the shore several kilometres away. In many ways, cyclones and whirlwinds drag 
animals, people and debris together with great force. As Davis puts it, sheets of 
iron are turned into “hazardous missiles, flying through the air and brought to a 
stop only when they hit an obstacle around which they became firmly wrapped like 
passionate lovers” (1992). Winds and things, people and landscapes, are wrapped 
into each other.
3.5  Climate Projections and New Futures
After the five cyclones in 2005, Cook Islanders had taken up scientific discourses 
of climate change, and talks with NGOs, business people, farmers and fishermen 
around the island of Rarotonga in 2010 and 2011 formed my clear impression that 
a certain gravity was indeed formed around the expectation that climate change 
would become more real through more frequent and more severe cyclones. 
Simultaneously, however, another gravity developed around the critical position 
that the adaptation of climate change discourse perhaps more rightly should be seen 
as opportunistic strategy for entering the climate change hub of travel opportunities 
overseas, conferences and grants for local development projects—with or without 
any obvious links to “climate change.” As reported elsewhere (Rubow, 2013), 
however, the perhaps most frequent response on the island among resident Cook 
Islanders was more hesitant. “We have to wait-and-see”—many people told me, 
pointing to the many uncertainties involved in interpreting the local signs and the 
global scenarios. 
Illustrating the scaling difficulties in climate sciences de Scally et al (2006) 
has presented a historical database of 143 tropical cyclone occurrences and their 
impacts in the Cook Islands over two centuries, drawing together large amounts of 
meteorological data and eyewitness reports. Apart from this valuable systematisation 
of highly heterogeneous material, de Scally (2008) has also analysed the intensity 
and frequency of the cyclones, leading to the noteworthy result that the number 
of seasons with three or more cyclones had increased since the mid-1970s (2008: 
455). This conclusion was in accordance with the observations made by many 
Rarotongans and in several vulnerability and disaster assessments and reports, 
and stressed in the National Communications to UNFCCC in 2011. The tricky thing 
about this increase in cyclones is that de Scally also shows that it coincides with the 
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beginning of satellite monitoring of cyclones, thus recording the frequencies more 
accurately. The Cook Islands covers a vast sea territory, and by acknowledging the 
variable quality of the reports over two centuries, cautions are raised about making 
direct comparisons before and after 1970. Thus, the apparent increase is, de Scally 
concludes, “almost certainly attributable to the beginning of satellite monitoring 
of cyclones” (2008: 455). In consequence, de Scally adds, in accordance with other 
central meteorological sources, “these increases cannot be attributed to global 
warming without a longer record and a better understanding of the role of cyclones 
in the general circulation of the atmosphere and ocean” (2008: 455).
Subsequently, late in 2011, new regional projections were published by the 
Australian Bureau of Meteorology, stating that between 1969 and 2010 “an average 
of just over one cyclone per season passed Rarotonga,” with the significant 
fluctuations being that cyclones occurred more often in years with El Niño, that 
is a natural weather pattern making the ocean warmer in the northern parts of the 
country. In conclusion, cyclones have not become more frequent. Furthermore, new 
projections from the Australian Bureau of Meteorology building on the findings 
of the 2007 IPCC Assessment Report, tend to show in the Cook Islands region not 
an increase, but “a decrease in the frequency of tropical cyclones by the late 21st 
century and an increase in the proportion of the more intense storms” (2011). 
In 2005, it was surely an increase in frequency that was loomed in local minds as 
debated elsewhere, this situation extends to other regions as far away as the North 
Atlantic (Jonsdottir, 2012; WMO, 2006). Only six years later, the question of frequency 
is cancelled, and projected intensification of the cyclones is now seen to pose the 
main challenge. The 2005 cyclones turned out, after the fact, not to be so unusual 
in a numerical sense. Notwithstanding, larger culturalnatural processes were set in 
motion. Qualitatively they destabilized the known landscape and opened-up spaces 
for the imagination and strategies for coping with environmental and societal 
changes. Now, new assessments, new plans, and new processes of climate proofing 
and more advanced computational models will be issued, discussed and modified. 
New twists and turns will occur in the anticipation of future weather patterns and 
extreme events as cyclones.
The central tenet of this article is that climate change does not happen 
around people; it is taking place in the midst of their world. In that sense, it is 
uncontroversial to predict that some communities will tend to strengthen the 
conceptual and causative link to global warming, while others, continuously or 
temporarily, will interpret the storms in terms of religious prophecy or in close 
relation to certain political programs. These variations are already present in Cook 
Islands, and throughout the Pacific, as described elsewhere in the present book. 
What is important to highlight is that climate change discourse is not only received 
by different people in different ways, it changed and twisted every time it enters 
new culturalnatural environments. In 2005, as before, the cyclones are not merely 
“there”: bracketed and isolated as self-contained physical phenomena. Rather, the 
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course they take in each individual garden, lagoon and hilltop will be an enactment 
consisting of many components: mangos, roofs, families and shrieking, spiralling 
wooshes. Cyclones are more than extreme weather events. They are also great 
culturalnatural events curled into the life of islanders and visitors as they overtop 
the reefs and minds.21
21 This chapter is based on research in the Cook Islands in June and July 2010, and in June and July 
2011, funded by the European Research Council. Thanks are owed to Tony Crook and Peter Rudiak-
Gould for valuable comments. 
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4  Crafting Certainty in Liquid Worlds: Encountering 
Climate Change in Kiribati
4.1  Introduction 
Societies have always read the weather for signs but generally they were signs of stable climates. 
Now, however, the weather is being read for its powerful, unpredictable ‘wanderings’, for climate 
instability.
(Szerszynski & Urry, 2010: 4)
Szerszynski and Urry suggest, using metaphors of orientation, that environments 
affected by climate change are lost, unfixed, with no destination ahead. They further 
point out that atmospheric science exposes the weather to technological intervention 
in order to reign in it (Szerszynski & Urry, 2010: 4). One could unpack Szerszynski 
and Urry’s passage and ask: What is the need for reading the weather if it is stable 
and predictable? And, conversely, how can one read the weather if it is absolutely 
contingent, uncertain, or chaotic? Reading the weather becomes a skill when the 
environment rests on principles of uncertainty and certainty, of contingency and 
stability.
In this article, I explore how people in the Pacific live in and make sense of 
changing environments. The navigation skills found in Kiribati will provide the 
empirical material for this purpose. I argue that both certainty and uncertainty are 
key to understanding how people navigate the oceans and predict changing weather 
patterns. Certainty and uncertainty exist, not in a dualistic relationship, but in an 
interconnected and organic relationship side-by-side. One does not exclude the 
other. And I show that engaging in understanding how the environment works 
and anticipating how the future will unfold are still important to people living in 
environments affected by the unpredictable wanderings of global anthropogenic 
climate change. 
Places impacted by global climate change have been described as increasingly 
uncertain for the people living there as the environment is dramatically reconfigured 
(Crate, 2011: 179-80). Hence, tremendous scientific efforts are invested in modelling 
the impact of climate change in the future. But numerous uncertainties and unknown 
factors are unavoidable (see for example Barnett, 2001: 982; Hulme, 2010: 271; Mitchell 
& Hulme, 1999: 59; Szerszynski & Urry, 2010: 1-2). In fact, Michel Callon et al point 
Maria Louise Bønnelykke Robertson, University of Copenhagen
 © 2018 Maria Louise Bønnelykke Robertson
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.
46   Crafting Certainty in Liquid Worlds: Encountering
out when examining controversies in scientific and technological advancement that 
“scientific and technological development has not brought greater certainty. On the 
contrary, in a way that might seem paradoxical, it has engendered more uncertainty 
and the feeling that our ignorance is more important than what we know” (2009: 
18-19). 
Anthropologist Susan Crate claims, in a review of anthropological engagements 
with global climate change, that climate change disrupts local environmental 
skills making folk weather forecasting unreliable. She highlights how adaptation 
practices are destabilized and cultural orientations and symbolic frameworks are 
challenged when people face the volatility of global climate change (Crate, 2011: 
179-80). Populations across the world are losing “the very totem plants, animals, 
and landscapes that are central to their spiritual orientation” (Crate; Crate & Nuttall; 
Cruikshank; Nadasdy; Nuttall et al; Rhoades et al; Salick & Byg; in Crate, 2011: 180). 
From this position Crate implies a loss of orientation when climate change disconnects 
environments into unknown configurations. 
While there is no doubt that climate change has dramatic effect across the 
world I want to revisit and question the assumption that people become lost in a 
changing world. Instead I will echo Katharina Schneider when she explains the open-
endedness of fishing movements among the Saltwater People in Papua New Guinea. 
Movements on the ocean are often unpredictable and surprising (2012: 40) indicating 
that islanders with their intense orientation towards the ocean inhabit the world not 
despite of, but because of, fluctuations.
In this analysis certainty and uncertainty should not be considered as in a 
contradictory relationship. Empirically and analytically they are difficult to single out 
and isolate from each other. They morph into one another, and the one is merely the 
other emerging. However, as Boholm reminds us, when she outlines the scope of an 
anthropology of uncertainty, “[u]ncertainty has to do with what is unpredictable in life 
[…]. Uncertainty concerns the future […]. Uncertainty implies recognition of change 
and awareness that states of affairs are not static; they can alter drastically for better 
or worse” (2003: 167). I examine how people engage with uncertainties when living 
with new emerging weather patterns by exploring two different modes of connectivity. 
John Dewey’s ideas on the relationship between nature and experience—in which 
experience is not superimposed upon nature, but is situated in a natural environment—
will establish the backbone of this analysis. As Dewey succinctly puts it: 
[E]xperience is of as well as in nature. It is not experience which is experienced, but nature—
stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. Things interacting 
in certain ways are experience […]. Experience thus reaches down into nature; it has depth. 
(Original italics, 1958: 4a [sic]). 
According to Dewey experience is situated in the interactions surrounding us. Humans 
as well as non-humans are places in a network of interactions, and it is from here we 
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engage our experience of what might be called nature or the environment. That is, 
experience is internal to, not separate from, nature. So, humans are simultaneously 
part of a network, as well as busy making sense of it. Connectivity, then, denotes both 
an idea that humans partake in shaping and forming the world around us, but also 
denotes an experiential position of how to make and remake the world through our 
connections to it. 
4.2  The Reception of Climate Change in Kiribati
The uncertain future was indeed a concern in Kiribati, a small atoll nation in the 
central Pacific. Anxiousness about the future prevailed here. One of the main 
concerns was that the sea levels are rising and encroaching on the shores of the small 
islands. Scientific assessments suggest that climate change will make the islands 
uninhabitable within this century (Barnett & Adger, 2003; Storey & Hunter, 2010). 
And data collected and represented in models on the government’s homepage shows 
that temperatures, rainfall, sea levels, and ocean acidification have increased in the 
last 50 years.22
Climate change was discussed in the churches, on the national radio from where 
most people received their daily news, and the issue of climate change was high on 
the political agenda. Yet, even if climate change was a major political concern on 
these islands this knowledge was not distributed evenly among the I-Kiribati people. 
The church, especially the Catholic Church, often referred to the rainbow promise 
where God promised Noah that the earth would never again be flooded and through 
this argument rejecting the existence of climate change. And when the President 
addressed the village elders, which he did during government elections taking place 
during my fieldwork in 2011, rumours had it that it was more important to bring bags 
of kava in order to secure votes rather than discussing the pressing issues of climate 
change. 
Also in 2011, the I-Kiribati government arranged a Climate Change Summit where 
all the Ministries, NGOs, and village chiefs in Kiribati debated how to integrate the 
issue of climate change into the national development plan, and President Anote Tong 
announced that climate change will have to be considered in every political decision 
in the future. This may seem contradictory when the churches, which are considered 
important institutions, were not aligned with this mission, and, furthermore, when 
you still find that people did not know about the issue of climate change. However, on 
the political level Kiribati depended on aid from donors, and that required working 
within a specific development framework and operating with a global climate change 
discourse. Among the villagers, on the other hand, it was not as straight forward. 
22 See http: //www.climate.gov.ki/changing-climate/. Accessed 28 June 2013.
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Here, global climate change was entangled in place-based concerns about religious 
or chiefly authority. 
But, nevertheless, people still tried to understand the environment. They tried to 
make sense of its emerging patterns. And when the question was raised, during the 
Climate Change Summit in 2011, whether there are any traditional ways of managing 
environmental change a representative from one of the NGOs answered “If the big 
waves comes we all go down to the beach with our knives, and show the waves that we 
are not afraid of them. We can do something like that.” This suggestion might seem 
bizarre. Waves do not care for knives. You cannot cut a wave in half. But considering 
that in Kiribati it has been believed that with appropriate rituals, such elements as 
the sun, the winds, the tides, the sea, and the rain could be influenced and used for 
the benefit of man: 
Natural signs like lightning, cloud formations, and the behaviour of birds were interpreted by the 
priests and prophets and used by the sorcerers (McDonald 1982: 12).
So even if the data collected the past 50 years shows a clear trend, and even if the 
scientific projections for these islands seem convincing, there was no single way 
the scientific data and knowledge were received among the people living in Kiribati. 
Rather, this was a matter for empirical investigation. In this chapter I examine the 
skills of one particular person, Teueroa. She is an I-Kiribati navigator who can travel 
between islands in the Pacific Ocean, and she can read the weather. Her skills rest 
on generations of knowledge carefully passed down through family lines. The skills 
have continually been tested and adapted to changing natural and social conditions, 
enabling interaction with the environment and between islands throughout history.
What caught my attention about Teueroa’s skills was that, despite being an 
authority on environmental knowledge in Kiribati, she entirely refused the scientific 
idea of global climate change, and, even more surprising, she rejected the idea that 
the environment was changing in new and unfamiliar ways. To her, the uncertainty 
of the future was not as much a concern as it was an existential condition. This was 
surprising to me, and I wanted to understand her rejection: How can a woman who 
is sensitive to the slightest change in her surroundings, who has intimate knowledge 
of the waves, the wind, and the currents reject the idea of global climate change? 
Teueroa’s stories and skills illustrate that the increasing technoscientific intervention, 
monitoring changes in temperature, precipitation patterns, and sea level rise, is not 
the only way of understanding emerging weather patterns. There are many other 
ways people are attuned to the ways the world is changing. And I furthermore show 
that skills and knowledge are not simply undone with the onset of climate change. In 
fact, these ancient skills play a part in crafting certainty in places undergoing climate 
change. 
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4.3  The Navigator: Skills for Reading the Weather
 Tabouea: ‘The families who have the skills of navigation they keep them to 
themselves. And the person who has the skills will choose very carefully who of 
their children they will pass the skills on to’. 
Maria Louise: ‘What kind of character are they looking for?’ 
 Tabouea: ‘They are looking for someone who is quiet and don’t talk too much. 
Someone who is shy’.
It was Tabouea and her husband Mauia, an I-Kiribati couple in their early thirties, 
who explained to me how people are chosen to receive the skills of navigation. At first, 
I interpreted this quality of shyness in the navigator to only serve the protection of the 
secrecy of the skills (Grimble, 1931, 1972). However, as I came to know the navigator, 
Teueroa, I began to understand that to become a navigator required someone who 
could enfold the skills, someone who would devote themselves to the skills. When 
Teueroa began telling me stories about her life I learned that often it was the skills 
themselves, which to a large extent shaped Teueroa’s course, not just on the ocean, 
but also in her life. Teueroa was an elderly lady, suffering from Arthritis and type 2 
diabetes, like so many other aging women who had lived arduous lives on the island, 
and so her journeys on the oceans had become more and more seldom. 
The navigation skills are considered family property, and, as I was explained, 
navigators would rather die with their skills than give them to someone undeserving. I 
heard stories of researchers interested in navigation arriving in vain and leaving empty 
handed because they found no navigator willing to talk to them. When I explained that 
I was interested in learning about the navigation skills people answered that no one 
could teach these skills, and that the navigators guard their skills as a secret. However, 
Teueroa had a desire to give the skills away, something that was unusual, and so she 
was different from the impression many of my respondents had given, namely that 
they were a select few, both shy and unwilling to share the secrets of navigation. The 
reputation of navigators were such that locals knew Teueroa was one of the most skilled 
navigators on Tarawa, but had no idea what she looked like, or where she lived. Perhaps 
this was so because Teueroa was truly so reclusive, or perhaps my informants knew 
more than they let on, and tried to protect the secrecy of the navigation by not sharing 
any information they might have had about her with me. 
It was the family I lived with during my fieldwork who arranged the first meeting 
between Teueroa and I. They knew Teueroa as a relative from their extended family. 
Even so, arranging this meeting took more than one month, as it required a formal 
invitation and Teueroa’s lengthy consideration. Since that first meeting, despite her 
age and deteriorating health, she made her way to the family where I lived every 
Sunday to teach me the navigation skills. Sitting inside one of the thatched huts 
(kiakia), and with small pieces of wood representing the stars and the moon arranged 
on a board, she demonstrated how celestial bodies travelled across the night sky. 
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Teueroa opened all our lessons (reirei) by making food offerings to stars and 
smoking the local tobacco to honour the stars. She explained that in Kiribati the 
stars are considered ancestors, and these acts of offerings pleased them. When I 
asked her why she did not teach me by directly observing the night sky and the 
stars, which she showed so much respect, she simply replied that I was not ready to 
learn in that manner. This echoes other accounts of how navigators learn their skills 
inside the huts as opposed to under the open sky. The navigator Biria from the island 
Butaritari had to learn inside the public meeting house “178 stars, constellations 
and nebulae; to indicate their relative position […] and to say at what height above 
the eaves (i.e. the horizon) anyone of them might be seen at sunrise or sunset at 
different seasons of the year” (Grimble, 1972: 218). Even if I was not aware of it at 
the time, Teueroa was not simply explaining her knowledge to me, she was more 
generally teaching me. In this she was a woman of authority. For hours, Teueroa, 
the family I lived with, and I sat cross-legged in a circle, and in Teueroa’s solemn but 
patient way she taught me the skills and told me stories. If nearby children made 
too much noise she glared at them and shushed them. If they continued she never 
hesitated to slap them across the arm or the thigh. She alone decided what I could 
learn, and what knowledge was too secret to be shared. And she constantly tested 
me by seeing how well could I retell the stories she told, or identify various stellar 
constellations in the sky at night. 
As argued earlier Teueroa’s skills as a navigator not only served to keep her 
on course when travelling the oceans; they also shaped the course of her life and 
the contours of her personality in many ways. In the following I will explore one 
particular event in Teueroa’s childhood. Throughout her life she had to endure 
several tests to demonstrate her worthiness as a navigator. Some of these tests were 
more straightforward than others. It could be naming stars and constellations in 
the communal meetinghouse (te maneaba) in front of village elders. But as a young 
girl, the first test she had to endure was being thrown in the ocean and abandoned 
there by her father. 
4.4  If You Are Going to Be a Traveller…
On these small atolls the ocean and its rhythms, the endless sound of the waves 
breaking on the reef, and the tides, constantly contracting and expanding around 
the islands like a heartbeat, feature in most aspects of daily life. Navigational 
skills have allowed a handful of people from these islands to align themselves in 
this ocean world and to predict sailing and weather conditions. Navigators have 
interpreted the formation and colour of clouds to identify islands over the horizon. 
Birds and certain species of fish would give an indication of the distance to land. 
Star paths were followed when travelling greater distances. Most impressively, 
ocean swells, reflected from far away islands and reefs, would echo through the 
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canoe and its navigator, and would be recognised like the face of an old friend 
(Akerblom, 1968: 116). However, several I-Kiribati got lost at sea during my eight 
months of fieldwork, and from time to time you can read astonishing stories of how 
I-Kiribati fishermen have survived long periods of drifting lost at sea.23 So however 
much can be understood and learned about travelling the ocean, navigation in the 
Pacific remains a risky activity made hazardous by unsuspected waves and reefs, 
strong currents, and outbreaks of bad weather.
Teueroa’s father passed on the navigation skills of his ancestors to her, 
including knowledge of the stars, the weather, and the currents used for sailing. 
But, more than this, from an early age Teueroa was also taught how to be in the 
environment. She had to know the ocean, how it felt, tasted, and behaved, when it 
would be welcoming, dangerous, or deceitful: 
The first time I learned to travel I was 14. I was on the local canoe with my father from the 
island Maiana. My father asked me to pick up something at the bottom of the canoe, as I leaned 
down my father pushed me into the sea. So I fell into the sea and you know how I tried to 
survive. I was crying and calling my mother, but my father sailed away. I can’t really remember 
how long I was in the sea for, but when I looked at the canoe, it sailed away and disappeared. 
I was crying in the middle of the ocean, calling my mother. The ocean there is very dark and 
deep. But that was a test for me to overcome the fear of the sea, because if you are going to be 
a navigator, if you are going to be a traveller, you cannot be scared of the sea. My father came 
back. He put me on the front of the canoe and then the he said: ‘tell me, where is the land?’ 
I pointed, and when it was wrong I got smacked. Then I tried to remember again what I had 
learnt. So I identified the land according to the cloud. 
When Teueroa’s father threw her in the water, time was momentarily suspended as 
she found herself floating; this unknown space created nonlinear time. She could 
not say how long she spent in the ocean even though her memory of the event was 
vivid, and every detail was conveyed. In that moment her senses were sharpened, 
and her mind absorbed all impressions. 
Human geographer Nigel Clark argues for the idea of excess, which can 
unpack Teueroa’s experience in the ocean. He draws on Deleuze’s criticism of 
transcendence, arguing that all forces or energies are immanent or enfolded in the 
material world, and Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, a theory maintaining that it is the 
collective role of the world’s biosphere which maintains the atmosphere in states 
far from equilibrium, never totally ordered, never totally chaotic. Clark suggests 
that we can never totally account for any forces or events. In other words, they are 
irreversible, and he views the human as embodying something: 
23 See for example ‘Kiribati Fishermen Rescued After Four Weeks Lost at Sea,’ ABC  News 8 May 2013, 
http: //www.abc.net.au/news/2013-05-08/an-fishermen-rescued-after-four-weeks-lost-at-sea/4676278
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of the other-than-human: traces of storms that have been weathered, stirrings of the earth that 
have been ridden out, poisons and infections that have been stomached. And the echo of events 
in the solar system and the wider cosmos. Some of these forces and processes, as we now know, 
come back to us bearing our own imprint (2005: 179). 
With this approach in mind, that the connections making up the world are always 
more than we can imagine, they are irreversible, unpredictable, and echoing 
earlier connections I want to raise the question: why does Teuroa’s father throw his 
daughter in the ocean? What kind of cruel exercise is this? We can only speculate, 
as Teuerao’s story does not reveal an answer. 
Teueroa learned much of her knowledge through repetition, memorisation, 
and models. But being thrown in the ocean was a very different lesson indeed. Her 
father maintained certainty through repetition of patterned connections in his 
teachings, but also instilled uncertainty by abandoning his daughter in the ocean. 
I argue that he was teaching her about how the world works, and his lesson was 
that the world can be treacherous, unreliable, and uncertain. Teueroa’s experience 
in the water underscored the “volatility and unpredictability of many of the 
physical processes that human beings and other living things rely upon” (Clark, 
2010: 32-3), as waves washed over her, and the current dragged her body along. 
There was no one, or no single thing controlling this event. There is no centralized 
hierarchical direction, as John Urry would put it (2003: 10; 2005: 8). While floating 
there at the mercy of the forces surrounding her, she was no doubt connected to 
and learning about the environment. Not by quantifying it or observing its parts, 
but by qualifying it, being in it, feeling it on her frail, young body.
I suggest this exercise was a demand on her father’s part to remain humble 
in her connection to the environment. He demonstrated that navigators too loose 
their way, their orientation, and their ability to align themselves in the ocean world 
when they find themselves in connections that cannot in any easy way be reversed. 
He reminded her that she was not over and above the environment simply because 
she could make abstractions of it. She was not a spectator describing nature from 
the outside (Prigogine & Stengers, 1986: 300). More precisely, she was part of and 
in fact immersed in an animated, unpredictable physical world (Hastrup, 2012: 
21). She learned that you cannot trust without the possibility of betrayal, and you 
cannot be certain without the possibility of uncertainty. 
However traumatic this experience was for Teueroa as a child, she actively 
used what she had been taught in her role as a navigator throughout her life. In 
2009 Teueroa was called upon for assistance when a ferry capsized on its way 
to Maiana, one of the outer islands. The Royal New Zealand Air Force sent an 
aircraft, and the government patrol boat was sent out to rescue the 55 passengers. 
Teueroa was also asked to be the captain of a boat that collected survivors and 
bodies.
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Many of them could not be taken back. They had been half eaten, or large parts of their bodies 
were missing. The government patrol boat went west, but I guided my boat east, and there I 
found a lot of bodies as soon as I found the current. Once we were in the current, I said to the 
crew ‘let us turn off the motor, let us float’. In this way we could hear if anybody screamed for 
help.
Teueroa did not know the course of the boat, nor even what her destination was. 
Nevertheless, she found what she was searching for. Even with her authority as a 
Captain, Teueroa did not attempt to direct the boat. In other words, she is not 
attempting to master the situation–she is wandering, as Szersynsky and Urry put 
it in the introduction. Floating is once again the theme. She accepts that the forces 
surrounding her cannot be known, and she used this mode of connectivity to find the 
bodies of the capsized ferry.
The idea of connectivity is not foreign to anthropological literature on Oceania. In 
what has become a modern classic “Our Sea of Islands” (1993), the Tongan and Fijian 
anthropologist Epeli Hau’ofa attempts to reconceptualise the dominating Western 
view of Pacific islands as “much too small, too poorly endowed with resources, and 
too isolated from the centres of economic growth for their inhabitants ever to be 
able to rise above their present conditions of dependence on the largesse of wealthy 
nations” (Epeli Hau’ofa, 1993: 4). According to Hau’ofa, this view overlooks the myths, 
legends, and oral traditions that by no means conceive of the world as fragmented, 
tiny, and poor in resources: 
The world of our ancestors was a large sea full of places to explore, to make their homes in, to 
breed generations of seafarers like themselves. People raised in this environment were at home 
with the sea. They played in it as soon as they could walk steadily, they worked in it, they fought 
on it. They developed great skills for navigating their waters, and the spirit to traverse even the 
few large gaps that separated their island groups (Hau’ofa 1993: 8).
In a conceptual move away from a view of fragmented Pacific islands, Hau’ofa 
advocates a view of a sea of islands connected through kin, exchange, and voyaging 
routes. Also concerned with connectivity, Carlos Mondragón explores how the Torres 
people of Vanuatu understand and represent the connections and transformations 
of themselves and their islands through ancient exchange cycles with other islands 
and, since then, through the contact with non-Oceanic people (missionaries, colonial 
administrators, and plantation recruiters) (2009: 117). He describes the maritime and 
insular milieu of Melanesian life in the Torres as a complex interweaving of land- and 
sea-scapes, personhood, and topogeny (2009: 116). In Mondragón’s words: 
(Is)lands and their maritime milieu are visualized as interconnected media through which a 
tracery of aquatic roads and bush paths are constantly being renewed or made redundant by the 
ongoing circulation, the ebb and flow, of persons and things (2009: 123).
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But through Teuerao’s other accounts and stories I learned that being embedded 
in irreversible environmental connections was not the only way she was attuned to 
the world. Teueroa explained that Bakoa, the shark and the spirit of the ocean, and 
Tabwakea, the sea turtle and the spirit of the land, had since the beginning of time 
been in a competitive and struggling relationship. However, there exists important 
ways to reconcile their struggle with each other or to correct imbalances: 
 Teueroa: “Sometimes when you want to go to the sea, you bring Tabwakea, and 
when you come out from the sea you bring Bakoa”. 
Maria Louise: “What do you mean?” 
 Teueroa: “I mean all the natures of Bakoa, you bring it to Tabwakea, just to try 
and make them friendly with each other.” 
Maria Louise: “What can you bring from the ocean for example?” 
 Teueroa: “Some of the grass from the deep ocean, like trees [seaweed] from the 
deep ocean. You bring it onto land. And you bring the flowers from the land and 
give them to the ocean.” 
There were other taboos that Teueroa had to adhere to as a navigator. The sea turtle, 
Tabwakea, the spirit of the land, but also, paradoxically, the spirit of the navigator 
(see also Teiwaki, 1988: 36), was forbidden for Teueroa to eat. One afternoon when 
a sea turtle was caught by a villager nearby, and everyone was engaged in eating 
its bright red meat I realized that this taboo not only applied to Teueroa. As she was 
teaching the skills of navigation, it also applied to me. She explained to me that if I 
was ever lost at sea Tabwakea could guide me home, and therefore it was important 
that I always declined to eat the sea turtle.
In addition, during one of our first meetings Teueroa told me was that when 
she was born her father took her umbilical cord and sailed into the ocean where the 
current ends, that is, where the ocean is very deep. He put the umbilical cord into 
his mouth, jumped onto the outrigger, and then proceeded to jump into the water. 
After swimming for a while he spat out the umbilical cord, and allowed it to sink into 
the deep ocean. He swam in a backwards motion to the canoe and sailed home. The 
story is rife with puzzling elements. Teueroa was never able to provide an answer as 
to why her father had left her umbilical cord in the ocean. She did however offer an 
explanation as to why he had swum to the canoe backwards: “It was so that he could 
keep an eye out for the creatures of the ocean.” Her father’s ritual is a variation of a 
well-known ritual in Kiribati described in “Kiribati: Aspects of History”: 
When the [umbilical] cord fell off, one of the baby’s grandfathers wore the cord on his right wrist 
for three days. It was then carefully wrapped and put away in a safe place. It was believed that if 
a rat ate it, for example, then the boy would be mischievous in later life. In the case of a baby girl, 
the cord was worn by one of her grandmothers. This was done so that the child would follow in 
the footsteps of its elders (Tito et al, 1979: 15).
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Teueroa’s father did not tie the umbilical cord to an older female relative as a way 
of connecting and grounding her within the extended family. Rather, he allowed it 
to descend into the deep ocean connecting and grounding her in this fluid space. 
He managed to effortlessly combine two apparent opposites: after establishing an 
intimate kin-like relationship between Teueroa and the ocean, he still made sure to 
keep an eye out for the creatures of the ocean—thus combining loyalty and betrayal, 
the secure and the treacherous. The landscape is then not a neutral background to 
human activities, but is a relationship of exchange as equally family and enemy. 
In the accounts the connectedness between ocean and land, spirits and humans 
appear, not as irreversible, surprising, and with no element of control, rather the 
navigator can correct imbalances and influence the way connections interact. 
Philippe Descola’s examination of the Tukano tribe of the Amazonian north-west can 
illuminate this variation in connectedness. Descola uses a thermodynamic model 
to describe a cosmos as an immense yet closed circuit encompassing the entire 
biosphere. In order to avoid entropic states in this cosmos exchanges of energy have 
to be carefully organised: 
For example, when a Desana [one of the sixteen tribes that make up the Tukano group] hunts and 
kills an animal, a portion of the potential of the local fauna is cut off and is transferred into the 
human domain when that game becomes food. It is therefore necessary to ensure that the needs 
for human subsistence do not endanger the good circulation of the flows of energy between the 
different sectors of the world. And it is the responsibility of the Desana to keep watch on the 
situation and compensate for the losses that are caused by what they take from non-humans 
(Descola, 2012: 482).
So it is a balanced flow of energy that ensures the survival of the world, and if the 
balance is off, if too many animals have been hunted, this imbalance can be corrected 
through sexual abstinence or through the exchange of souls, that is, sacrificing a 
member of the tribe, in return for game (Descola, 2012: 482-3). 
Descola describes a finite circuit humans can tinker with and adjust in order to 
ensure that it works well, contrary to Clark’s idea of (infinite) excess outlined above. 
However, the idea of correcting connections into balance cannot account for Teueroa’s 
experience of being abandoned in the sea. The oceanic connections she suddenly 
found herself embedded in were entropic and irreversible and could not be controlled 
or appeased, neither cognitively nor spiritually, in any meaningful way. Rather, it was 
a mind-independent uncertain reality, and there is no way of organizing it to rein 
it in. However, when Teueroa performed rituals to reconcile Bakoa and Tabwakea, 
refrained from eating the meat of the turtle, or when her umbilical cord was given to 
the ocean, it was exactly the kind of tinkering Descola describes, which ensures that 
the world worked well. So Teueroa was attuned to the world in more than one way. 
I want to momentarily dwell on what takes place after Teueroa’s father returned to 
her in the ocean as it illuminated the transition from one mode of connectedness to 
another. As he rescued her from the water, he demanded her to set the course and take 
56   Crafting Certainty in Liquid Worlds: Encountering
them home. A difficult task when the world seems entropic. When Teueroa was wrong 
he slapped her face, as if to say: “Wake up! Assume another position in the world.” 
He insisted that she engaged all of what he taught her about how the world worked.
In the following I will explore Teueroa’s forecasting skills, as yet another way 
of connecting (with) the world. However, while the connections were uncertain, 
irreversible, and mind-independent while Teueroa floated in the ocean, and that she 
could balance connections through ritual practices, the skills used for prediction are 
certain, reversible, and mind-dependent.
4.5  Crafting Futures: The Certainty of Navigation
How then does navigation actually work? If the lesson of Teueroa’s father’s was that 
world is uncertain, and you never know when it will betray you, how can you predict 
the weather? How are the connections made between stellar constellations in the sky, 
the journey of the moon, and the weather and ocean around the islands of Kiribati?
Oceanic navigation is a skill found across the Pacific Islands, as it is crucial for 
connecting people in a region scattered across the largest ocean in the world. While 
there are many commonalities among the various traditions each is also particular to 
an island, sometimes even to a single family or individual. Keeping in mind that these 
are non-written knowledge systems I will briefly outline some of the basic principles 
by which navigators conceptualize lengthy inter-island canoe trips. Common across 
the Pacific has been the reliance on knowledge of the stars, sailing directions, and how 
to read the waves and predict weather (Goodenough & Thomas, 1987: 3). Navigators 
constructed charts. Different versions are found across the Pacific, including stick 
charts made of palm ribs bound together with string of coconut fibre and used to 
model swell phenomena and their interaction with islands, or star compasses made 
of sticks and stones showing rising and setting navigation stars (Akerblom, 1968: 105, 
117). Living seamarks—a “tan shark making lazy movements, a ray with a red spot 
behind the eyes, a lone noisy bird” (Goodenough & Thomas, 1987: 8) could reveal 
navigators’ positions in the vicinity of islands or midway between them. Living 
seamarks did not serve as markers in navigation, but they were encountered when 
lost at sea, so that the navigator who had lost his bearings could align himself once 
more in the island world (Goodenough & Thomas, 1987: 8). 
In the Caroline Islands navigators use the star compass consisting of the four 
cardinal points and between 28 and 36 additional points indicating the position of 
rising and setting navigation stars. The stars are so selected that during a sailing 
season “several stars can constantly be observed at different heights above the 
horizon” (Akerblom, 1968: 103-105) allowing sailing throughout the sailing season 
and throughout the night. In the Marshall Islands navigational knowledge is also 
astronomical, but special attention is paid to the changes in the direction and 
configuration of swell and waves. The change and configuration of swell indicates 
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direction to land and determine the navigator’s position in relation to surrounding 
islands (Akerblom, 1968: 116). In Kiribati very few accounts of navigation exist. There 
are two reasons for this. Firstly, Kiribati has received less ethnographic attention than 
many other Pacific islands (but see Gilkes, 2009; Grimble, 1931; Osmond, 2007). It 
has even been questioned whether the few accounts that do exist, especially those 
of former Governor Arthur Grimble, who only studied navigation on the island of 
Butaritari, can be said to be representative of all of the Islands in Kiribati (Akerblom, 
1968: 134). Secondly, navigational knowledge is a skill that is considered secret and 
therefore not easily shared with non-family members (Grimble, 1931: 198). 
The few accounts that do exist suggest that instruction in navigation was carried 
out in a communal meeting house (te maneaba), where the great roof substituted for 
the sky, and where stars could be imagined in its thatch. Later when sailing on the 
ocean, the navigator would refer to the sky as “the roof of voyaging” (Grimble, 1931: 
197–8). Imagining the sky as a roof, the eastern and the western roof plates make 
up the entire night sky, and rafters and beams supported this imaginary roof. “Lying 
across these rafters, like the steps of a ladder up the sky, the astronomer imagines a 
series of three equally-spaced cross-beams […] on each slope of the roof” (Grimble, 
1931: 198). The beams allowed the navigator to express the altitude of the star, and the 
rafter allows him to measure its declination (Grimble, 1931: 199). 
Teueroa used a method called te raranga to predict the weather. Te raranga literally 
means the weaver, as when you weave a sitting mat from pandanus leaves. It consisted 
of 28 small pieces of wood, representing a lunar month, in the shape of a square, with 
each side of the square consisting of seven pieces. The square was balanced on one of 
its tips, pointing north, south, east, and west. Teueroa manipulated three additional 
pieces in the square: the moon (Namakaina), Scorpio (Rimwimata), and the Pleiades 
(Nei Auti). The configuration in which these three elements appeared indicated how 
the weather would unfold. The moon travelled clockwise and faster than the stars, 
which travelled counter clockwise, reconfiguring the moon, Scorpio, and the Pleiades 
every day. When the moon appeared in the east of te raranga it indicated full moon, in 
the north it indicated first quarter, in the east it indicated new moon, and in the south 
it indicated third quarter. 
The small pieces of wood indicated the constellations‘ location in the sky. 
Therefore, in order to use te raranga for navigation it was imperative to imagine oneself 
inside it, looking up at the sky and towards the horizon, not outside it observing as a 
privileged learner. Teueroa’s story of being thrown in the water as a child was crucial 
here. Simply learning about the navigation skills through te raranga would leave the 
student with the impression that navigation was only a matter of fixing connections 
and imposing order. Instead navigation was both about imposing order, through te 
raranga, and about floating within a network of elements with their own forces. This 
was the interstitial space between certainty and uncertainty where the navigation 
skills emerged. Teueroa made sense of a changing world through these two methods 
simultaneously.
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A prolonged drought affected the island during my fieldwork, something many 
referred to as global climate change. Others referred to the La Niña phenomenon 
cooling down ocean surfaces thereby limiting evaporation and precipitation. I 
wanted to talk to Teueroa about the missing rain, and whether she thought it was 
connected to climate change. It was then I realised that Teueroa did not know 
anything about climate change. “What is climate change?” she asked through my 
interpreter. I explained that human pollution of the air and the atmosphere changes 
weather patterns and makes the climate change, that temperatures and the oceans 
rise, changing patterns of rainfall and changing the coastline for example through 
erosion. Teueroa looked at me confused and shook her head. She could not believe 
such a thing. In one way, I was not surprised to find that Teueroa was not familiar 
with the scientific knowledge about global climate change. This was true for a number 
of the informants I spoke to. However, I was surprised that Teueroa had not at least 
noticed any environmental change, the absent rain, the rising temperatures, or the 
changing coastline. So, I asked her about the missing rain: 
 Teueroa: ‘I already predicted last year that there will be no rain for seven months. 
This is the time for rain, but it depends on the moon and the stars, then the dry will 
continue. There will be a change if the moon and Rwimimwata meet close together 
on the third day of full moon this will indicate another six months of drought.’ 
Maria Louise: ‘Do you think the drought has anything to do with climate change?’
 Teueroa: ‘No, this has nothing to do with climate change; this was already in the 
stars!’ 
Firstly, if we try to see climate change as an imbalance in connections as Descola 
outlined among the Tukano, where humans have endangered the good circulation 
of the flows of energy between the different sectors of the world (2012: 482) then 
accepting this flawed circulation would threaten Teueroa’s skills and her whole 
world. Secondly, for Teueroa drought was not an anomaly. Change, irregularity, and 
uncertainty were already accounted for in Teueroa’s skills. There was a particular 
certainty, time, and space for drought. Teueroa crafted connections between stars, 
islands, and oceans to make a world where fluctuation was not a symptom of chaos 
and unpredictability, but an environment that unfolds, in all its variability, according 
to a careful order.
4.6  Concluding Remarks 
I have explored how Pacific Islanders make sense of changing environments through 
the skills and experiences of a navigator. Through Teueroa’s accounts she positions 
herself comfortably between two different philosophical positions. The notion 
that the world is made of relationships, engaging in known and unknown ways, 
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fixing and unfixing, always struggling and co-operating, and the world emerges in 
these connections. And the notion of organised exchanges of energy, which allows 
individuals to engage with systems and correct imbalances that could otherwise be 
said to be out of their control (see also Hayles, 2010: 325).
These two positions allow Teueroa to alternate between different modes of 
connectivity in which she attunes herself to the world around her. These two modes of 
connectivity are organised around certainty and uncertainty: as a decentred human, 
mercilessly at the forces of the world surrounding them; as a subject able to correct 
and maintain a certain balance in the environment through ritual practices; and as a 
subject at the centre, which is the one connecting and mobilising a specific network 
of actors.
Certain connectivity and uncertain connectivity are in themselves two different 
ways of being in the world. They do not add up. They teach two different things. Yet, 
they simultaneously do not contradict each other. People inhabit the world through 
both certainty and uncertainty, and both are a commitment to understanding the 
environment. Enormously skilled craftsmen, the navigators, perform their work in a 
hazardous space, the ocean, and their ability to align themselves in the larger universe 
is impressive. It is as much about crafting certainty and accepting the uncertainties as 
it is about competence, about devoting a lifetime to understanding the forces around 
you from the celestial bodies in the skies to the deep blue ocean.
I would like to return briefly to the name of te raranga, the weaver, because it’s 
very name underscores the point I make. The idea of a weaver suggests neat patterns 
and order. Weaving also requires someone to do the weaving. It requires mastering and 
making your way towards a known end by crafting specific connections. Throwing 
a young girl in the Pacific Ocean was also a critical lesson in becoming a navigator. 
Floating in the ocean does not denote ideas about mastering or order, but rather it 
denotes ideas about entanglement, of being at the mercy of the surrounding forces, of 
accepting a place as just another being in the physical world, and of “orderly disorder.”
While climate change no doubt severely affects the Pacific Islands, their coastal 
areas, their natural resources, and their public infrastructure, it is difficult to say 
anything in general about how notions and knowledge of climate change are received in 
these societies. Marching to the coast with knives to face the threatening ocean or using 
the skills of navigation in order to craft certainty are two ways in which the I-Kiribati 
make sense of the changing climate. I have shown that people are not simply lost in 
a changing world of global climate change, but that they continue to engage with the 
world, tinkering with and attuning to change. I have also shown that even if people are 
authorities of environmental knowledge they may not know about the scientific notion 
of climate change, and they may even disagree that the environment is changing in 
new and unfamiliar ways. This raises important questions for anyone involved climate 
change adaptation or mitigation. How can we best assist people in the challenges they 
are facing related to climate change without debunking the knowledge and skills, which 
have allowed them to live on these islands for generations?
Emilie Nolet
5  A Tsunami from the Mountains: Interpreting the 
Nadi Flood
5.1  Introduction: “A Tsunami from the Mountains”24
In Fiji, recent large-scale flooding events have brought growing attention to climate 
change in both political and public areas. This paper will examine how climate 
change is both present and absent in popular accounts of early 2012 floods in Nadi 
(Western Viti Levu), as well as local understandings of perceived environmental 
changes and acceptable coping strategies.25 Fiji is exposed to a range of geological, 
climatological and hydrological hazards, but suffers especially from cyclones, 
which sweep the country during the season extending from November to April. In 
addition to damage caused by strong winds, cyclones and tropical depressions 
tend to generate floods of variable intensity (McGree, Yeo and Devi, 2010). There is 
a general scholarly consensus that climate change may contribute to an increase in 
the frequency and/or intensity of extreme weather events in Fiji and other Pacific 
islands groups in the near future (Barnett and Campbell, 2010; Government of the 
Republic of Fiji, 2012; Koshy, 2007). Episodes of high intensity rainfall combined with 
increasing population pressure and ongoing changes in Fiji’s watersheds (through 
deforestation, intensification of agriculture, urbanization, expanding tourism, etc.) 
may result in intensified flooding (Chandra and Dalton, 2010). Furthermore, coastal 
erosion and storm surge inundation are expected to worsen as a consequence of sea 
level rise (Gravelle and Mimura, 2008). 
On the 29th and 30th March 2012, a tropical depression bringing heavy rains 
caused widespread flooding in Fiji, particularly in the Western Division. Several 
people were killed and 15,000 sought shelter in evacuation centres. These floods 
resulted in extensive damage, amounting to at least US $40 million, which does not 
include the estimated cost of damage to houses (OCHA, 2012: 3). The town of Nadi, 
24 The expression “tsunami from the mountains” is cited by M. Wise in an article published by the 
Fiji Times (1 April 2012).
25 This text was written shortly after ESFO Bergen’s conference (November 2012), before the passage 
of cyclone Winston, which caused massive destruction in Fiji in February 2016. For this reason, cyclo-
ne Winston is not mentioned in this chapter.
Emilie Nolet, Université de Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, UMR 7041 ArScAn
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the third largest urban centre and tourist capital of Fiji, was severely hit. Nadi is 
located on the western coast of Viti Levu, the biggest and most populated island of 
Fiji’s archipelago. The town had a population of 42,284 in 2007, but it also hosts a 
large transient population of foreign tourists from the nearby international airport. 
Nadi is situated at the junction of two major river systems, which merge in the town, 
and most of its surface lies 6 metres below mean sea level. The existing flood risk 
could be now worsened by various factors, including climate change induced sea 
level rise (Fiji Times, 15 April 2012), land use practices leading to soil erosion and river 
sedimentation (like agriculture and forestry business) and increased development in 
flood paths (FT, 7 March 2011). Nadi’s flood victims have stressed the extreme velocity 
of the water rise, which caught them off guard and, in parts of the town, caused “utter 
and complete” devastation (FT, 2 April 2012a; Agence France Press, 3 April 2012). 
The shock was amplified by the fact that Nadi had already been flooded from the 
21st January till the first days of February 2012, and was in the process of recovering. 
In January 2009, the town had also suffered devastating floods, whose economic 
consequences were still being felt in 2012.
Over the past fifteen years, a growing number of studies have focused on the 
socio-economic impacts of environmental hazards in Fiji, on local policy and practice 
in disaster management and on existing or potential options for climate change 
adaptation and resilience to disasters.26 Climate change has become a priority for the 
Fijian government (GRF, 2012) and a great deal of effort has been devoted to assessing 
its effects and raising awareness among the public and stakeholders. However, 
little research has been carried out on the processes that mediate perceptions of 
environmental risk and influence response (or lack of response) at a community 
level. How is Nadi’s population interpreting such a striking succession of large scale 
flooding events, the scientific concept of climate change that is being disseminated, 
and the possible link between the two? To what extent do popular views diverge from 
government and experts’ approaches, question them or converge with them? Are the 
floods seen as an inevitability or as a phenomenon which can be fought, stopped or 
contained? What are the solutions finally recommended or already adopted at the 
community level to cope with floods and climate change—actual and anticipated? We 
will explore these topics using a case study conducted in Narewa, a village community 
close to the town centre of Nadi.27 Narewa is a mostly indigenous Fijian (iTaukei) 
village and the place of residence of the Tui Nadi, a high-ranking traditional chief who 
26 See for instance: Holland, 2009; Lal, Singh and Holland, 2009; Méheux, Dominey-Howes and 
Lloyd, 2010; Méheux, 2007; Mataki, Koshy and Nair, 2006; Veitayaki, 2006; Veitayaki and Sivo, 2010. 
27 The field research in Narewa was conducted in December 2011 and May-June 2012, and was fun-
ded by a post-doctoral grant from the AXA Research Fund. We will also draw upon field research 
conducted in the northern Yasawa for the French Laboratory of Excellence “Coral Reefs Facing Global 
Change” (Labex Corail). Interviews were conducted in English and all quotations in this chapter are 
drawn from fieldwork materials.
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has authority over nine villages.28 The Narewa clans are the traditional landowners 
of Denarau, a tourist complex built on a group of artificial islets, which features a 
high-end residential development and several luxury hotels. Government approval 
had also been given for a casino resort project, expected to open by October 2013 
but which has been delayed ever since. The tourist complex provides substantial 
leasing income to Narewa village and is also a major source of employment for its 
inhabitants. The data collected may help to explain how the influence of climate 
change is perceived in urban Fiji, particularly in relation to other anthropogenic 
stressors such as urban development, intensive agriculture and mass tourism, and 
why some Fijian communities may consider relocation in the name of climate change 
a far worse option than “dealing with disasters.” It may also provide information on 
existing coping strategies and on the combining of traditional and “modern” skills or 
resources (such as tourism) in order to resist the impact of increasing flooding and 
respond to forecasts and present realities of climate change. 
5.2  Explaining the Floods
The January-February and March-April 2012 events have caused widespread concern 
and triggered a nationwide discussion about the root causes of flooding, especially in 
the Nadi area. The government and media have both portrayed global climate change 
as a major culprit and stressed the need for global political action for mitigating 
climate change as well as local adaptive strategies: for the scale of the havoc following 
the floods would seem to hint at future devastation, should Fiji fail to adapt. In 
September 2012, Fiji’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, addressed 
the 67th United Nations General Assembly as follows: 
In Fiji, we experienced our worst flooding on record during the months of January and April this 
year. […] as a people who live on a group of small islands in the South Pacific, we feel particularly 
vulnerable. The ongoing failure of the international community to seriously address climate 
change means we will all see more frequent and more intense weather events (Kubuabola, 2012).
After the floods, repeated calls for national vigilance and a stream of suggestions 
for improving preparedness were made. Nadi’s residents, in particular, were urged 
to become more risk-conscious and, if worst comes to worst, to anticipate a massive 
relocation of the city (FT, 12, 15, 16 and 20 April 2012). On the national scale, efforts 
to improve public understanding of climate change issues have also led to the 
28 Ratu Sailosi Dawai had just been declared the new Tui Nadi when this research was undertaken. 
However, he passed away in 2016. His younger brother, Ratu Vuniyani Navuniuci Dawai, was confir-
med Tui Nadi by the iTaukei Lands and Fisheries Commission in April 2017.
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endorsement by the Fiji Cabinet of a iTaukei Climate Change Glossary, translating 
foreign expressions such as “climate change” (draki veisau) and “carbon dioxide” 
(kaboni dokosaiti) into the vernacular idiom. Furthermore, the floods have raised 
concern about the fast-urban development in the Western division: some have 
denounced the influence on flooding of soil erosion, poor drainage, unsustainable 
farming practices or land reclamation (FT, 7 February 2012; Fiji Sun, 21 April 2012). 
However, this argument has been opposed by the Nadi Chamber of Commerce, whose 
president publicly claimed that climate change and heavy rain were the primary 
causes (FT, 10 April 2012a). Moreover, some officials and journalists have alleged that 
Fiji’s population was underprepared for natural disasters and that a lack of awareness 
and negligence or complacency had worsened the impact of flooding (FT, 1, 2b and 3 
April 2012). 
Narewa, which is located along the Nadi river, was severely touched by both flood 
events, the last one being unanimously qualified as the worst ever in local history. 
According to witnesses’ statements, the March-April flood was exceptional in several 
respects. Firstly, it occurred after a short period of rainfall following a clear day, not 
after a prolonged period of heavy downpour as was usual. Secondly, the rise of the 
water was unexpectedly fast, taking only two to three hours to completely flood the 
village. Lastly, the water reached exceptional levels: informants talked of six to seven 
feet on the village green and up to five feet in private houses. The damage was severe 
and the army had to intervene to clear the enormous amounts of silt and debris left 
by the receding floodwaters. For many inhabitants, such a series of floods could not 
be seen as a regular, understandable natural event, but instead indicated a rupture 
and disorganization of the natural order of things. While small-scale flooding is said 
to have positive effects (like bringing new plants and cleaning the land), the last 
floods have been described as unexpected, destructive events that local traditional 
lore was unable to circumvent. A tourism activities leader reckoned that Narewa 
was indeed a “dry place” (contrary to others like Rewa, in eastern Viti Levu, where 
inhabitants “have been wet all the time”) and that the present reversal of conditions 
had caught the population largely unprepared: “when it’s wet, people are lost.” The 
urban location of Narewa village and very good access to public media have certainly 
favoured the awareness of global climate change among the inhabitants (which 
seems to be lower in rural eastern Viti Levu. Cf. Lata and Nunn, 2012; Nolet, 2016) and, 
during the field study, various potential manifestations of global climate change were 
mentioned. For example, one resident assumed that “climate change” had caused a 
decline in the productivity of mango and banana trees and yams, while taro (which, 
he said, could not be grown properly in the past and had had to be brought from 
humid areas like Naitasiri and Suva) was now growing locally. Hence, climate change 
was seen to contribute to a change in local eating habits and to the undermining of 
the cultural knowledge associated with them. Yet changes in marine ecology, such 
as the disappearance of the babale shellfish used in traditional medicine, were 
attributed far more often to coastal activity and the tourism industry than to global 
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climate change. Equally, while many respondents believed that climate change was 
a contributing factor to the floods (by influencing the rain pattern or increasing flood 
levels through sea level rise), only two young people considered it to be the main cause. 
As will be seen, others invoked a range of social, economic, political or even spiritual 
malfunctions to explain the increasing floods. A middle-aged man, very involved in 
church activities, even stated that global climate change was non-existent and that 
floods were ordinary natural manifestations experienced since time immemorial: “I 
don’t believe in climate change. It has been the same all over. Day comes, and night 
goes. It rains, it goes. It’s still the same world God puts us in.” Such a refusal of climate 
change may involve the idea that human agency (through greenhouse gas emissions 
etc.) cannot profoundly alter the world God created, or reshape creation. In a sense, 
accepting climate change scientific narrative would be tantamount to endorsing an 
alternative explanation for what only God can do. 
On the contrary, some other villagers saw in climate change and extraordinary 
floods a clear expression of God’s power and agency (which climate change scientific 
narrative thus contributed to reaffirm). For instance, it was argued that an increase 
in extreme weather events was reminiscent of events described in the Apocalypse 
and possibly announced the imminent coming of Judgment Day. Such a divine origin 
would make technical preparation or relocation pointless, even dangerous, as no one 
is supposed to go against God’s will. One elderly man thus admitted that he did not 
leave his house at the height of the floods because he intended to submit to God’s 
plans. “It’s in the Bible. Some they run away and they search a place to hide. You 
can’t go. You can’t go away. […] I was sitting just down here and sing, and pray, and 
thank God.” This apocalyptic focus has been echoed both in the national press and 
on various websites run by expatriate Fijians: “Rumour has it that Nadi is reliving 
biblical history, and will suffer the same fate of the two infamous cities in Lot’s time. 
But I find comfort remembering God’s promise to mankind after Noah’s flood” (FT, 27 
April 2012a). Other interpretations involving supernatural agency have been recorded 
in Ba province. In Vuake village (Matacawalevu, Yasawa), informants asserted that 
the Christian God used extreme weather events to attract man’s attention and that the 
recent floods were a punishment for the “Western” style of life of Nadi’s population, 
the focus on capitalistic development and less commitment to traditional and 
Christian duties: 
That is God teaching them. God’s telling them: ‘You have plenty money and you forgot me’. In 
Nadi. Because they have plenty money. Everything in Nadi. Everything. Hotels, Airport… ‘Well, 
you have money but you forgot me. You have to change, come back, I love you, come back.’
In this rural location, but also by some of its own inhabitants, Nadi tends to be 
considered the epitome of modernization gone haywire. This belief implies an 
unprecedented preoccupation with money, idleness induced by leasing income, a 
severing of community ties due to disputes over land tenure and chiefly titles, and a 
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breaking with some central iTaukei values: honouring chiefs, customs and parents, 
and respecting Christian morals. Some have even wondered whether the floods 
could represent a spiritual cleansing or veivakasavasavataki process (similar to 
those undertaken by the Methodist Church)29 to wash away Nadi’s sins (FT, 27 April 
2012b). Similarly, a person writing in the Fiji Times suggested that the floods may have 
expressed “nature’s disapproval” of the casino project, which has been believed by 
some to bring immorality to Fiji and to go against Christian teachings (FT, 4 April 2012). 
However, such an idea was never encountered in Narewa, whose inhabitants own the 
land where the casino was supposed to be built and where some talked of easterners’ 
“plain jealousy” of Denarau’s good fortune. No one in Narewa mentioned either the 
idea that the floods were an ancestral or divine testing of the military government30 
or a spiritual punishment for the abolition of the Great Council of Chiefs,31 arguments 
which could be found on the websites of opponents to the military regime in 2012.32
Religious interpretations are combined with others focusing on the characteristics 
of Nadi’s rivers and streams, ecological deterioration and the impact of coastal 
development. A former village headman of Narewa (turaga ni koro) was one of the few 
to suggest that Nadi’s river should be straightened and widened to be able to properly 
drain rainwater running down from the mountains. A vast majority of informants also 
mentioned the influence of soil erosion on the river system through deforestation, 
construction, aggregate mining and poor farming practices. The responsibility 
would lie with insufficiently controlled or cynical developers, but also with iTaukei 
communities who would neglect their land while working in cities and “going the 
Western way”: 
‘They are not planting anymore trees, too. They are just building more houses, houses… No one is 
planting anything, they are all going to work. No one wants to plant trees, do the hard job. They 
all want to be modernized now.’ 
Here again disaster is understood as a consequence of the iTaukei’s changing lifestyle, 
which is viewed by many as a corruption of identity that is coming to a head in 
western Fiji. This analysis is reminiscent of the classic opposition made between 
29 According to G. Pigliasco, Methodist officials in Suva would rather use the expression veivakavoui 
vakayalo kei na veivakaduavatataki or “spiritual renewal and reconciliation” (2012: 51). 
30 In December 2006, Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama overthrew the elected government of Laisenia 
Qarase, which he accused of corruption and racial discrimination against the Indo-Fijian population 
(Fraenkel, Firth and Lal, 2009). A military government was in power from 2006 to 2014. Voreqe Bai-
nimarama won the general election of September 2014 and was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Fiji.
31 The Great Council of Chiefs (Bose Levu Vakaturaga) was an institutional body of traditional chiefs 
with wide constitutional powers. It was suspended by the military government in April 2007 and ab-
olished by decree in March 2012.
32 See Tomlinson, 2013: 82-4 on religious argumentation against the coup and Commander 
Bainimarama’s political programme. 
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the “way of the land” (that is the traditional, genuine iTaukei style of life, based on 
kinship, giving and community duties) and the “way of money,” which characterizes 
Western societies (Toren, 1989; Williksen-Bakker, 2002). In a sense, working in 
town and constant pressure to make money are thought to alter indigenous Fijians’ 
relationships to their ancestral lands, with disastrous consequences: the ancestors’ 
heritage is neglected, even rejected entirely, and clan members are gradually forgetting 
how to make use of their own natural resources, trapping themselves in monetary 
exchange and the need for imported food products. A middle-aged man thus believed 
that a general change in lifestyle and the modernization of village infrastructure had 
led to ecological deterioration in Narewa: various food trees and medicinal plants 
which used to thrive in this village were disappearing because of a lack of care and 
interest (“nobody uses them anymore”), while the nearby river was becoming heavily 
polluted and unsuitable for bathing and fishing because of sewage spilling into it. It 
was also said that drainage work which used to be done by the villagers was no longer 
carried out, with possible consequences on river sedimentation and flooding impact. 
While the responsibility of communities was often mentioned, some asserted that the 
Fijians could do very little to protect their own environment, all community efforts 
being spoiled by heavy polluters and dishonest developers who should be “the ones 
to pay” to reverse the current ecological damage. 
On the other hand, in Narewa this rarely leads to frank criticism of tourism, 
which is by far the primary source of income,33 even if unwelcome effects are widely 
recognized. Some regretted a weakening of village taboos through daily contact with 
tourists and the introduction of Western ways, others a disappearance of hunting 
and picnic areas now converted into residences, golf courses and hotels. It was even 
claimed that the villagers had lost their “food chain” due to the building of Denarau 
(which was described as highly fertile land before construction works and as the 
former “fish supermarket” of Narewa), and that local men were weaker, smaller and 
less virile than their forefathers as a consequence of the change in their diet (cf. Clark, 
1989, on “shrinking” feelings of Wiru men of Papua New Guinea as a consequence of 
missionary proselytization, and Tomlinson, 2004). Moreover, the constant passage 
of cruise liners or dive boats combined with hotel activity and waste disposal is 
thought to impact the coral reef and fish stocks. One villager also considered that the 
leasing system could foster community tensions and lead to a distressing splitting up 
of families: “it’s better in Rewa, somewhere where there is no hotel, because people 
are still eating together there.” Regarding flood risks, some were of the opinion that 
extensive removal of mangroves and coastal urbanization may have caused drainage 
problems and led to flooding. However, only one woman openly supported the current 
assumption that the Denarau complex itself could be the ultimate cause of flooding, by 
33 A middle-aged hairdresser from Narewa thus explained: “It’s good, they come, it helps our count-
ry […] If they stop tourism, I don’t think that we will survive.”
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hampering the river’s ability to discharge water into the sea (cf. FT, 8 June 2011). Finally, 
residents invoked human failures to explain the particular severity of the March-April 
flooding. While some accused the National Weather Office of not issuing a proper 
warning, many mentioned that an accidental or deliberate opening of Vaturu dam’s 
spillway gates could have been responsible for the flood: “This kind of current that 
came, it was different. It was like man-made.”34 Equally, poor-planning, insufficient 
funding and a lack of coordination between various development agencies were seen 
as having resulted in bad drainage and contributed to flooding throughout the Nadi 
area. In summary, environmental changes are mainly interpreted as the result of inner 
malfunctioning and chiefly lead to self-blame, societal criticism or the denunciation 
of local politics. In Narewa climate change narrative is present but secondary, or 
even encapsulated into a religious interpretative scheme making weather change a 
spiritual sanction or message, responding (again) to local dynamics. 
5.3  Coping with Flood Risks
On the national scale, two main solutions to Nadi’s flooding have been put forward. 
The first one is a partial diversion of the Nadi river, once said to be considered the “best 
option” by Nadi’s business community,35 but which would necessitate the evacuation 
of two villages (FT, 15 May 2012; FS, 17 July 2012). The other, the relocation of Nadi’s 
city centre and other vulnerable areas, has been supported by scientists and climate 
change activists. For instance, Prof. Patrick Nunn, professor of oceanic geoscience, 
has argued that dredging rivers, diverting the mouth of Nadi’s river or replanting 
trees would not solve a flood problem caused chiefly by climate change-induced sea 
level rise and that relocation was “inevitable” (FT, 15 April 2012). On the other hand, 
in Narewa, an overwhelming majority of residents have agreed that relocating the 
whole village or their own family or clan was hardly feasible, nor desirable. During 
the field study conducted in 2012, only a handful of residents wanted to resettle in 
a higher, safer area, almost all being women and men from other villages married 
to locals. An elderly man from Narewa who stated that village relocation was the 
sole viable solution, since sea level rise would keep worsening flood risks in the 
future, was a notable exception. Such statement was obviously based on scientific 
predictions concerning global warming, which are conveyed by the Fijian media 
and local or foreign environmental organizations. However, while many people 
in Narewa were aware of such scientific discourse and interpreted some perceived 
“natural irregularities” through it, few inferred that global climate change could lead 
34 Popular rumour was strong enough for a statement denying it to be made in the national press.
35 In the aftermath of floods, the president of Nadi’s Chamber of Commerce argued that the reloca-
tion of Nadi town was “an impossible task” and unacceptably costly (FT, 10 April 2012b). 
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to resettlement in a close or distant future. More precisely, although migration may 
be considered a suitable solution by some Pacific communities, scientists or political 
leaders,36 it is certainly the worst option for Narewa people (this even leading some to 
underestimate the level of environmental change or to dismiss climate change as an 
important issue). Financial and logistical barriers were invoked, but most inhabitants 
also stated that they were used to the place and that leaving would perhaps be worse 
than staying and enduring chronic losses due to floods, especially because it equated 
to a shameful abandonment of ancestral lands. Strong ties exist between indigenous 
Fijian clans and the particular territorial areas (vanua) they are identified with. 
Relocating would mean breaking links with ancestors buried on these communal 
lands, as well as abandoning their yavu (ancient house foundations), which express 
the antiquity of family lines and their respective status. The land itself had come to 
hold mana, or spiritual power, over time. As a resident put it: “the further you go from 
this village, the crops don’t grow nicely.” Some have stressed the difficulty of taming 
a new environment and the cultural erosion which could result from relocation. It was 
even suggested that relocation would cause a loss of customary identity and upset 
social order: 
Now everything is good because they know where they come from, what mataqali, what yavusa, 
what tokotoko,37 and they are very sure with that, but if they gonna move, everything gonna be 
misplace. 
Furthermore, inhabitants have argued that staying in Narewa offered them both 
easy access to the town centre and an inexpensive lifestyle, with the possibility to 
plant their own crops and to mobilize kin solidarity whenever needed. Such a perfect 
combination of village and city life, each with its own practical advantages, would not 
be easily found elsewhere. Moreover, the present position of Narewa is very close to 
the Denarau complex, which is extremely convenient for the many tourism workers, 
especially for night shifts. A young educated man argued as well that relocating was 
pointless, because “even going to another place, you will still face the same thing,” 
referring to the extensive flooding of the Nadi area. For many, relocation seems difficult 
to accept, but neither do river diversion and straightening raise much hope (“unless 
they make it big like Mississippi,” added a resident). Most inhabitants were sceptical 
about the possibility of controlling such a large mass of water and reckoned that the 
floods would not cease, whatever the government tried, because as one man put it: 
“nature, you can’t go against it.” Equally, most people considered dredging as an 
36 See the case of Napuka islanders in the Tuamotu archipelago (French Polynesia), who recently 
sought asylum from the neighbouring Marquesas islands where their ancestors originally came from. 
Chaumeau, 2011.
37 These are clan and sub-clan units.
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insufficient, costly option, which had already demonstrated its limits.38 Such fatalistic 
statements seemed to rely only partially on the scientific discourse on climate change 
and its irreversibility, and far more on concrete observations of a constant worsening 
of floods and of an upsetting of the local natural balance: both being the result of an 
array of factors, of which sociocultural changes were not the least. The March-April 
flood, indeed, was widely considered as an irresistible giant wave not originating 
from the outside but from the interior, from the nearby mountains and, one would 
say, from societal factors such as land misuse and spiritual corruption (thus involving 
a political and spiritual response before a diplomatic or technical one). Even if 
pessimism dominates on the grounds that water levels have kept rising in recent 
years (although some added the reminder that “Only God knows”), a vast majority of 
residents are determined to stay, seeing Narewa not as an unsafe environment, but as 
land which must be cared for, protected and occupied whatever the cost: 
We have decided to say that it’s part of life, that we will have this kind of situation […] So this is 
where we will be for the rest of our life, [we] just face it, learn from it, live with it, accept it, move on.
For a majority of respondents, the best option would be to stay on the same area of 
land but acquire a two-storey house, which is believed to offer sufficient security 
even during the biggest floods. One may even wonder whether the brave and humble 
acceptance of current flood risks is considered by some a virtue and a part of the 
needed response to God’s warning expressed by the recent floods.
While few people seemed to trust large-scale technical solutions, interviewees 
from Narewa appeared highly confident in their own ability to recover from floods, 
relying on their own social or moral resources. The villagers did not usually claim to 
be culturally prepared to face the floods, as do the people of Rewa province (Nolet, 
2016), but believed kinship and traditional relationships (i. e. ceremonial and political 
links between clans and land units) would prove powerful tools for recovery: kin and 
fellow clans linked to the Tui Nadi can offer material help and shelter to affected 
families, while expatriate Fijians are strongly expected to send money. Both tourism 
income and iTaukei customary solidarity are counted on to provide a certain security, 
helping villagers to endure chronic losses and to continue occupying the land of their 
forefathers (who are also the original source of their rights to the village’s treasure, 
Denarau island): 
Our hotel, the industry, has provided a lot of money too in the village. Every day. Every week. 
[…] And Fijian custom, when you work, you’re not only working for you. You work for everybody. 
38 The villagers of Lomanikoro, Rewa (South-East of Viti Levu), expressed very different views about 
the efficacy of dredging during an anthropological study that we conducted in 2011. Contrary to Na-
rewa, this flood-prone village had not experienced a large flood event for some years and dredging 
was widely considered there to be a useful protective technique. 
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[…] If you get $300, $200 a week, you can go shopping $100. The rest of the hundred will go 
somewhere else. Like $20 for the death, $20 for the new-born child that side, and the aunty came 
and asks for $10, and you have to buy salt and kerosene for grandfather. We have to do it like that. 
That’s why life in the village rolls on. It doesn’t stop.
It was stated as well that residents had learnt, through experience, how to quickly 
return the village to its normal state and to clean it up efficiently. And indeed, the 
village was impressively clean and neat of debris only six weeks after the flood. One 
resident was even convinced that the villagers had inherited from their ancestors a 
physical capacity to resist flood impacts: “The people are used to this, even small 
children […] they have a system that works well with the flood, it can stop them 
from getting sick and all […] Our body is just accustomed to everything about the 
flood, we are used to it.” Additionally, some inferred that the villagers had gained in 
patience and humility through their recent experiences of disaster, as if the successive 
floods had taught them how to live with fewer material possessions and how to be 
less emotionally affected by their losses, this contributing as well to resilience in the 
widest sense.39 
Over here we are used to it. Even when the flood comes, never mind we lose our stuff, we laugh 
and smile, because we are used to the flood […] We can’t see anymore people buying anymore 
settee, like this. We don’t wanna buy lots of beds. People are just careless, now. […] Better you 
just put the mat, everybody sleep on the mattress, we gonna lose, lose, lose, all the time […] 
Because in Fiji every house we want to fill it up with all the necessities. But now we change our 
mind, keep us free, it’s better.
Therefore, even if certain specific actions and improvements are expected from the 
government, especially tighter controls on urban planning and drainage, villagers 
seem to rely heavily on their own resources to face future flooding hazards. This 
coping logic (which contradicts an often-heard accusation of “State-dependency” 
at the community level) appears to rely on various grounds, such as: the utmost 
importance of staying in the traditional village site; scepticism about the possibility 
of controlling the flooding process in the short-term; submission to a divine agency; 
a deep trust in the adaptive power of iTaukei culture; and even a cultural tendency 
to consider dangers and hardships only once they have materialized. Tourism is 
also considered a possible coping strategy. Some villagers have proposed to convert 
Narewa into a tourist centre which would offer the full spectrum of iTaukei culture to 
overseas visitors. Proposed attractions included a guided tour presenting village life, 
cultural shows like firewalking, popular resort entertainment such as meke (dancing), 
massages, hair braiding, lovo (earth oven) feasts, and more. The core idea is to take 
39 In a sense, floods are thought to have a purifying effect, leading or forcing people to live in a more 
Christian manner: they don’t only punish or warn, but provide the conditions for moral improvement 
through poverty, the strengthening of community ties or the overcoming of existing conflicts.
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advantage of the large transient population of foreign tourists (many of whom converge 
on the Manamuca and Yasawa island resorts after a short stay in Nadi) and offer them 
a cultural experience adapted to expected Western taste, which may not be found 
in package resorts. One of the project developers did not see the tour as a possibly 
destabilizing factor or threat to village taboos but, on the contrary, as an opportunity 
to “liven up” the village, upgrade infrastructure and bolster cultural knowledge while 
“making money.” Such a project would help to build financial resilience to the floods, 
but it would also provide autonomy vis-à-vis the foreign companies which have 
invested in Denarau and their uncontrollable financial dynamics and relations with 
the government. This project is reminiscent of other initiatives to develop community-
based tourist enterprises and economic self-reliance through vanua resources, in 
which the combining of Western entrepreneurship and the village ethos (a life lived 
“in the way of the land” or vakavanua) can turn out to be a major challenge (Farrelly, 
2009). In Narewa, some seemed to consider that a small-scale community project 
under local leadership could be a far better option than dependence on large foreign 
companies which can easily “outrun” both landowners and employees.
5.4  Conclusion 
Arguably, the 2012 floods highlighted the issue of climate change more forcefully 
than ever before in Fiji. For some, especially in the political and media arenas (where 
the influence of climate science is strong), the floods “made visible” the devastation 
potentially awaiting this oceanic country in the near future, should the Fijians 
fail to react promptly. Apocalyptic visions were omnipresent both in the national 
press and in government rhetoric, but the situation also offered an opportunity to 
illustrate and foster national unity through interethnic solidarity during recovery 
operations. However, there are still conflicting views about the cause of these 
floods, the part played by global climate change and even on what global climate 
change is all about. Whereas most community members interviewed were conscious 
of the reality of global anthropogenic climate change (even citing precise local 
effects), floods seemed to be chiefly seen as the result of internal Fijian dynamics, 
in particular environmental and societal deterioration. Both in Narewa and in the 
northern Yasawa, many assumed that flooding was a direct consequence of land 
mismanagement, excessive coastal urbanization, poor development choices and the 
corruption of local customs and values, whether this was expressed within a religious 
framework or secular one. It is fairly clear that the 2012 floods have been incorporated 
into a cultural frame of reference linking natural disasters to social disruptions, 
and promoting self-transformation or patient acceptance as possible responses, but 
also that they have intensified popular questioning about Fiji’s economic destinies. 
At the community level, the floods appear to have revived a longstanding debate 
about the proper limits to development and Westernization, and the balance to be 
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achieved between the “way of the land” and the “way of money.” For some, the 
floods even represented a violent reality check, reminding Fijians that caring for their 
environment, ceasing to fell and burn forests indiscriminately, had become a crucial 
challenge. This is far from leading to a general rejection of Western forms of economic 
development: in the Nadi area, tourism is even considered to be a recovery tool and 
an asset in coping with the current environmental threat. Nonetheless, some pleaded 
for better political control of local and foreign companies and for the development 
of community-based enterprises, which would preserve some key aspects of vanua 
culture, offer job security and even give tourism “back” to village-dwelling Fijians. 
Furthermore, we have observed that the floods served to foster critical thinking 
about consumerism and aggressive commercial pressure to acquire comfort goods in 
urban areas: some villagers explained that the floods had encouraged them to keep 
“free of things,” so as to improve their resilience and practical effectiveness during 
emergency operations. Finally, it has appeared that many were sceptical about the 
solutions under discussion at the municipal and national levels for improving flood 
preparedness and resilience. In particular, we have seen that most villagers consider 
relocation impractical or inappropriate, even worse indeed than property loss and 
a present sense of insecurity. Some community members pleaded for an in-depth 
review of urban planning and ecological assessments, while others advocated social 
or ritual readjustments, for instance a reviving of the Christian spirit and religious 
activity. In the aftermath of the March-April flood, Narewa community members 
seemed to pin their hopes first and foremost on their own ability to cope with floods 
and not on the authorities’ capacity to inverse or control the process, through large-
scale technical measures or political advocacy on the international scene. In a sense, 
the scientific discourse which is conveyed by the media seem not to have led (at least 
for the time being) to a conversion of local challenges into the global challenge of 
climate change, and to a pure externalisation of responsibilities and solutions: 
instead, potential manifestations of global climate change are considered indicative 
of internal imbalances and as showing the way to local improvement.
John Connell
6  Nothing There Atoll? “Farewell to the Carteret Islands”
6.1  Introduction
The Carterets are a portent of catastrophe to come—not only for the other low lying atolls of 
the South Pacific, but for low-lying coastal communities across the world, from Bangladesh to 
New Orleans … These are the Carterets, the islands at the beginning of the end of the world … 
Some time next year the islanders will become the world’s first climate-change refugees; within 
a few years, barring a dramatic reversal, their home will literally go down in history as the first 
inhabited territory in the world to be swallowed up by global warming (Parry, 2006).
A small number of Pacific islands, notably Tuvalu and the Carteret Islands (henceforth 
“CI”), have become iconic sites in contemporary chronicles of global warming and 
sea level rise: the “canaries in the coal mine” and synecdoches for future change. 
The most anticipated physical impacts of sea level rise (SLR) on islands are coastal 
erosion, flooding and salinity intrusion, reducing the resilience and viability of 
small island ecosystems, so stimulating migration. By far the most popular image 
with regard to climate change is that of disappearing islands and populations forced 
against their will to become environmental or “climate refugees” (Farbotko, 2010). In 
the media, but also in various academic accounts, the CI have been widely depicted 
as the first islands whose population must be relocated owing to climate change 
and thus the first “climate change refugees” (Connell, 1990; Edwards, 2013; Luetz, 
2008; Morton, 2009). So strong has this linkage between the CI and disappearance 
become that when “Carteret Islands” is put into Google, the automatic categories 
offered in response are “Carteret Islands Sinking,” followed by “Climate Refugees” 
and “Relocation.” In 2010 Papua New Guinea issued a set of four “climate change” 
stamps all featuring the CI. There is an extraordinary national and global fascination 
with a few tiny islands disappearing beneath the waves (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012). 
The Carteret Islands in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) 
consists of a single coral atoll, with five populated islets, none more than three metres 
above sea level (Figure One). That may already suggest a difficult future, but can there 
then be no other way of thinking about these islands—so frequently doomed to disappear 
as sea level rises? This chapter examines this perception, seeks to account for the iconic 
status of the CI—far beyond what might be expected of a tiny island with fewer than two 
thousand people on the extreme fringes of an already globally marginal Pacific state—
and analyses the way in which Western and Carteret Islander activists alike have applied 
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scientific discourses of climate change to the CI. In short, the chapter queries how the 
complex history and multiple stressors at work in the CI have become a monocausal, 
monolithic narrative based on “climate change,” and then offers alternative perspectives. 
Figure 6.1: The Carteret Islands, Papua New Guinea.
6.2  (Mis)representing the Islands? 
In several reports, from sources distant from the western Pacific, the CI—a single coral 
atoll 85 kilometres north-east of Buka (Bougainville, Papua New Guinea) (Figure One) 
—have already been abandoned. In a fairly typical example, the UK Minister of State, 
while visiting Papua New Guinea in April 2013, stated: “In 2007 the Carteret Islanders, 
in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, became some of the first in the world to be 
forced from their homes by rising sea levels and extreme weather.”40 Similar emotive 
and inaccurate statements have been made many times about Tuvalu, rather more 
40 https: //www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-office-minister-hugo-swire-talks-to-port-mo-
resby-chamber-of-commerce
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iconic in constituting an entire nation (Barnett and Campbell, 2010; Connell 2003; 
2013). Since only a handful of households have been formally relocated from the CI, 
and the problems and complexities of resettlement have become longstanding issues, 
more informed statements about the CI simply focus on problems caused by sea level 
rise and the urgent need for resettlement. 
A suite of quotations follows somewhat similar lines to those of the opening 
quotation. For the western Pacific, an Australian academic writes: 
The people of Tuvalu and Kiribati in the north Pacific, Takuu (Mortlock Islands) and  the Carteret 
Islands in Papua New Guinea, and Australia’s Torres Strait Islanders, are now voyaging towards 
an uncertain future. Rapidly rising sea-levels and massive king tides are encroaching on their 
villages and salt is affecting arable land. The mass migration of entire island communities is 
imminent (Cochrane, 2010: 93).
A British academic describes CI as follows: more than 60% of the territory has fallen 
below sea level; two uninhabited islands disappeared in 1999 and the island has 
been cut into two by the sea (Blitz, 2011: 441). In this way, the CI have repeatedly 
been singled out, with islanders typically being described, here from the Australian 
Climate Institute think-tank, as “the first direct climate change refugees with islands 
inundated and damaged, gardens and water supplies destroyed by salt water 
intrusion and evacuation announced in 2005” (Roper, 2009). A decade ago a British 
journalist reported: 
For more than 30 years the 980 people living on the six minute horseshoe-shaped Carteret atolls 
have battled the Pacific to stop salt water destroying their coconut palms and waves crashing 
over their houses. They failed. Yesterday a decision was made that will make their group of low-
lying islands literally go down in history […] the Carterets’ people became the first to be officially 
evacuated because of climate change. Starting as soon as money is available to the Papua New 
Guinean regional government, 10 families at a time will be moved to Bougainville, a larger island 
100km away. Within two years the six Carterets […] will be uninhabited and undefended. By 2015 
they are likely to be completely submerged (Vidal, 2005: n.p.). 
The phrase “literally go down in history” by then had become repetitive (Connell, 
2013)—as had other similar phrases—while 2015 was soon to become a familiar date 
for reports on the CI, despite no known scientific or other rationale for this date. 
Typically “scientists expect the islands to sink back into the sea by 2015” (Anon 
2008), while “the 1,700 or so Carteret islanders may be among the first people to 
move. That’s because scientists estimate the islands will be drowned by 2015.”41 Who 
the mysterious scientists were has never been revealed. 
41 Keith Jackson. http: //asopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2011/08/the-climate-refugees-of-the-
carteret-islands.html 
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In 2009 the prominent British journalist, George Monbiot, in a report entitled 
“Climate change displacement has begun but hardly anyone has noticed” claimed 
that, two weeks earlier, “a momentous event occurred: the beginning of the world’s 
first evacuation of an entire people as a result of manmade global warming” (2009: 
n.p.). As stated in a report from the NGO World Vision International: 
There has been reluctance to leave, especially among older islanders, but after fighting a losing 
battle against the ocean for more than twenty years (building sea walls and planting mangroves) 
it appears the islanders have given up hope, resigned to be among the world’s first “climate 
change refugees” (Luetz, 2008) 
This and similar reports and comments copied, built on and cross-referenced each 
other, in the absence of formal studies of socio-economic and physical changes in 
CI, or alternative perspectives. Though such reports have a veneer of accuracy, few 
indicate that their authors had travelled within a hundred kilometres of the CI, let 
alone visited the islands themselves. With internet search engines rendering these 
comments immediately accessible to anyone seeking to make statements on the CI, it 
is inevitable that the “imminent end” narrative was rehashed many times over. These 
sources include seemingly reputable (e.g. UN) sources, academics, journalists, film 
makers and NGOs. 
Yet “[t]he vulnerability of the [Pacific] islands is a symbol used by researchers 
who need problems to investigate, journalists who need problems to sell and NGOs 
who need problems to solve” (Barnett and Campbell, 2010). For NGOs especially, 
small islands are sites and sources of refugees, and places that demonstrate the 
harmful effects of greenhouse gas emissions and overconsumption in the developed 
world: frontline victims of the excesses of capitalism. Media reports, building on each 
other and without real local understanding, not unexpectedly invariably attributed 
environmental problems to climate change and sea level, as they did elsewhere 
(Connell, 2003; Farkbotko, 2005). Yet only the CI were going down in history at a fixed 
time, so ensuring their unique iconic status. 
The drama of disappearance depicted in media reports is accentuated in pictures 
and films. Typical photographs from a variety of sources are shown with their original 
captions in Figures 6.2 to 6.6, all emphasising the fragility and vulnerability of small 
islands and their populations. Photographs highlight sites of devastation, where 
islanders wade through what was once dry land, where coconut trees are eroded or 
fallen, and where water has cut in two the island of Huene in the CI: apparent visible 
proof of an atoll whose end is near. Documentary films have similarly lingered on 
disruption, attaching particular significance to high tides and flooding and eschewing 
residual normality. 
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Figure 6.2: “The View of Han (Huene) Island from Yolasa Island, both part of the Carteret Atoll. Han 
used to be one island but has now been bisected by rising sea levels. Fallen coconut trees in the 
foreground were caused by the erosion of the coastline” (IRIN Asia 8 June 2008). Photo Credit: Pip 
Starr.
Figure 6.3: “A mother takes her young family to drier ground.” Proto Credit: BBC World Service, 
“A World Underwater,” 2009.
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Figure 6.4: “Rising sea levels have eroded much of the coastlines of the low-lying Carteret Islands 
situated 50 miles from Bougainville Island, in the South Pacific.” Photo credit: Jeremy Sutton-Hibbert 
/Greenpeace.
Figure 6.5: “The two halves of what was once Huene Island, which was cut in two in the 1980s. Its 
twin, Iolasa, is going the same way. When the tides rise stingrays and sharks swim around. Then 
when the water goes down, the place is wet and stinking. Then the mosquitoes breed and the 
children get malaria and diarrhoea.” Photo credit: Jeremy Sutton-Hibbert.
 Thinking About Sinking   79
Photographs, their captions, and films are dramatic depictions of a disappearing island 
and people and a graphic visual substitute for the absent science: “simultaneously 
scientific denotations of global warming and cultural connotations of danger and 
vulnerability” mirroring wider apocalyptic scenarios of catastrophe, hopelessness, 
misery and doom (Manzo, 2010). Moreover, disappearing islands seem idyllic. PNG’s 
own study records: “islands, which, from space, look like the beads of a necklace 
lying on a turquoise background” (Memafu, 2011). The Times depicts “the Carteret 
Islands—among the smallest, most beautiful and most remote inhabited islands in 
the world” (Parry, 2006: n.p.). 
6.3  Thinking About Sinking
The Carteret Islands group consists of an oval-shaped atoll, ranging from 
approximately 10 to 20 kilometres in diameter, with six main named small islands 
and an entire surface area of about 0.7 sq. kms (70 hectares). Sea level rise in the 
western Pacific is faster than in most parts of the world, but the highest recorded rate 
in the region—close to Tuvalu—is 5.1 mm per year, and that rate has only occurred 
in recent years. No good records of sea level rise exist for CI, or nearby islands; it is 
unlikely to be more than that of Tuvalu but probably in excess of the average 3.1 mm 
per year recorded for the Western Pacific, and almost certainly increasing (Connell, 
2015). While that is significant for the CI, in itself and for the time being sea level rise 
creates few problems.
Short term cyclical events have had a much greater local impact on environmental 
change than sea level rise. The CI are outside the normal cyclone belt but occasional 
storms produce storm surges (sometimes called king tides) that create overwash, as 
waves traverse the islands. More significant for short-term climatic events is the El Niño 
Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a quasi-periodic climatic pattern that occurs across the 
Pacific roughly every five years, and has occurred for centuries (well before significant 
greenhouse gas-induced global warming), changing sea surface temperatures and air 
surface pressures. At the peaks of ENSO cycles more extreme weather occurs. During 
these periods sea levels are unusually high, storm surges more frequent and overwash 
more common. Overwash can reduce potable lens water to a brackish water supply 
unsuitable for drinking for more than six months, and destroy fresh food supplies (in 
taro beds) for at least as long. That was the situation during 1989 and in mid-2008, 
when La Niña was in place, partly accounting for problems that brought in the media 
at critical times of obvious disruption. 
Distant source wind-waves, emanating from the eastern Pacific and not associated 
with regional circumstances, have been an occasional source of inundation of low-
lying areas; late in 2008 swell created considerable damage in the CI at a time when 
regional sea level, due to La Niña conditions, was unusually elevated (Hoeke et al, 
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2013). The impact would have been greater had it arrived during a peak of spring tides 
or in stronger La Niña conditions. 
Relative sea level rise, both cyclical and irregular, is considerably influenced 
by tectonic change, and particularly strong vertical movements around the nearby 
convergence of the Australian and Pacific plates. Geophysical data on movements on 
the plate boundary are extremely scarce, other than in the Torres Islands (Vanuatu), 
where between 1997 and 2009 the islands subsided by about 117 mm—one of the 
highest recorded subsidence rates in the world, effectively quadrupling more gradual 
sea level rise, resulting in considerable flooding and local resettlement (Ballu et al, 
2011; Siméoni and Ballu, 2012). Similar explanations account for parallel changes in 
other parts of the Solomon Islands and PNG, all close to the plate boundary, and for 
changes in CI (Duguman, 2009; Connell, 2015). 
Human impacts from the construction of seawalls, removal of mangroves, and 
sand mining have also had significant impacts on erosion and coastal change (Connell 
2003, 2013, 2015). There is little information on such factors in CI, though they are likely 
to have made some contribution to localised coastal erosion. Monbiot (2009) did note 
that there were “compounding factors—the removal of mangrove forests and some local 
volcanic activity—but the main problems appear to be rising sea levels.” Parry also stated 
“there is no doubt that the islanders have unwittingly made their own contribution 
to the problem. Unlike many tropical reefs, the Carteret atoll seems little damaged 
by bomb fishing—but the mangroves that once formed a natural sea wall around the 
islands were stripped away for firewood a generation ago” (Parry, 2006). Dynamiting 
of reefs occurred when the population grew during the Bougainville crisis of the 1990s 
(Regan, 2010). Various sea walls have been constructed at least as early as the 1960s 
and a survey team in 1964 reported that, already, “erosion is a constant menace in these 
islands” (quoted in O’Collins, 1990). Erosion has been greatest and most visible in the 
more modified parts of atolls, especially where people lived at high densities. On many 
Pacific atolls, islanders are conscious that erosion is part of a “normal process”—more 
of the same—and have long taken steps to modify and defend eroded areas and secure 
land elsewhere, at least as early as the 1970s (Bridges and McClatchey 2009; Connell 
2015; Pam and Henry, 2012; Rubow, 2013). While Carteret Islanders have not apparently 
commented on past changes, and present changes may be substantially greater than at 
any time in the recent past, some contemporary changes are the outcome of cyclical and 
recurrent environmental changes. 
6.4  The Carteret Islands: A Recent History 
Carteret Islanders reportedly fled from Buka in pre-contact times to settle the island 
and displace a previous Polynesian outlier population (Mueller, 1972). Difficulties in 
maintaining livelihoods were frequent in other nearby atolls in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century (Bayliss-Smith, 1975), and it is highly likely that this was also 
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true of CI. In post-war years the island periodically experienced food shortages of 
varying severity, at least since the 1960s, associated with a steadily growing human 
and pig population, and the increased conversion of coconuts into copra to generate 
income, so reducing local food supplies. Between the 1960s and 1980s administration 
patrol reports regularly remarked on food and timber shortages, and occasionally 
made reference to malnutrition, while CI were often singled out as the Bougainvillean 
atoll with the most severe development problems (e.g Kukang et al, 1987). Some 
islanders worked away and when the Bougainville Company no longer took crew from 
the Carterets for their ships “they cut the people short of everything” (Mueller, 1972). 
In the 1950s and 1960s the islands were known to be subject to occasional inundation 
during storm surges, especially during strong wind conditions.42 Resettlement was 
considered by the colonial administration at least as early as the 1960s (Mueller, 1972). 
By the 1990s very little land was cultivated and the main foods eaten were fish and 
coconuts, alongside imported foods such as rice and flour. People were dependent on 
driftwood and timber brought from Buka for construction. An agricultural survey in 
2002 recorded at a time when the population was still increasing: 
There are clear indications of stress in the Carteret Islands. There are serious and chronic food 
supply problems. … so severe that it is possible that inadequate nutrition is inhibiting children’s 
mental development. There are also clear signs of environmental stress. The area on Han Island 
which was previously devoted to swamp taro production was flooded by sea water several years 
ago. The small areas of swamp taro pits were then abandoned. These problems are not new and 
have been reported for up to 40 years (Bourke and Betitis, 2003)
Breadfruit, swamp taro, sugar cane and bananas were all produced in the recent past 
but bananas died during the late 2000s. Stress has been recurrent. 
Adequate demographic data for the CI are absent. The resident population is 
likely to be around 1,200 and the number of Carteret Islanders living elsewhere is 
likely to be about 300, but there is no means of being sure. The Admiralty Handbook 
recorded the CI as having a population of 440 in 1940; after the war that had grown to 
574 in 1954 and 864 in 1970 (Mueller, 1972). The resident population at the time of the 
2000 census was 979 people giving a population density of 1224 people per sq. km, 
the highest of any Bougainvillean atoll and the highest density in PNG (Bourke and 
Betitis, 2003). To remain at home in the islands as conditions worsened was regarded 
as relative deprivation, and by then roughly a third of all Carteret Islanders lived on 
Bougainville. The closure of the mine and a decade long period of civil war, violence 
and deprivation across Bougainville resulted in return migration to the CI and 
increased pressure on local resources, particularly as opportunities for trade were 
especially limited during this time. By chance that coincided with the initiation of 
global and regional concerns over climate change and sea level rise (Connell, 1990). 
42 http: //ianmott.blogspot.com.au/2007/03/rising-sea-levels-or-just-sinking.html
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The following two decades were unusually difficult. In the 1980s cash incomes were 
erratic and unreliable since the sale of copra, shells, bêche-de-mer and other marine 
products was dependent on fluctuating prices and irregular transport to Bougainville 
(O’Collins, 1990). During the Bougainville crisis transport worsened considerably, and 
remained difficult thereafter as Bougainville only slowly returned to normality and 
“outer islanders” (a neologism) were further marginalised. Various Carteret Islanders 
live off-island, mainly in Buka (Bougainville).
Formal resettlement from CI has had two phases. The first resettlement began in 
1984, with a plan to relocate Carteret Islanders to an area north of Arawa in Bougainville 
(adjoining a similar settlement for migrants from the other Bougainville atolls), but 
this scheme ended in 1989 with the outbreak of conflict. Several households had been 
established, and garden food was being been sent back to the CI, but the resettled 
households returned to the CI during the crisis. In the twenty-first century, after the 
resolution of the crisis, a second attempt at resettlement began. That phase sought to 
relocate 50% of the island’s population by 2020. Neither the government of PNG nor 
that of the now Autonomous Province of Bougainville gave this priority or purchased 
land for resettlement, leaving the task to a local CI organisation, Tulele Peisa (“Sailing 
the waves on our own”) with some support from the Catholic church in Bougainville. 
Tulele Peisa regularly reported relocation being needed because of “rising sea levels.” 
The lack of state-provided land meant that an “ideal opportunity for securing land for 
some of the world’s first climate change displaced persons was lost” (Displacement 
Solutions, 2012: 18). Obtaining any land beyond the 81 hectares donated by the church, 
let alone suitable land for successful relocation, was extremely difficult, and Tulele 
Peisa had no financial resources to secure land or develop a settlement (Edwards, 
2013). By 2011 no more than ten households had relocated to Bougainville, and there 
were frequent disputes with nearby landowners. Resettlement was unusually difficult 
because of the unwillingness of Bougainvilleans to relinquish or lease land, the 
tensions of a post-conflict period in which employment opportunities were scarce, 
and the absence of kin to facilitate the kind of migration that has occurred in other 
atoll contexts. Despite frequent stresses, and several attempts, Carteret Islanders 
have been unable to establish multi-sited livelihoods.
Making a livelihood on atolls has always been regarded as precarious: “coral 
reefs with their low sandy islets provide the most limited range of resources for 
human existence and are the most tenuous of habitats for man [sic] in the Pacific… 
Maintaining a livelihood is a considerable task” (Thomas, 1963). In pre-colonial times 
atolls achieved sustainable development partly through extended geographical ties, 
typified by socio-economic linkages across atolls and between clusters of islands. 
Elaborate exchange systems and reciprocal regional and local socio-economic-political 
ties contributed to sustainability (Alkire, 1978; Bayliss-Smith, 1982), though sometimes 
involving feuds, warfare and violent conflicts over land, resources and fishing grounds 
(D’Arcy, 2006, 2009). Survival necessitated external ties. Small islands could not 
afford to be insular. Without mobility and migration life could be particularly difficult. 
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Nearby Nukumanu atoll experienced a considerable population reduction in the 1870s 
following overpopulation and famine, though overpopulation was unlikely to be the 
sole explanation, and adjoining Takuu experienced a similar decline, prompting 
administration interest in resettlement (Bayliss-Smith, 1975; Moyle, 2007). Migration 
became a widespread household strategy, for diversifying sources of income to 
minimise risks, resulting in the establishment of a culture of migration and dependence 
on remittances (Connell, 2008, 2013, 2015). Pacific atoll islanders established their own 
settlements on central high islands, such as Guadalcanal, Pohnpei and Chuuk and 
Guam, or moved to central urbanized atolls such as Funafuti, Tarawa and Majuro, in 
search of superior incomes, education and health services. Unlike so many other atolls 
the CI were unusually disadvantaged, particularly evident after the Bougainville crisis 
and the dual failure of resettlement schemes. 
6.5  Inside the Garbage Can
Small islands offer sites where the great global narratives of climate change can be 
comprehended, interpreted and made tangible and visible, and where “proof” of the 
reality of climate change can supposedly be constructed from indigenous testimonials 
(Farbotko, 2010). Environmental knowledge in the CI is a product of history and 
culture, influenced by scientific analysis, but mediated through the media and local 
transformation. Carteret Islanders, like Tuvaluans (Connell, 2003), are not passive in 
the face of science but actively construct their own environmental knowledge based 
on both observation and knowledge transmission. The science to which they have 
been exposed, limited as it is, confirms exactly what they have observed. Local fears 
and distant perceptions confirm, enhance and emphasise each other, so eclipsing the 
space for local causalities and explanations.
With the exceptions of Monbiot’s reference to “compounding factors” and Parry’s 
reference to islanders’ own contribution to the problem, in both cases seen as secondary 
to sea level rise, no reference to recent environmental changes in the CI has suggested 
an origin in anything other than climate change. Climate change and sea level rise 
embrace the totality of observed changes and scientific explanations. Nothing else is 
possible, resulting in a “garbage can logic” where unusual, seemingly inexplicable, 
changes have occurred, and a confluence of factors have been condensed and 
simplified into a narrative of monocausality. With scientific studies quite absent in the 
CI, “climate change” (or “sea level rise”) has become the sole source of environmental 
change: a “garbage can anarchy” where once separate and complex phenomena have 
become systematically interrelated (e.g. Connell, 2003; Corlett, 2008; Hulme, 2010). It 
would be almost impossible to imagine any environmental phenomenon less directly 
observable, more remote from daily experience and more dependent on science for its 
“truth” than climate change. The science and data of climate change are constantly 
contested and its effects can neither be accurately predicted nor spatially or temporally 
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determined. Any influences on climate change occur far from the island Pacific, and 
cannot be attributed to local activities, hence perceived physical changes that may 
have alternative explanations can still be attributed to climate change and sea level 
rise: instances of “promiscuous corroboration” (cf. Rudiak-Gould, 2012a, 2013a).
Media and occasional NGO accounts are replete with romanticised statements 
such as “Island chief John Kela doesn’t understand the science of climate change. 
But he sees that the ocean surrounding his island is rising” and “Even as the last 
veneers of organic matter are pushed out to the ocean, Tobasi [in Han] prays daily 
for his island. He knows that life on the atoll is coming to an end” (Luetz, 2008: 
17, 20). Science is constantly given short shrift. Ursula Rakova, the CEO of Tulele 
Peisa, frequently returns to this theme. While noting that she has heard alternative 
explanations for local problems, from volcanic activity to tectonic change: “We 
don’t know much about science; all we know it’s happening all over the world” 
(quoted in Oxfam, 2008). Later: “We do not know much about science but we watch 
helplessly as the tides wash away our shores year in and year out” (Rakova, 2012). 
Distant causes absolve local people from responsibility. Among Carteret Islanders 
there is only a single recorded dissenting voice to the monocausal climate change 
narrative, and this dissenter appears to have been quashed: “I used to think that it’s 
because of unreligious activities of the people. They seem not to be following the Ten 
Commandments” (Dreiling, 2009). Climate change is the sole culprit.
Physical changes are considerable and eminently visible. The leader of Piul 
observed: “‘When I was a small boy this shore began out there” Mr Tubin [sic] says, 
pointing to a spot 150 metres out to sea. “One year ago it was five metres out from 
here. There were houses here, and fruit trees’” (quoted in Parry, 2006). Some sites 
are particularly striking. “Chief Bernard Tunim of Piul Island points to a decaying 
coconut stump nearly 200 metres offshore … ‘That used to be our shoreline only ten 
or 15 years ago. Look how the sea is eating us away. We are only a small island, the 
king tides have already swamped our gardens and soon we will have to leave. The 
future of my island is now only for fish, not people” (Bohane, 2009). Various films of 
the CI, and other atolls such as Takuu, and the numerous films of Tuvalu, are replete 
with local people demonstrating the disappearance of their land, usually by wading 
where it was. “We are right where my grandfather’s house was … out there were 
coconut trees and some other fruit gardens” (CNN, 2007). Little can be more dramatic 
than food gardens and coconut palms—the basis of livelihoods—awash in the ocean. 
Nothing more is needed for the media to apply the “refugee” label. Small islands are 
thus marginalized through the creation and reiteration of emotional geographies 
tied to particular named sites, such as burial areas, to remembered places that have 
disappeared, to the particular island and the atoll as a whole. 
Before erosion life was good, and vestiges of that remain, especially to those 
people who have no wish to migrate. On Huene, where only two families still remain, 
Selina Netoi pointed out: “I may not go. You can sleep outside and no one comes to 
disturb you. I like to watch the wind blowing in the palm trees. I don’t have to pay 
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anything, everything is free” (Tweedie, 2009). By contrast “On the mainland you can’t 
get something for nothing” (Redfearn and Metzger, 2010). Selina also observed “You 
do not get lonely here … There is the sky and the sea and the trees, all changing. And 
there are people over there [nearby Iolassa]” (Redfearn and Metzger, 2010). 
For a fifty-year-old man: 
Here we are simple fishermen. We love fishing. If you go fishing and catch many fish, you would 
come and share what you have with me, and I would do the same. We look after each other, here 
on these islands (Tweedie, 2009).
Figure 6.6: Climate change refugees.
For a younger man in Han: 
It’s a holiday island, paradise. When you wake up you think about fishing. You can just sit and 
relax. Check if your coconuts are growing. You don’t have a hefty workload (in UNU, 2009) 
Since the cause is evidently climate change, as the ‘chief‘ of Piul has stated: 
We are frustrated and we are angry at the same time. We are victims of something we are not 
responsible for. We believe that these islands are ours, and that our future generations should 
not go away from these islands. I think it’s about time these industrialized countries realized 
that these island countries in the Pacific are taking the toll. We are bearing the brunt of these 
[greenhouse] emissions (quoted in Westwood, 2008: 37) 
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This theme is repeated in almost every account: local people, with no capacity to 
influence climate change, victimised by distant forces. An anonymous Islander said: 
“We have mixed feelings of anger and sorrow at the same time. We don’t want to lose 
our ground. Losing our island is losing our lives, losing our identity, losing our custom 
and whatever we have” (Dreiling, 2009). Living on Bougainville would necessitate 
abandoning some aspects of culture (notably material culture) and adapting to new 
livelihoods in a different physical, cultural and linguistic environment. Despite the 
threats to livelihoods in the CI, only some of the Islanders, mainly younger families, 
wish to go. Becoming part of a wider world is not without emotional costs: “home” 
remains on the atoll.
6.6  Conclusion: 2015 and All That 
Contrary to recent journalistic and local commentary, the CI face multiple problems, 
only one of which is climate change. Sustainable livelihoods have been under 
extreme pressure for more than half a century while expectations for development 
have increased. Sea level rise, though posing a serious problem in the future, is yet to 
have a significant influence on environmental change in the CI. Flooding and coastal 
erosion have been the result not of climate change-induced sea level rise but of tectonic 
changes, seismic events, ENSO-related tidal and storm surges, cyclones, wind-driven 
waves, and local actions. Indeed, significant physical changes were occurring on 
coral atolls long before the late 1980s when the first news of the “greenhouse effect,” 
climate change and global sea level rise reached the Pacific region.  
But once this scientific concept did arrive, both on the CI and in Western 
newsrooms, it became possible for a complex historical, ecological, and social 
situation to be brushed aside in favour of the “grand narrative” of climate change (see 
Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012; Kuruppu and Liverman, 2011; Rudiak-Gould, 2011, 2012a). 
Disappearing islands and people—climate refugees—are emotional matters, drawn 
on by NGOs, journalists, and islanders themselves to encourage global mitigation and 
adaptation and to draw attention to the excesses of capitalism. While catastrophic 
narratives of inundation, flight and loss may be unhelpful for Tuvaluans and Marshall 
Islanders, who largely favour in situ adaptation over relocation (Farbotko and Lazrus, 
2012; Rudiak-Gould, 2013a), in the CI, where environmental degradation is unusually 
severe and migration opportunities few, this rhetorical gambit provides a moral 
context that might shape a desired diasporic future. Not surprisingly Islanders have 
no wish to be “tectonic refugees,” where no human influences exist, and morality 
is absent. Likewise, whereas in most atoll contexts climate change is a distraction 
(Gaillard, 2012) from the necessity of achieving daily livelihoods, and climate change 
induces a sense of powerlessness, what might otherwise be powerlessness has been 
transformed in the CI into a potential means of gaining new livelihoods. 
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For centuries atoll islanders have diversified livelihoods by migration. Islanders 
themselves and colonial and post-colonial authorities recognised migration and 
resettlement elsewhere as a means of alleviating poverty and food insecurity, and 
formal resettlement schemes were sometimes put in place. In many other islands, 
islanders developed their own strategies for migration, colonisation or resettlement 
elsewhere. Maintaining an adequate local livelihood and achieving sustainability 
on the CI has always been difficult, and has worsened with increased population 
pressure and detachment from Bougainville during and after the crisis. During both 
the crisis years and the extreme weather condition of the late 2000s the CI needed 
greater connectivity to diversify local livelihoods. A growing culture of migration and 
significant environmental degradation increasingly emphasise each other. 
As elsewhere migration and resettlement are entwined with ambivalence between 
the desire for migration and possible superior living standards and a preference for 
holding on to the security and certainty of home. Not all Carteret Islanders wish to 
leave, anchor populations will remain, and, should depopulation occur, the islands 
will become fishing grounds. Tulele Peisa hope to retain a small population in the 
Carterets but not “most of those with income-earning potential” (Displacement 
Solutions, 2012). Migration simply provides necessary flexible and productive 
livelihoods. Islanders are not impotent but, because of land and political issues in 
Bougainville, have limited migratory options. Local agency is not passive, but in 
difficult circumstances has effectively moulded global forces (through the narrative 
of climate change and disappearing islands and people) into external concern and 
widespread acceptance of the necessity for resettlement. A negative climate change 
discourse has been turned into both a romantic essentialism of place and a weapon 
of the weak (Scott, 1995). Carteret Islanders face a difficult future in a troubled nation 
but a “natural” hazard has provided one means of overcoming the challenges of 
development on an unusually small, densely populated and resource-deficient 
island: despite the “scientists”, most Islanders will still be there long after 2015. 
Jennifer Newell
7  Weathering Climate Change in Samoa: Cultural 
Resources for Resilience
Whether or not it has to do with climate change, Samoans have been adapting for a very long time.
Leasiolagi Malama Meleisea, National University of Samoa, 2013
Julie glanced around the circle of workshop participants at the Museum of Samoa, the 
door behind her open onto a warm breeze and the ginger flowers decorating the entrance 
porch. She took a breath. “Look,” she said: 
we are the generation that is really going to have to deal with climate change. Losing the fale 
samoa is a pity, because we are losing our cultural gift, but for me, it is OK. We will have to adapt. 
We have to do what we have to do to survive.43
The fale samoa is the traditional house of Samoa (Figure 7.1). Open walled, with 
sturdy, smooth wooden pillars placed in an oval, holding up a high reaching, domed 
roof, all lashed together with strong coconut fiber, thatched thickly with palm leaves. 
Mata’afa Autagavaia, a Talking Chief and one of the Ministry of Education’s cultural 
specialists, is particularly attached to the fale and all it stands for. He was part of the 
workshop circle. He leaned forward, into the challenge within Julie’s summation of 
the issues pulling back and forth within everyday life in Samoa. “But,” he said, “the 
fale is a safer house in a cyclone than a European house”: 
In a cyclone the palm fronds fly off and fly about, it is fun for kids. The sheet metal on the 
fale papalagi roof flies about and kills people. The fale in a cyclone sways—the sennit allows 
flexibility. The European house falls flat with no time to get out. Don’t think that living in a new 
European house will make us safer. It won’t.44
This statement is echoed in official circles: the sheet-metal fatalities of recent cyclones 
prompted the Head of State to call for beach fale resort owners to “build back better” 
after disasters, with safer, traditional pandanus roofing. Samoan doctoral student Anne 
Godinet-Milbank, working on a UNDP research project on Samoan architecture, found 
43 J. L. L. Saia in discussion at “Rethinking Home: Climate Change in New York and Samoa” work-
shop, Museum of Samoa, Apia. 14-15 November 2013.
44 M. Autagavaia in discussion at “Rethinking Home: Climate Change in New York and Samoa” 
workshop, Ministry of Education, Sport, and Culture (MESC), National Government of Samoa. Apia, 
Samoa, 14-15 November 2013.
Jennifer Newell, Australian Museum
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traditional lashed arches and high-pitched roofs to be stronger in a cyclone (Samoa 
Observer, 25 September 2013). A UNESCO report stated the fale is “highly resistant to 
cyclones” (UNESCO, 1992: foreword). The fale samoa, strong and intricately-bound, can 
be seen to be a reflection of the strong and intricately-bound nature of Samoan society. 
Samoans think of themselves as part of a closely-connected whole, a strong structure of 
family and village, wrapped with cords of obligation, belonging, stories, histories; like 
the intricate patterns of the sturdy coconut fibre cords, ‘afa, lashing together the fale roof 
(Figure 7.2).
Figure 7.1: Fale talimalo (house for receiving guests) built by Laufale Faanu for the Tiapapata Art 
Centre, Apia, 2014. Photo: Steven Percival.
Figure 7.2: ‘Afa binding on the roof structures in the fale at the Tiapapata Art Centre, Apia, 2014. 
Photo: Steven Percival.
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Dionne Fonoti, a visual anthropologist at the National University of Samoa, 
said to me recently, “Samoans don’t do anything alone.” This is both good and 
bad; a network of safety, security, and identity—and a web of surveillance, weighty 
expectations, restrictions and pressures to conform (Goodman, 1983; Lay et al, 2000). 
I am interested in finding out how these tightly-knit communities are approaching 
their climate changed world. What cultural resources—what pillars of strength—do 
Samoans have to support their wellbeing, in the way the pillars of a fale, the pou, 
hold up the roof? These questions have been at the core of the project “Rethinking 
Home: Climate change in New York and Samoa,” a partnership between the American 
Museum of Natural History (New York) and the Museum of Samoa (Apia). The project, 
part of the U.S. State Department’s Museums Connect program, has linked two 
coastal communities who have lived through severe tropical storms: Hurricane Sandy 
(October 2012) and Cyclone Evan (December 2012). 
Moving beyond the usual focus of researchers on infrastructure and economic 
resources when considering a community’s resilience to climate change, our project 
has been exploring how cultural and community structures provide psychological 
and social resilience. The cross-cultural learning from the project has been 
considerable, and is being published elsewhere.45 This chapter is a reflection on what 
we have learnt on the Samoan side. I should clarify that the “Samoa” I am talking 
about here is Independent Samoa, the ten islands (four inhabited) formerly known 
as Western Samoa. Most of the people we spoke to are on the island of Upolu, which 
holds the bustling capital, Apia, on its northern coast. Some of our informants were 
from Savai‘i, the more forested and rural island. To the east of Samoa is American 
Samoa, fundamentally Samoan and the post-1900 intertwining with the US readily 
apparent. My research in Independent Samoa has begun recently: I have visited four 
times over 2013-2014, while working on the “Rethinking Home” project. I do not yet 
speak Samoan and I am fortunate that a wide range of people—villagers, university 
students, government employees and officers of NGOs—have been willing to speak to 
me in English. 
Low-lying atolls have understandably been a focus of media attention and 
scholarship on climate change in the Pacific; Tuvalu and Kiribati have become 
poster children for the “front line” of climate change.46 However, communities on 
high islands are also experiencing radical life changes and wide-reaching impacts 
on lifeways, health and wellbeing. In Samoa, there are changes being felt in the 
higher tides eating into the land in which ancestors are buried, in the dying reefs, 
reducing the availability of food species, in the increasing heat and rising rainfall, in 
the droughts and the growing force of the cyclones hitting Samoa’s coasts, washing 
45 See www.amnh.org/our-research/anthropology/projects/rethinking-home
46 For important reflections on this issue see Orlove et al, 2014: 249-75.
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forests down hillsides and tearing through villages. In all of these are challenges to 
the way Samoans live on their land (Samoa Meteorology Division, 2013).
Like the inhabitants of Kiribati and Tuvalu, Samoans have been questioning how 
they should be living within their land. How to rebuild after a destructive event, how 
to adjust to fast-paced environmental change are issues that Samoans can’t avoid. 
Climate change is also a very visible part of the Samoan administrative environment. 
The Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Program (SPREP) has its headquarters in Apia, 
and they distribute funds flowing into the Pacific from “Annexe 1” countries (those 
recognized under the Kyoto Protocol as the highest emitters). These nations send in 
funding for projects of assessment, mitigation, and adaptation. Each of the projects 
brings a swathe of consultants for surveys and climate change impact statements that 
need regular renewal.47  
The Samoan Government has been distributing internationally-framed, locally 
corroborated information about climate change to the local population through radio, 
newspapers, posters and brochures, essay competitions and courses at the National 
University of Samoa.48 Messages focus on explaining climate change, strategies for 
mitigation and adaptation, with some statements about what it means for Samoa now 
and in the future. The issue of who is to blame is not centre stage.49
Samoa has signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change since 1992 
(Government of Samoa, 1992, 1999). The Minister of Natural Resources spoke in 
Warsaw at CFCCC COP 19, November 2013 on Samoa being in the process of putting 
its “own house in order,” with a National Greenhouse Gas Abatement Policy, and a 
target of being carbon-neutral by 2020.50 The Government has already exceeded its 
National Energy Policy target for renewable energy sourcing. After describing the 
intense tropical storms and other impacts of climate change Samoa is weathering, 
Dr le Tumaalii stated: “Climate is therefore an existential issue for Samoa”.51 Climate 
change is experienced as a thoroughly “visible” phenomenon in Samoa, far from the 
“invisibility” that the global scientific community has long insisted upon (Rudiak-
Gould, 2013b).
47 M. Moneo, personal communication, Environment, Climate Change and Crisis Prevention and Re-
covery offices, United Nations Development Programme, Apia, 11 July 2013.
48 L. Apelu, personal communication, Museum of Samoa, Ministry of Education, Sport, and Culture 
(MESC), Samoan Government, Apia, 10 July 2013 and F. Latu, personal communication, National Uni-
versity of Samoa, Apia, November 2013.
49 On blame as a key dimension of how people engage in the issue of climate change, see Rudiak-
Gould, 2014a.
50 F. Tumaalii, Statement to the High Level Segment, 19th Conference to the Parties to the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC/CMP9, Warsaw, 21 November 2013.
51 Tumaalii, Statement, 2013.
92   Weathering Climate Change in Samoa: Cultural Resources for Resilience
7.1  Sources of Resilience
Resilience to climate change can be seen as a combination of cultural and ecological 
resilience (Peterson, 2000; Adger, Brown, Nelson et al, 2011). Cultural resilience 
encompasses the ways a society and its individuals are fitted to deal with environmental 
changes and challenges by virtue of their cultural mores, belief systems, their social, 
religious, economic and political relationships and capacities. Ecological resilience 
comes down to the capacity of an ecological system, including its people, to bounce 
back from a changing set of physical parameters. 
I am most interested in cultural resilience, and within this, the capacity that 
Samoans (or any other group) have to manage their “interior” (psychological) 
world and manage their “exterior” (physical) environments, to deal as effectively as 
possible with climate change. By managing their interior world, I mean managing 
their wellbeing as individuals, families, villages and as a society as a whole. This 
encompasses the extent to which at each of these levels people maintain senses of 
security, solidarity, identity, clarity of purpose, and other positive feelings. 
Samoans recognize that an important part of their resilience is contributed by 
their culture, “The Samoan Way”: fa’a Samoa (see Meleisea, 1987). Fa’a Samoa is a 
particular, Samoan, approach to living. It is at heart the strong social cohesion; ways 
of relating to each other and to environments; customs and material culture; long 
traditions of being both rooted in land and effective in migration; and a capacity for 
adaptability. 
The conversation between Julie and Mata’afa reflects the extent to which climate 
change is heightening the challenges that “modernity” poses to fa’a Samoa. While 
there is a sense that the environment has always been full of dangers, there has been 
a slow rise over the past few decades of an extra swathe of serious threats to families, 
homes and landscapes, and a threat to the practice of customs.52 People are assessing 
their safety and security, and how they lead their lives, now and into the future. Here, 
as elsewhere, climate change is a “threat multiplier” (Crate and Nuttall, 2009).
How each family approaches these increasing threats—what blending of 
holding onto traditions, or adopting new ideas and things—is variable. A physical 
manifestation of the fluid and contested nature of how a Samoan individual can be in 
the world can be seen in the way fale are a fluid and contested form, especially now 
that people are feeling the need for more physical security. Many Samoan families 
retain at least one traditional-style fale on the family land, in its open-walled, 
shady, breezy structure made of local materials, offering open hospitality, a public 
monitoring of behaviour, and embodying a sublimation of individual life to the larger 
family (Franco and Mageo Aga, 1997). Often the other houses on the family land are 
52 L. Duffy-Iosefa, interview with J. Newell at Conservation International main office, Apia, 10 July 
2013.
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built with iron roofs and more protective, private, enclosing walls of concrete blocks 
and glass windows.53 One of the participants in the “Rethinking Home” workshop at 
the Museum of Samoa had energetically defended the centrality of the traditional fale 
for maintaining Samoa’s cultural strength and social accountability, but said quietly 
to me afterwards, “actually, I couldn’t live in a fale. I have to keep my children safe.” 
One can see these dynamics in terms of an interplay between, on the one hand, 
a conceptual “pathway” from the land and from the past, which brings traditional 
ways of being (and which is generally given the moral high ground), and on the other, 
pathways from across the ocean, bearing different ways of being, thinking, and a 
degree of kudos attached to cosmopolitan attainments.54 These new pathways have 
arrived over time on canoes from other Pacific islands, tall ships from Europe, steamers 
from America, warships, airplanes, with travellers, traders and invaders. The original 
Samoan conception of the universe being contained within a dome of the sky, ending 
at the horizon (Lay et al, 2000), was broken through by white papalagi voyagers in 
the 1700s.55 Since then the paths from the outside world have offered up ideas like 
Christianity and Western science; techniques like timber milling and wage labour, 
and goods of utility and desire: cotton cloth, tinned beef, cars, sunglasses and mobile 
phones. These things fall into a category that is spoken of locally as “modernity,” 
papalagi, or more casually pālagi. How one walks the ancient path from the land, 
and whether one merges or ignores the paths that have landed from overseas, has 
long been the subject of energetic debates, discussions, and individual, everyday 
accommodations. It has always, and perhaps always will, cause a sense of loss for 
many Samoans when new ways cover over the old. As a character in Sia Figiel’s Where 
We Once Belonged says: “Each time a child cries for Coca-Cola instead of coconut-
juice the waves close into our lungs. Each time we choose one car, two cars, three cars 
over canoes and our own feet, the waves close in further…” (Figiel, 1996: 234).
The ways that people are thinking about climate change in the Pacific often has at 
heart a consideration of these paths, in any community you might travel to, amongst 
any group of people you might sit down and talk to or tune into on the radio or online. 
Peter Rudiak-Gould’s work demonstrates it is this dynamic between tradition and 
modernity that is at the heart of how Marshall Islanders are engaging with climate 
change (2013a, 2014a).
53 For a discussion of the changing form of the Samoan fale, see relevant chapters in: Rensel and 
Rodman, 1997; Neich, 1985; Allen, 1993.
54 See Thomas (2010) for the history of Samoans and other Pacific Islanders enganging with the 
outside world, especially through travelling, and their complex negotiations between the value of the 
local and the exotic. 
55 According to Kramer, papalagi means literally “sky breakers”—from pā: to to penetrate, break 
forth, and lagi: sky (Kramer, 1994: 27). However, whether the missionaries who originally recorded 
this term misunderstood it is a matter of discussion by historians. See particularly Tcherkézoff, 2008: 
187-202.
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7.2  “Nothing New”: A Tradition of Adaptability
While many Samoans might find the losses of tradition and continuity that accompany 
climate change are upsetting, one of the key features that Samoans identify within 
themselves, with pride, is adaptability. This is seen as a pan-Pacific trait, entailing a 
capacity to manage living in a difficult, changing environment. Leilani Duffy-Iosefa, 
Terrestrial Program Manager at Conservation International, has said: 
Climate change is nothing new: it is just a Western concept now being put onto environmental 
changes. People have always adapted to changes.56
Samoans feel they have maintained an ability to make adjustments to ways of life, 
and also to take on the changing potentials offered by the wider world, incorporating 
them into the fa’a Samoa. There is some hope and some sense of control that can be 
gleaned from both holding onto old ways and embracing technology from the outside 
world: cleaner energy and transport systems, “climate proof” houses and roads, 
seawalls—industrial solutions to the blight caused by the industrial age. 
Many people see taking on new technologies as an important part of the capacity 
of Samoans to observe, predict, react to a changing and increasingly unpredictable 
environment: “we need our high technology, our machines – our warning systems,” as 
one of the students at our workshop said.57 Filomena Nelson, director of Samoa’s Disaster 
Management Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, has talked 
about a recent study showing Samoan fale to be more resilient than fale pālagi. She said 
she understands this, but also understands the impetus to adopt the new: 
… it’s also because we’re becoming westernized; we can’t really be isolated from what’s going 
on. We’re connected through technology and everybody wants to be like other people in other 
countries.58
As we saw in Julie and Mata’afa’s comments, modernization is seen to be both shoring 
up and eroding the capacity of Samoans to cope with climate change. Many villagers 
choose to use funding from international bodies to install solid, tangible defences 
against the encroaching waters. These are reassuring. But this intervention changes 
existing hydrological dynamics, slowing the release of flood waters, creating more 
serious flooding.59 One commentator stated: 
56 Duffy-Iosefa, interview, 2013.
57 S. Lemalu, discussion at “Rethinking Home: Climate Change in New York and Samoa” workshop, 
Museum of Samoa, Apia, 11 June 2014.
58 Interview with J. Lacey, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Apia, 22 November 2013.
59 Moneo, personal communication, 2013.
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There is so much funding out there for Small Island States for Climate Change, but it deals with 
a short time frame. Sea walls are funded–but these create more damage. We need to concentrate 
on trees. I’d seriously encourage more natural solutions. If people could focus on their cultural 
values that would help, looking to what worked in the past to adapt.60
This approach is one that is increasingly being promoted in Samoa and more broadly. 
A leaflet produced by SPREP on “Ecosystem-based adaptation” describes “natural 
solutions for resilience” such as ensuring plant cover on slopes and shorelines for 
protection from natural disasters and supplying a range of “ecosystem services,” 
compared to no adaptation, or “hard engineering” adaptation options such as dredging 
and sea walls—which can damage biodiversity and coastal ecology (Figure 7.3). It will 
be interesting to see how well this proposed program plays out; it at least has the 
advantage of being more likely to be effective as it relies on the knowledge and activity 
of the people most intimately connected with the place, rather than being entirely 
dictated and directed by outsiders (Crate and Nuttall, 2009). 
Figure 7.3: Brochure. “Ecosystem-based adaptation.” Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment 
Program (SPREP), 2014.
60 Duffy-Iosefa, interview, 2013.
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7.3  It is Not ‘I’ but ‘We’
When you ask Samoans about what helped them cope with the recent intense storms 
and floods, and the 2009 tsunami, they immediately cite their family. The centre of life 
in Samoa is the extended family and the surrounding community: cohesive, coherent, 
co-operative. That it is not about “I” but “we” is often mentioned to outsiders.61 It is a 
state of being that Sia Figiel, in her novel Where We Once Belonged (1996),  lays bare 
in her protagonist’s moment of crisis: “Alone. For the first time I am alone. I am alone. 
I am ‘I’ in its totality—‘I’ without ‘we’.” (Figiel, 1996: 236). Filomena Nelson, director 
of Samoa’s Disaster Management Division, said: 
Samoa is a communal society and that’s a safety net for us in times of crisis. We value the support 
of our families and from our neighbours as well. It’s part of our culture, it happens every day on 
a day-to-day basis.62
Belonging to a multi-generational family and close-knit community provides a strong 
sense of identity, a clear framework and sense of purpose for the individual to fit into. 
It also provides an easily-coordinated body of people to deal with a crisis, a range of 
able-bodied people to care for young and old, and a structure for managing every day 
matters. The main building-block of this structure is the ‘aiga, the extended family, 
a lineage (Lay et al, 2000; Meleisea, 1987). The larger one’s ‘aiga, the more power 
and security one has. A collection of ‘aiga, working together in one place creates a 
nu’u (village). The head of each ‘aiga is the matai (chief) (Lay et al, 2000). The matai 
represents the family on the fono: the village council. These leaders meet under the 
roof of the large village faletele to resolve disputes, mete out punishments, organize 
events, keep the village working. The head of all the matai is the high chief, the ali’i. 
There are also tulafale “talking chiefs,” or orators, and the pulenu’u, like a mayor, 
is an intermediary between village and government. The primary binding for this 
community cohesion is respect for elders and leaders (Lay et al, 2000). 
7.4  A Higher Power
The respect for leaders extends to include the leaders of the church, the faife’au 
(pastor). Samoa is a very Christian nation. From the 1830s the religion had the support 
of the high chief Malietoa from soon after the arrival of missionaries (1830), as there 
had been a prophecy about the arrival of a new “kingdom of heaven” (Henry, 1980). 
Churches of various Christian denominations are a dominant and visible part of the 
61 Apelu, personal communication, 2013.
62 Nelson, interview, 2013.
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village landscape, sitting tall amongst the fale (Figure 7.4). Sundays are dedicated 
primarily to worship, the community attending church dressed in white. As in any 
religious community, the presence of a divine force is a great source of confidence that 
things are under control, providing a sense of being looked after. Our discussions at 
the Museum of Samoa made clear the extent to which, across multiple generations, 
the Church provides significant psychological wellbeing for dealing with natural 
disasters and the stresses of a changing environment.
Figure 7.4: Village church, northern coast of Upolu, Samoa, 2014. Photo: Jennifer Newell.
7.5  Skilled Voyagers, Rooted to Place
One question I had at the start of the “Rethinking Home” project was whether 
Samoans see themselves as being part of the great tradition of Pacific voyaging, and 
if this can be seen as one of the cultural pillars supporting them as their land comes 
under increasing threat. I wondered if they feel connected to a Pan-Pacific voyaging 
heritage, gaining strength and a sense of being able to feel at home in any part of 
the “Sea of Islands” as Epeli Hau’ofa advocated (Hau’ofa, 2004), rather than being 
isolated by colonially-imposed boundaries.
Being Pacific voyagers is not something that sprang immediately into words for 
those I spoke to. A bit more questioning, however, revealed that many were aware of, and 
valued, their voyaging ancestry. There is a sense of a continuum in voyaging, and that 
while Samoans are rooted to place, they are skilled in modern modes of voyaging. Being 
able to travel around the world, to migrate effectively, to keep the link to ‘aiga and home 
alive, to be successful wherever in the world they may go—is an ongoing part of what it is 
to be Samoan. Lumepa Apelu, my colleague at the Museum of Samoa, has said: 
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Samoans are quite proud of being skilled migrators—that we can say there are Samoans in 
Alaska, there are Samoans all over the world. It is something we have always had—voyaging 
across the ocean...that ancestry is still within us. Voyaging was to trade, and we still do that. We 
trade, send back money and things, all for the ‘aiga.63
For Dr Anne-Marie Tupuola-Plunkett, like many others of Samoan heritage, her 
grounded yet mobile connection with her homeland is central to her identity. “I’m 
a New Zealand-born Samoan, raised in Auckland, living in New York”—the poetic 
litany of connections underlines the way Pacific islanders have always lived. Annual 
inter-island long boat races (Lay et al, 2000) and the Samoan Voyaging Society in 
Apia reinforce this viewpoint. With their voyaging canoe Gaualofa, members of the 
Society were part of a fleet that travelled around the Pacific in 2012, supporting the 
revival of ancient navigation techniques and promoting the respect and care of the 
ocean.64 While voyaging heritage might not be a major part of the way Samoans see 
their armoury for dealing with climate change on the ground, a capacity to conceive 
of themselves as being able to stay connected despite moving away does contribute 
to how people approach the question of whether to stay or relocate. This could be 
seen as part of the concept of Va, or the space of connection between things: between 
people, between people and the Creator, between people and the created world (Van 
der Ryn, 2007). 
7.6  On Family Land 
James Clifford has spoken of the extent to which people are now part of the world 
not so much as citizens of their singular nation as participants in routes between 
places that they trace throughout their lives (1997). It can be said that the strong role 
given to routes within the heritage of Pacific Islands makes it a trope that supports 
rootedness to home. In Samoa each ‘aiga is deeply grounded and to a profound extent 
defined by a plot of ancestral land (Lay et al, 2000; Meleisea, 1987). The profound 
depth of connection that individuals possess in family and the family’s land provides 
a deep-seated capacity to voyage well. They depart, but, in essence, they don’t leave. 
Connections are kept alive through regular trips home, through phone calls, email 
and Facebook, through things sent home to support the ‘aiga. Connection to family is 
also maintained for all those travelling by virtue of there being someone in the role of 
tausi ‘aiga, the person who stays on the family land (tausi means “looking after”).65
63 Apelu, personal communication, 2014.
64 http://www.unesco.org/new/en/apia/about-this-office/single-view/news/gaualofa_crew_voya-
ging_across_the_pacific/#.U7-pwRZ8PeI
65 Apelu, personal communication, 2014.
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The depth of the roots in both ancestral lands and in voyaging makes traveling 
away more possible to achieve with equanimity, with a sense of reinforcing and 
honouring a way of being and one’s own identity. This can be seen as a cultural 
resource, a form of resilience that might swing into play in the future, when conditions 
can be expected to become more challenging. 
The flip side of this is, however, that the ability to remain connected to family 
land, depends on being able to revisit—to pay respects to the esteemed ancestors 
buried in the front garden (Figure 7.5), to have the generations, living and dead, 
being kept together. If one cannot, in time, live on that land, voyaging takes on a 
different tenor. Becoming not a temporary stretching of the bond but a severance, a 
deep and irretrievable loss. This is a rising issue on low islands. “Failing to appreciate 
the uniqueness and irreplaceability of the islands,” says Peter Rudiak-Gould, “is a 
common outsider’s error” (2013a: 160). In the Marshall Islands, he writes: 
Locals give disarmingly straightforward answers to the question ‘Why is land important to 
Marshall Islanders?’ It is survival, people say; that is all we have. For an outer islander, seeing 
your land destroyed would be like a westerner seeing his home burned down, being fired from 
his job, and losing his savings account all at once (2013a: 160).
Figure 7.5: Fale with family grave in the front garden, northern coast of Upolu, Samoa, 2014. Photo: 
Jennifer Newell.
This sense of looming loss of everything is something that is not unknown in high 
islands. One of the environmental science students in our “Rethinking Home” group, 
when I asked what she imagined life would be like twenty years in the future, said it 
would be sad, because Samoa would be under water, many Samoans will have left, 
and those that couldn’t leave will have drowned. 
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Samoans are negotiating these dilemmas, and taking up their positions. Faainu 
Latu, Environmental Science lecturer, NUS, has summarized this process, and the 
resources that people have for taking steps: 
Obviously there are people…people who have given up already: ‘let’s go, let’s move, let’s migrate to 
NZ /Australia, we’ll be safe there–if we stay here in Samoa we’re just going to lose our land, we’re 
going to sink’. But there are on the other part of the scale the people are willing to adapt and do things 
like move inland. And it won’t be so bad because we’ll do things that will enable us to survive…
Now our greatest assets are our people. … [there is] our knowledge, traditional knowledge–and if you 
haven’t noticed, there’s a bond especially within families and between families…66
All these bonds have implications in a place increasingly threatened by natural 
disaster. One of the members of our Samoan group laughingly said, of the Cyclone Evan 
evacuation order: “I’m not the evacuating type. No, I didn’t go—I needed to stay and 
look after the family land.” She survived being in the heart of the storm and floods; 
others didn’t. A research group recently found villagers expressed an unwillingness to 
move from increasingly dangerous areas for two key reasons. One, attachment to place: 
“we can’t relocate—this is our land from our ancestors” (Male resident, Siumu West. 
Govt. of Samoa, 2013). Two, there was a lack of other options: “I am not sure where to 
go” (Male resident, Falefa, Anoama’a. Govt. of Samoa, 2013). Anyone who arranges to 
relocate to another family’s land lives as an exile, uncomfortable, “not free”.67 Dionne 
Fonoti, anthropologist at NUS, has said it could be argued that it is precisely: 
because Samoans feel like land is their inheritance they move around, whether it’s underwater 
or not. I’m not convinced that Samoans will leave Samoa or move because they’re afraid of the 
elements. I think they’re more apt to move because of their conviction that this land has and 
always will always be theirs and no matter what happens they can always come back to it.68
7.7  Managing the Tangible World
Aspects of the fa’a Samoa that support the effective management of the tangible, 
changing environment help people and their environments to bounce back from 
environmental disaster and protect existing systems (such as terrestrial and marine 
ecosystems and food production systems). Having the matai to oversee work on the 
lands belonging to the village, along with the village “workgroups”—the ‘aumāga 
(untitled men) and aualuma (unmarried women) (Franco and Mageo Aga, 1997)—to 
66 Latu, personal communication, NUS, Apia, 2013.
67 Apelu, personal communication, 2014.
68 Fonoto, personal communication, 2015.
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coordinate efforts to re-establish mangroves or to clean up after a cyclone, is an effective 
management approach, often operating in consort with government programs.
As we saw above, Samoans are deeply rooted in their landscape. Their original, 
pre-Christian legends of the creation of the island and the powerful beings that animate 
it might have receded in their potency, but there is still a foundation of awareness of 
the landscape being created by a pantheon of gods and other sacred beings. While 
these beings tend to now be classified as “demons” and young people report that their 
parents will get angry if they ask about them the legends are still part of the bedrock 
of conceptions of the island.69 Some commentators report on a continuance of an 
integrated system of understanding, with ancestors at its core: Penehuro Fatu Lefale 
writes: “Samoans view the environment as a total, integrated system, with many 
weather and climate phenomenon being directly caused by activities of ancestral 
beings” (Lefale: 323).70
Certainly, some conception persists of the ancient, mutually-generative, 
intermingled, lustily intertwining couplings, and devastating battles between spirits, 
animals, people, rocks, sea, land. Writing of gods, Sia Figiel explains Pili could manifest 
himself “in any state of godliness he wished…manifesting love in the form of a pigeon, 
lust in the heart of a hibiscus, strength in the eye of a wind, or beauty in the form of 
man” (1996: 139). Some Samoans talk of there being malevolent spirits that continue 
to live on in the environment, that are particularly present in forests and abandoned 
houses, that can creep up on you, and cause sickness, ma’i aitu.71 “People are frightened 
to venture into forests,” Leasiolagi Malama Meleisea told me; “there is a proverb: ‘We 
love the forest, but we fear the spirits’.”72 
There were once ways of indicating these presences and living with them safely, 
as well as managing the consumption of food species sustainably; at the Pitt Rivers 
Museum, Oxford, there is a set of “signs” of palm leaf plaited into a variety of shapes, 
some with strips of siapo (barkcloth) or coral incorporated (Figure 7.6). They were 
hung at the edge of an area that a chief was protecting through instigating a tapu 
(taboo), such as reserving a fishing area at a particular time, or placing a turtle nesting 
ground out-of-bounds (Luna, 2003). Retribution for transgression could be expected 
from the animals and spirits of the area.73 
69 “Rethinking Home” workshop, Museum of Samoa, June 2014.
70 While some of his sources are historic, his understanding of Samoan conceptions has grown out 
of years talking to several chiefs in Savai’i. 
71 Apelu, personal communication, 2014. Ma’i meaning sickness, aitu meaning ghost.
72 Interview with J. Newell at Center for Samoan Studies, National University of Samoa, Apia, 9 July 2013.
73 The signs were collected in Samoa by the missionary Rev. J. E. Newell, in 1887. He donated them 
to the Pitt Rivers Museum, with notes, in 1888. The practice of protecting a fishing ground or grove of 
trees or other food sources by marking the area with coconut leaf signs and keeping it protected by 
dint of the owners’ status and the threat of attack by resident spirits can be seen across many parts 
of the Pacific. The practice of marking areas or species as rahui, restricted, is well documented in 
Tahitian history (Newell, 2010) and is an ongoing practice in the Cook Islands (Tiraa, 2006). There are 
signs on the coast of Rarotonga marking bays that are, at certain times, ra’ui. 
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Figure 7.6: Tapui au, palm leaf figure of a gar fish (rar-aku) placed on trees or land by the head of 
a specific ‘aiga, to protect a fishing area against theft. 87cm x 7cm, collected by Rev. J. E. Newell, 
London Missionary Society, Nov. 1887, Acc. No.1888.5.3, reproduced courtesy of the Pitt Rivers 
Museum, Oxford.
In a threatened environment, an ongoing, intimate, relationship between plants, 
animals and landscape, people and spirits, which involves the heart as well as 
the mind, can be seen to be an important resource. A relationship of closeness 
and respect for the power of things residing in the landscape is more likely to be a 
mutually-supportive relationship, arguably more likely to lead to people treating their 
environment with respect. 
Traditional environmental knowledge (TEK) is a foundational resource in 
Samoa—as it is for many indigenous societies around the world (Crate and Nuttall, 
2009; Nilsson, 2008). A recent study suggests that TEK is still important in Samoa 
for understanding and living with their changing environment.74 The MNRE has 
held workshops with elders to “pass on their knowledge…to share the knowledge 
that ancestors depended upon to forecast the weather, tides and other natural 
changes, before modern science took over.”75 Their observations of signs such as 
cloud formations, bird calls, the behaviours of insects and marine creatures are being 
recorded for a reference book “to complement the knowledge of modern day climate 
studies” (Lefale, 2010; Newsline). 
7.8  Undermining the Fale Pillars
There are aspects of the way Samoans tend to approach their world that erode the pillars 
supporting the wellbeing of their environment. Some of the academics, government and 
74 The Study was conducted by the Samoan Government and the National Institute for Water and 
Atmospheric Research, New Zealand; see Lefale, 2010. 
75 Newsline, 25 August 2013: 2, see also http: //media.bom.gov.au/social/blog/61/bureau-wins-
awards/
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NGO workers working on climate change in Samoa have expressed a very real frustration 
at the ‘blind spots’ that many Samoans maintain. They feel there is a side-stepping of 
responsibility, and a shutting-off of previously-felt connections to the environment in 
order to engage in the timber industry, to fish on a large scale, to put in cash crops, to 
squeeze more money from the land and sea. Mata’afa Autagavaia (MESC) has said that 
in the past Samoans “were careful about using the environment…We got food from the 
forest. The forest was our factory. The trees are our brothers and sisters.” He spoke of his 
sadness over the arrival in Savai’i in the 1960s of timber-getters from Oregon: 
Our people rushed to get jobs. Cutting down the trees. The foreigners sold the bodies. Those that 
were not good enough were left on the ground to rot. It was like a graveyard. No birds…the land 
was desolate, like a battlefield.76
People are seen to be handing over responsibility to two higher forces: God and Climate 
Change. One academic expressed frustration at the changes in conceptual frameworks 
that accompany Christianity that allow people to abrogate responsibility: 
The environment is not seen as something that needs to be preserved.… Samoans attribute natural 
disasters—storms, flooding, etc—to something supernatural…If you think the environment is 
controlled by God, then your relationships to the environment can be quite destructive.77
It is not uncommon for Samoans to feel that whatever happens is the will of God and it 
is not for people to try to change this decree. In a Samoan-made Youtube documentary 
about climate change, a manager of a beach fale resort stated: “Climate change is 
not man made but God’s will. It is the nature of things and Samoans have come to 
understand this” (Lal, 2009).78 Many people feel that they should not be concerned 
about climate change: they are confident in God’s promise to Noah, confident the 
world will not be flooded again. 
Sunny Seuseu, chief climate scientist in MNRE’s Meteorology Division, has said: 
“One of the difficulties and challenges that we face is communicating science to a 
very Christian nation and people”.79 When he talks about climate change projections 
he is sometimes asked “about the confidence that can be placed in this,” and also 
if he is “doing God’s work”? He has to be “really innovative” and make clear links 
76 Autagavaia, 2013.
77 Anon, Apia, 2013.
78 Feagaimalii Leupolu, manager of the Taufua Beach Fales (Lalomanu). He mentions that they were 
wanting to relocate the fales away, to avoid unpredictable disasters like cyclones and tsunami. As it 
happens, the family had started work on an uphill residence, but it was incomplete when a tsunami 
hit Lalomanu, two months after the documentary aired. There was great loss of life, including many 
members of the family that runs the Taufua Beach Fales.
79 S. Seuseu, interview with J. Lacey, Meteorology Division, MNRE, Apia, 18 November 2013.
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between the scientific narrative and what communities are “feeling in their day to 
day lives”.80
7.9  Climate Change as a Cultural Resource
The environmental workers in Samoa I spoke to feel that the concept of climate 
change has become a useful prop for people. On the one hand government bodies 
and villages can deploy the term to leverage funding from international funders. 
If a new road is needed, said one conservation worker, a village only has to say it 
is for climate change adaptation to secure funding. Climate change, as a label and 
an idea, is itself a useful resource for resilience to climate change, providing a way 
of supporting mitigation, flexibility and a way of dealing with a more constrained 
access to resources.81 The term is a convenient way for people to side-step personal, 
traditional, “ordinary” environmental responsibility. The Marine Program officer at 
Conservation International sees climate change being used as a “catch all,” blamed 
for “everything from deforestation to less fish in the sea.”82 “Over the last 4-5 years,” 
he says:
Climate Change has become a buzz word. People are saying there are not enough fish, because 
of climate change, not because of their fishing practices, not because they are overfishing and 
ignoring size restrictions (Van Dijken, 2013).
An all-pervasive scapegoat, it is drowning out former conservation efforts, says 
Leilani Duffy-Iosefa, of Conservation International: 
Climate change is overused; biodiversity is now at the back of everyone’s minds. Everything 
is climate change now. It is “climate change this, climate change that”…Climate change is an 
excuse for not taking responsibility for what people are actually doing. Especially in developed 
countries. It is not as well known elsewhere. In Palau they are more concerned with biodiversity 
and invasive species.83
The sense of Samoans having strayed from the original, traditional path of being 
part of the living, “natural” and spiritual world around them, of caring and being 
intimately intertwined was echoed by others. As an NUS lecturer said: “We have 
removed ourselves from nature. We need to insert ourselves back in” (2013).
80 Seuseu, interview, 2013.
81 With thanks to Tony Crook for contributing this point.
82 S. Van Dijken, personal communication, Apia, 9 July 2013.
83 Interview, 2013.
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7.10  Conclusion
This reflection on Samoan cultural resources for dealing with climate change has 
identified several pillars of strength. The ‘aiga and villages; the matai system; the 
capacity for adaptation; skill in migration; rootedness in land; and some continuity 
of the ability to read the environment. There is also the potential for close integration 
with foundational concepts of a deeply changeable, intimately interconnected 
environment. We have explored some of the foundations of Samoan conceptions 
of themselves. We have explored the ways that Samoans see traditional practices, 
relationships and material things as a resource for dealing with climate change, 
and the ways some of the paths from the land have been overlaid or merged with 
paths from overseas. Some of the loss of old paths and changing to the new is seen to 
weaken Samoan resilience. Some taking of new pathways—particularly the adoption 
of remote sensing, computing, communications technologies and approaches to 
house building—are seen to bolster strength. 
We can see that recognizing existing strengths within a community can help to 
shore up and extend what works. The alternative is to permit the common approach 
of having people from the outside—scientists, commentators, and analysts—decide 
on  resilience indicators and responses (Cote and Nightingale, 2012; Fabinyi, Evans 
and Foale, 2014).
Knowing more about how communities see themselves, about their own resources 
for cultural and environmental resilience, is the type of learning we need as we all 
face an increasingly unpredictable and challenging world. Samoa’s greatest resource 
for dealing with climate change is undoubtedly the solidarity of extended family and 
community. The ‘aiga, as manifest in the fale samoa, is undoubtedly something Mata’afa 
would point to, and he would hope that the fale will continue, a material representation 
of all that he holds dear. He will continue to advocate the fale samoa as the safest house 
for Samoans. And Julie? She is now attending university in Aotearoa New Zealand. We 
can wonder where in the world, and in which ways, she will eventually create a home 
that will provide her with physical and emotional security. Where she and others of her 
generation will settle on the continuum between fa’a Samoa and pālagi  and how they 
decide to deal with their climate-changed world, we shall have to wait and see.84
84 I am grateful to Lumepa Apelu (National Museum of Samoa), Jacklyn Lacey (AMNH), to Leasiolagi 
Malama Meleisea (National University of Samoa), Sunny Seuseu (MNRE) and Faainu Latu (NUS) for 
commenting on this chapter, to Mark Gunning (Gunningdesign.com) and Shelby Pykare (AMNH) for 
their support, and the many informants in Samoa who generously agreed to be interviewed for this 
research. I give special thanks to editors Tony Crook and Peter Rudiak-Gould for their inspiring work, 
for convening the original ESfO session and for their conceptual input to this chapter. I gratefully 
acknowledge the support of the U.S. State Department’s Museums Connect program. This important 
program is made possible by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and is administered by 
the American Alliance of Museums.
Marion Struck-Garbe
8  Reflections on Climate Change by Contemporary 
Artists in Papua New Guinea85
8.1  Introduction
This chapter extends the discussion of scientific, policy and cultural discourse on 
climate change to an artistic perspective on the issue.  It aims to draw attention to a 
Pacific culture as seen through the eyes of its contemporary artists, and explores the 
knowing, multiple and often ironic ways in which artists are responding to reductive 
images and subverting stereotypical assumptions. Artistic responses here combine 
representational and revelatory knowledge-practices, and the chapter is therefore 
also a creative experiment in depicting these contested tensions, and similarly moves 
between modes of knowledge in being faithful to “outsider” views of how climate 
change in Papua New Guinea might be seen, and being faithful to these “insider” 
artistic responses. One effect of this experiment is that the narrative may at points 
sit uncomfortably with depictions of similar themes and similar venues elsewhere 
in this volume. In destabilising these positions in knowledge, the chapter voices the 
assertions, tensions and predicaments through which climate change knowledge is 
being made, revealed and understood.
The consequences of climate change are already felt in Papua New Guinea, 
especially on the atoll islands. Between 3,500 and 6,000 dwellers will need to resettle 
due to increasing land loss, salt-water inundation and growing food insecurity. Once 
resettled as “climate refugees” at nearby Bougainville Island, they are losing their self-
sufficiency as well as their cultural identity. Papua New Guinean artists are conscious 
of local issues and through their contribution they are documenting major social and 
environmental concerns of their people, trying to highlight how they think and feel 
about the threat of climate change.
Contemporary art has been a focus of local artists since the 1970s. Usually, themes 
and motives are dealing with changes in society, depicting scenes of traditional and 
cultural events or body art and decorated dancers. More recently, some artists started 
to focus explicitly on environmental issues. Losing one’s home and culture due to the 
consequences of climate change, losing the forest due to logging by multinational 
85 An earlier version of this chapter appeared in Pacific News, 38, July/August 2012.
Marion Struck-Garbe, University of Hamburg
 © 2018 Marion Struck-Garbe
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.
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companies or staying hungry because of fish shortage due to over-fishing have become 
their concern. Papua New Guinean artists’ art can challenge the perception of and the 
relationship with climate change and environmental modifications by deconstructing 
common views and revealing alternative perceptions. By presenting and commenting 
on their motives (see artist biographies in footnotes, and Struck-Garbe, 1998), I want 
to show and creatively convey how this fear of loss is reflected in their artwork.
8.2  Climate Change in Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea is highly exposed to the effects of climate change and has often 
experienced extreme weather conditions. Some of the 600 islands of this Pacific 
Island state experience flooding and severe cyclones more often than in previous 
years. Manus, Duke of York, Siassi Islands, Mortlock, Tasman and Nurguira Island and 
Carteret Islands have recorded rising sea levels in the last two decades and it must be 
feared that in the long-run, rising sea levels will lead to significant land losses. Coastal 
flooding is already a serious problem affecting thousands of people every year and 
causing migration to less affected areas. Coral reefs are suffering from bleaching due 
to rising ocean temperatures and further falling under threat from ocean acidification.
Average rainfall is projected to increase in most areas especially during La Niña 
events.86 This will cause flooding and landslides with adverse effects on peoples’ lives 
in the coastal and low land areas, as well as in the highlands. Rising flood waters at 
the coastlines and in the river areas are also attributed to consequences of climate 
change. For instance, during spring 2010 many communities along the Sepik River 
experienced the worst flood in 40 years. An estimated twenty thousand people of the 
East Sepik Province were affected. But residents have been able to sustain themselves. 
There are inter-community supply chains thanks to traditional coping mechanisms, 
so that people had enough food and shelter.
The El Niño phenomenon has led to droughts which are associated with bush fires, 
fresh water problems and even frost. In the wake of this event serious health problems 
and food shortage evolved because sweet potato and other crops withered. As happened 
in 1997-8, Papua New Guinea then relied on foreign aid to support her people.
Another climate change issue is deforestation, which is rarely mentioned in 
conjunction with the Pacific Islands. The forest’s importance for carbon storage has 
86 La Niña is characterized by unusually cold ocean temperatures in the Equatorial Pacific, compa-
red to El Niño, which is characterized by unusually warm ocean temperatures. El Niño and La Niña 
result from interaction between the surface of the ocean and the atmosphere in the tropical Pacific. 
Changes in the ocean impact the atmosphere and climate patterns around the globe. In turn, changes 
in the atmosphere impact the ocean temperatures and currents. The system oscillates every 3 to 4 
years between warm (El Niño) to neutral or cold (La Niña) conditions. http: //www.elnino.noaa.gov/
lanina_new_faq.html. 
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been realised fairly recently. Rainforests play a key role in regulating local and global 
climates. Their massive degradation and destruction result in a loss of natural carbon 
storing and leads to an increase of greenhouse gas emissions.
Papua New Guinea is still hosting some of the world’s largest and remaining 
intact forest landscapes. The forests have always provided a livelihood but due to 
continued legal and illegal destructive logging and the conversion of forest areas into 
plantations, the forests and living environment of the people are now under threat.
The observed impacts of climate change pose threats to the 85% of the population 
who make their living from gardening, agriculture, fisheries and the forests. It is 
furthermore an immediate threat to the development aspirations of the country 
which now has to tackle adaptation and to address mitigation plans and to deal with 
damages due to the impacts of climate change.
8.3  Sinking Islands
It was widely reported in November 2005 that the low-lying Carteret Islands of Papua 
New Guinea have progressively become uninhabitable, with an estimate of their total 
submersion by 2015.87 The islands gained some dubious fame, because the inhabitants 
are being called one of the world’s first climate refugees.
The islanders have fought a more than twenty years’ battle building a seawall and 
planting mangroves. However, storm surges and high tides continue to wash away 
homes, destroy vegetable gardens and contaminate fresh water supplies. Due to the 
loss of land and due to inundation, the islanders are no longer able to grow crops, 
such as bananas and taro, to feed themselves. Families survive on mainly fish and 
coconuts, and are battling the swamp mosquitoes that have brought malaria.
The smallest tiny islands in their atoll and a considerable part of the total land mass 
of the Carteret atoll have disappeared already and in foreseeable years the rest of the land 
mass of the atoll is likely to submerge. Due to the fact that the area is small in size and low-
lying, inhabitants will have nowhere to retreat to as the seas inundate their coastlines.
Carteret Islanders now have to move permanently to another place, to find a new 
home. In July 2009, nearly 3,000 islanders began what will eventually become a full-
scale evacuation to Bougainville, the next major island about 80 kilometres away 
from their ancestral grounds. Relocation will continue over the next ten to twenty 
years. As the national and local government’s relocation plans are slow the islanders 
have set up a relocation team. In 2006, they founded the local NGO Tulele Peisa. The 
87 Pacific Small Islands Developing States, United Nations Members, 2009, Views on Possible Secu-
rity Implications of Climate Change to be included in the report of the Secretary-General to 64th Ses-
sion of the United Nations General Assembly, p. 11; http: //www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/
ga-64/cc-inputs/PSIDS_CCIS.pdf
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name can be translated as “sailing the waves on our own.” Their aim and task is to 
support and facilitate the voluntary resettlement of the islanders. They campaign for 
social justice on behalf of the Carteret Islanders and raise money to implement their 
own relocation program (Struck-Garbe, 2009a).
Figure 8.1: Alexander Mebri. “Refugees of the sinking islands, No III,” 2008, Acrylic on Canvas.
The painting by Alexander Mebri88 shows a disturbed crowd. Men, women and 
children are rushing away from their island. They carry their bilum (net bags) 
with their belongings or an infant inside. They have only a small amount of space 
88 Alexander Mebri was born in 1960 in Jayapura, the capital city of what is now Papua Province 
in Indonesia. His family originated from Yoka Village, Lake Sentani, the home of traditional bark 
paintings and tapa cloth. In 1998 he crossed the border to Vanimo, Papua New Guinea, as a refugee. 
Later he moved to Port Moresby to stay with his cousin brother. At the Faculty of Creative Arts, University 
of Papua New Guinea (UPNG), he enhanced his natural inborn talent in drawing and painting. He 
graduated in 1994 in Fine Arts. His aim is to emphasize the subject between abstract and reality by 
driving and losing control of the paint itself producing a special sense of beauty and emotions. He is 
specialized in painting detailed faces of indigenous people. In a personal communication Alexander 
stated: “Contemporary art and tribal art both equally remain valid expressions of indigenous cultural 
values, all my works reflect this culture and are an expression of how it has shaped me from the 
past to the present.” Alexander Mebri has won wide acclaim in PNG and overseas and exhibited in 
London, Australia and Germany.
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at their disposal. The blue sky merging with the blue ocean evokes a feeling of 
being lost in a vast environment and escaping into the void. At the same time the 
painting emphasizes the declining space showing people crowded together. Like 
all the artists mentioned here Alexander Mebri follows the national discourse on 
the climate change issue in the media and therefore he also commented on his 
canvas: 
This painting depicts the experiences of the people of the Carteret Islands in Papua New Guinea, 
whose islands are disappearing through rising sea levels. Their struggle to survive, as their 
gardens are covered by sea water, has finally resulted in their resettlement on higher land, giving 
hope to the islanders.89
Climate change is provoking these people to migrate further inland and is causing 
a social security threat due to enhanced population pressure. The tensions intrinsic 
in migration of people can easily transform into an open conflict as people compete 
over scarce resources. Access to land for gardening or housing and access to fresh 
water could gear up further conflicts among the islanders. If villagers start to mark 
borders, forbidding others to come and fetch water from their community wells the 
existing order might shift (Böge, 2009).
In her terms Ursula Rakova, executive director and spokeswoman from Tulele 
Peisa, endorses the picture: “[f]or you it (climate change) is a matter of lifestyle, but 
for us it is a matter of life and death. If we do not move we are going to be drowned. 
Our shores are being eaten away. Since more than ten years we are building walls. 
But the ocean is stronger than us. Nothing can stop the erosion.”90
Displacement seems to be unavoidable. Rising sea levels are not only eating away 
the land of the tiny atolls of the Carteret Islands, but also at their inhabitants’ way 
of life. If the consequences of climate change are admitted, it is like acknowledging 
that this is inevitable and it feels likes surrender. People want to have a decent life till 
they come to terms with the irreversible relocation. Migration means homesickness, 
means losing land rights and means losing voting rights. People don’t want to go, 
they are forced.91
8.4  Displacement and Resettlement
Fear of the resettlement environment and possible tensions with the host communities 
leads to strong feelings among the families. They want more safety and security in 
89 All statements by Mebri taken from email to author. 
90 Personal communication, Hamburg, 14 April 2011.
91 Personal communication, Peter Emberson, Climate Change Campaigns Officer with the Pacific 
Conference of Churches, Copenhagen, 15 December 2009.
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their new communities. Even though Tulele Peisa had organized meetings between 
the two groups prior to relocation, uncertainties among the resettlers remain. For 
instance, the ten Carteret Islanders who had been transferred from the islands to 
mainland Bougainville in 2009 could not get the legal rights to the land they needed. 
Potential problems related to landowning and the feeling of insecurity towards the 
new environment drove them to return to their home island.
Figure 8. 2: Julie Mota. “Homeless Refugees,” 2009, Mixed media on paper.
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This collage from Julie Mota92 pictures a couple. The woman is holding a baby 
in her arms. They are in distress, moving, fleeing and leaving their hearts behind. 
People are faced with looming crises or in other words: “we have a feeling of anxiety, 
a feeling of uncertainty because we know that we will be losing our homes. It is our 
identity. It is our whole culture at stake,” to quote Ursula Rakova again.93 This attitude 
becomes apparent in the remark of a tribal chief of the Carteret Islands, when asked 
by a journalist: Are you not afraid to stay on the island? He answered: “I am not 
frightened. If the island is lost, I’m lost too. I’ll get lost with the island”.94
Loss of the land is a disaster. Living on other peoples’ land is not an easy way of 
life. Land is a very high-ranking issue not only in Papua New Guinea but in the Pacific 
as a whole. Pacific identity is closely connected with land: “the land is part of me and 
I am part of the land.” Furthermore, land has spiritual quality and connects people 
with the past, present and future. It is life and nurture and it gives the inhabitants a 
sense of being and belonging. They burrow the umbilical cord into the ground where 
the offspring are born and want to be buried at this particular place when they die. 
The inhabitants are the guardians of the land and want to stay where they belong, 
maintaining the key link with the land. In short: land holds life together and holds 
meaning, land equals identity. People’s intimate connection to land makes its loss a 
personal disaster.
If the land is already inundated by salt-water, gardening is becoming a major 
problem. This adds to the workload of women. They have to find another piece of land 
to start again to grow a productive food garden. The new garden might be farther away 
from home and the journey to and from will take a longer time. If there is a shortage of 
land women’s concern increases. They are at the heart of climate change vulnerability 
(Boncour and Burson, 2010; Struck-Garbe, 2009b).
Even though women have the roles of care giver, agriculture worker and water 
provider they are mostly marginalised from information about and participation 
in climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies. As traditional custodians 
92 Julie Mota was born 1978 in Lae, Morobe Province. In 1998 she graduated in dramatics and play-
writing at the Faculty of Creative Arts at UPNG. She also took drawing classes at UPNG. Her interest 
in art originates from her family’s background. She descends from Tufi in the Oro Province, an 
area which is famous for its women’s face tattoos and tapa clothes. Julie Mota stated in a personal 
conversation: “For me to follow in my great grandmothers’ and grandmothers’ footsteps and put ink 
on paper instead on bark cloth and make my mark in history is a tremendous and privileged task. 
My work is influenced by traditional legends and stories told by my grandparents.” A lot of her work 
deals with gender issues in contemporary Papua New Guinea and shows women being humiliated 
or victims of male violence. Another concern of her depicted in her paintings is peril and troubles of 
modern urban life. Julie Mota’s work had been exhibited in Canada, the USA and Germany.
93 Personal communication in Tinputz, Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, March 2011.
94 Marshall, Steve (2007): PNG-Carteret Islands, Broadcast: http: //www.abc.net.au/foreign/con-
tent/2007/s1903373.htm
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of the land women have passed on their skills in natural resource management for 
generations. Through their experiences, they have acquired valuable knowledge that 
will allow them to contribute positively to the identification of appropriate adaptation 
and mitigation techniques, if only they are given the chance to voice their ideas or 
become agents of change. On the Carteret Islands women have accumulated ancestral 
knowledge about water supplies that will be useful in planning and implementing 
community level adaptation strategies. Carteret society is matrilineal: mothers now 
fear that they will never be able to pass their land to their daughters because their 
heritage will be gone by then.
Despite women being central figures in everyday life and often having considerable 
knowledge and skills they are mostly excluded when it comes to politics and decision-
making. This also holds true for resettlement issues. The lack of recognition of the role 
of women in the use of the land and their right to determine how it is used is a major 
obstacle in the development of adaptation strategies. This is despite fundamental rights 
being enshrined in national constitutions and policies, and in international agreements 
such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
which Papua New Guinea has signed and ratified. Women are not only in the face of 
climate change denied the enjoyments of their rights but the issue is a chance for them 
to address the key barriers again and demand the observance of their rights.
8.5  Coral Bleaching and Overfishing
The small islands of Papua New Guinea are reef-dependent. Pressures on the reef 
systems represent significant threats to livelihoods and well-being. Strong reefs 
play a vital role as natural breakwaters minimising wave impacts during storms and 
cyclones and as a food provider supplying fish (and protein) and sea-food for daily 
consumption.
Sea temperatures in the tropics have increased by one degree Celsius over the last 
ten years and are still increasing currently.95 Reef building corals become stressed by 
higher temperatures, they are bleached and die in great numbers. Fewer corals mean 
less protection and less food for the islanders in times when they are experiencing 
stronger and heavier storms at the same time (Hoegh-Guldberg, 1999).
Figure 8.3 by Alexander Mebri illustrates people walking on the reef looking for 
fish and shellfish. They seem to be in panic because they cannot find any seafood. He 
gives the following statement about his painting: “Marine life in the Pacific is slowly 
being destroyed, as uncontrolled fishing is being carried out by more developed 
countries, with bigger ships and sophisticated machinery. The simple coastal villager 
95 Marshall, Steve (2007): PNG-Carteret Islands, Broadcast; http: //www.abc.net.au/foreign/con-
tent/2007/s1903373.htm
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now struggles to catch fish for his daily family’s meal.” His comment points to an 
additional problem: having fished out their own waters, countries like Japan, Taiwan, 
Korea, China, the United States and Spain are now sending their industrial fishing 
fleets to the Pacific to exploit the region’s stocks. Overfishing is seriously depleting 
tuna stocks and destructive fishing practices are killing other valuable marine life. 
Pacific Island countries are being exploited for their resources. For them the ocean is 
no longer the provider of food. This is a terrifying situation and such a threat to the 
sustainability of the entire social-eco-system of the islands that it obviously forces the 
islanders to act desperately.
Figure 8.3: Alexander Mebri. “Where has my fish gone, No II,” 2008, Acrylic on Canvas.
8.6  Deforestation
The importance of the forest and the necessity for reducing emissions from 
deforestation was quickly recognized by Papua New Guinea’s then long-time Prime 
Minister Michael Somare. He said at the UNFCCC COP 13/CMP3 meeting in Bali in 
December 2007: “If we lose the world’s forests we lose the fight against climate 
change. Rainforests are our earth’s greatest utility—our planet’s lungs, thermostat, 
and air-conditioning system.”96 Despite this comprehension the Somare government 
96 Spiegel Online Wissenschaft: 02.05.2011, Prognose: Meeresspiegel steigt stärker als erwartet; http: 
//www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/natur/0,1518,760148,00.html
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continued to facilitate the expansion of large-scale industrial and destructive logging. 
Over the past years successive governments before and after him have favoured 
industry over the environment, staunchly defending the interests of foreign logging 
companies and supporting their illegal activities. Local people have not benefited from 
large-scale foreign owned development and industries, and  government corruption 
does not effectively manage revenue from extractive and lumber developments 
so that services like hospitals, roads and schools are available to the population. 
Furthermore, the public also does not have the information available to hold the 
government accountable for mismanagement.
Figure 8.4: Julie Mota. “Forest Concern,” 2009, Pen illustration, charcoal and watercolor on paper.
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Although much of this area is still untouched Papua New Guinea is losing 
the struggle against forest degradation due to current policies and practices. Poor 
governance and a high level of corruption have led to large-scale illegal logging. Forest 
management is poor. The people have seen no benefit from logging, just destruction. 
At some stage, they thought they give away forest for development. According to a 
former missionary and landowner Brother Jim Coucher from Vanimo: “At first they 
welcome the loggers because they think it might mean money, but in fact they get 
very little out of it. The loggers don’t do any replanting or clearing up at all … and they 
give no benefits to the people. They use bulldozers to drag the logs which create all 
sorts of problems with erosion.”97 Forest protection on the one hand and small-scale 
eco-forestry on the other could be a way to slow down the speed of destruction and to 
solve the problems of forest loss.
In “Bush Fire” Alexander Mebri depicts a couple who is involved in inflaming a 
bush fire. In the background, there are other people standing closer to the origin of 
the fire. In the flames appear the eyes of their ancestors watching and crying with 
black tears. The eyes are also symbolising the soul of the forest. The artist comments 
on his works as followed: “Bush fires, one cause of climate change in the world today, 
are caused by uncontrolled burning of forests to make more gardens as population 
increases.”
A significant threat to Papua New Guinea’s forests is agricultural expansion. 
The country’s high population growth rate (3.1%) means increasing amounts of land 
are converted for subsistence agriculture. Each year 50,000-60,000 h.a. are cleared 
totally and permanently: 45% for agriculture, 48% for industrial logging, and the 
rest for infrastructure98. As the population neared 7.8 million in 2014 with over 80% 
of this population living a traditional rural subsistence lifestyle, the capacity of the 
ecosystems to continue to support the country’s rural population has come under 
threat. More people impose greater demands on natural resources. Over the past 30 
years, the country’s population has more than tripled, from 2.1 million to 7.3 million 
in 2011.99
Typically, fire is used for land-clearing and at times—especially during dry El 
Niño years—agricultural fires can go out of control. During the 1997-8 El Niño events, 
fires burned thousands of hectares of dried-out forest while hundreds of people died 
from food shortages and famine in the central highlands.
97 http: //www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/45991/newsDate/13-Dec-2007/story.htm 
98 Zwartz, Barney (27.02.2010): Rampant logging‚ destroying PNG; http: //www.smh.com.au/envi-
ronment/rampant-logging-destroying-png-20100226-p94l.html
99 http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/papua-new-guinea/4378/pngs-population-stands-at-
around-78-milliongrowth-/ (24 January 2014). 
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Figure 8.5: Alexander Mebri. “Bush Fire,” 2008, Acrylic on Canvas.
One aspect of Alexander Mebri’s statement is based on the assumption that the smaller 
forests are, the less carbon dioxide (CO2) is absorbed by trees; this then accumulates 
in the atmosphere as a result of pollution. Deforestation is one of the main causes of 
climate change, accounting for almost a fifth of all greenhouse gas emissions. At the 
same time, there will be an increased presence of CO2 if trees are being burnt or being 
logged (Greenpeace, 2008).
The greatest hazard for the ecology of the rainforest in Papua New Guinea derives 
from industrial logging. Officially it is the so-called “selected logging” that takes 
place. However, in fact at the present, as well as for the past two decades, forest 
harvesting has occurred in a destructive and in an ecologically unsustainable fashion. 
Phil Shearman’s report shows nearly one quarter of the rainforest was damaged or 
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destroyed between 1972 and 2002 (Shearman et al, 2009). The numbers indicate that 
Papua New Guinea cannot and does not regulate forest operations. Under the Special 
Agricultural Business Leases (SABLs)—introduced in 1996 and meant to develop 
small-scale agricultural projects on the local level—a rapid deforestation happened 
which was accompanied with a huge land grab. Over 5 million hectares (12% of 
Papua New Guinea’s landmass) of customarily owned land has been given to foreign 
companies for 99 year leases despite landowners’ opposition. This deed violated the 
rights of indigenous people and caused harm to their livelihoods and the natural 
resources they depend on. The government yet is still failing to take a meaningful 
action to address this problem. Meanwhile the deforestation goes on.
8.7  Pacific Islands and the Global Challenge
The impacts of climate change are being felt hardest by some of the world’s poorest and 
remote communities with little opportunity or support for adaptation to these impacts. 
In 2008, Kiribati’s then President Anote Tong said at an environmental conference in 
New Zealand: “The climate change is not an issue of economic development; it is an 
issue of human survival.”100 But nothing has changed. The emissions in the atmosphere 
will carry on contributing to climate change, so the small low-lying islands will be 
submerged within this century, according to the worst-case scenarios.
Ursula Rakova is riled at this perspective. “We are angry. Some of our people do 
not understand the science, but they know they are losing their homes and they are 
angry they have to pay for what other people in industrialised nations have done.”101 
John Danger102 illustrates her comment.
100 United Nations Environment Programme: The Environment in the News, 2008, 6 June, World 
Environment Day Coverage, p. 12
101 Morton, Adam (28 July 2009): First climate refugees start move to new island home; http: //www.
theage.com.au/national/first-climate-refugees-start-move-to-new-island-home-20090728-e06x.html
102 John Danger Ulka was born in 1969 in the village of Kakagl in the Simbu Province where he grew 
up and went to a local school. In 1999 he moved to Port Moresby and became a grass roots artist 
without any formal training. His paintings depict scenes of the people and their surroundings of his 
home country in a kind of naive and two-dimensional way. John’s paintings are popular with the tou-
rists and local people including business houses in Port Moresby. He is currently the spokesperson for 
all so-called street artists in Port Moresby. John Danger is well-known in Papua New Guinea and has 
been participating in art shows and exhibitions in the country for many years.
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Figure 8.6: John Danger. “Climate Change,” 2009, Acrylic on Material.
In his painting, he depicts the human influence on climate change. Industrial 
activities in the developed countries produce carbon dioxide and increase the 
greenhouse gases’ concentration while the island village is drowned due to sea level 
rise. Despite the fact that Pacific Island countries are low-emitters of greenhouse 
gases, they are in fact among the most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate 
change. They are the first victims of climate change, which tremendously hampers 
their development.
The concerted call of Pacific Island nations for a globally coordinated response 
to climate change for years seems to trail off unheard. The people fear that many of 
the islands will disappear under the ocean if climate change is allowed to continue. 
The consequences of climate change are already felt in Papua New Guinea 
and discussed in the mass media by NGOs, politicians and church representatives. 
Contemporary art in some parts has always dealt with the problems of modernity 
in the country and has now taken up climate change as a theme. Living in a 
contemporary society that is culturally diverse, rapidly changing and threatened 
by environmental disasters and damages means it is important that the arts of this 
society embrace and reflect these changes. Art is a sensor of society and it challenges 
perceptions of climate change by visualising the feelings of threat and danger that 
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come along with climate change. Even though artists want to be relevant in their 
culture and society they see their artwork also as a message to the outside, to the 
global world. The underlying narrative acknowledges that the rich countries have 
responsibility for the current excess of carbon in the atmosphere, and therefore 
should support the poor countries in their fight against the consequences of climate 
change. Their paintings can be seen as participating in an unfolding and contested 
conversation between North and South.
Joeli Veitayaki, Elisabeth Holland
9  Lessons from Lomani Gau Project, Fiji: A Local 
Community’s Response to Climate Change
9.1  Introduction
Life in the Pacific Islands is being transformed by climate change: higher 
temperatures are causing coral bleaching and will affect crops and biodiversity; 
rising seas are consuming the coastal areas and causing salt water intrusion that 
is affecting freshwater supplies; carbon dioxide emitted by fossil fuel combustion 
is being absorbed by the ocean, resulting in changing pH levels leading to ocean 
acidification; and more frequent and severe storms and tropical cyclones will 
exacerbate floods and loss of human lives and property. Climate change is altering 
ecosystems and affecting how Pacific Islanders live in their small island developing 
states—already burdened by rapidly increasing populations; limited land area; 
restricted natural resources to accommodate people’s development aspirations; 
limited finance and scarce and unskilled labour. With such wide-ranging impacts 
on people’s lives, climate change is regarded as the greatest challenge to life in 
the Pacific Islands in years ahead. This makes the effort of Pacific Islanders to live 
with climate change remarkable. While climate change adaptation is everybody’s 
responsibility and Pacific Island Governments are taking action at national and 
international levels, the focus in this paper will be on how local communities that 
are dependent on their land and marine resources are taking action to protect their 
sources of livelihood and adapt to the new reality ravaged by climate change. 
Local Fijian communities heavily depend on their island environment that is 
dominated by the sea and marine resources. These people are at the forefront of 
attempts to live with climate change, which is expected to have devastating impacts 
that may mean relocation and the alteration of all their rights. Although indigenous 
Fijians have ownership rights over their environmental resources whose uses are 
regulated under customary arrangements and practices, Fijians today have to 
ensure that their environmental resources provide for them as well as succeeding 
generations in a time when customary arrangements may no longer be effective 
and appropriate. Already, many of the time-tested customary arrangements have 
been altered owing to the transition to a cash-based economic system and other 
aspects of globalisation now witnessed in the country. In addition, Fijians have to 
adapt to changing climatic conditions using both the knowledge and practices of 
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their ancestors alongside appropriate contemporary methods spearheaded by their 
governments and civil society organisations. It is critical that the people quickly 
realize that their best development option is to ensure that their natural resources 
continue to provide for them in the future even in the face of climate change, 
increasing populations and other pressures. 
This chapter highlights the effects of climate change in a rural indigenous Fijian 
community where it is customary to prepare for eventualities while there is still 
time (vakarau ni se siga toka—prepare while there is still daylight). The paper will 
examine how the people on Gau Island relate to climate change and how they are 
dealing with it. The chapter demonstrates how the people have addressed the effects 
of climate change, and contributed to the climate change discourse in a distinctive 
way. This is a co-management arrangement where outside partners including the 
authors worked with the local communities who have customary ownership rights 
to formulate a resource management approach that is relevant to the local people 
as well as reflective of the need to adapt to climate change. This approach has 
allowed the external partners to filter the climate change discourse in terms that 
are relevant to the people, secure the necessary funding support and work with 
the local communities to determine an appropriate set of activities to address the 
effects of climate change. 
The partners organised capacity building workshops and meetings at various 
levels to ensure that the messages are widely known and are used to design local 
solutions. The involvement of local people was more challenging as it meant 
redefining some of their established practices and ideas. The Lomani Gau network 
was the outcome and solution; it provided an association of people committed 
to improving their living conditions for the long run. The network formulated 
resource management plans for each village, which were then shared with the local 
communities and are implemented and monitored. 
To be relevant to local communities who were often misrepresented as being 
free and idle, there was a need to explain climate change in local terms and local 
solutions to convince them of the urgency for local action. In addition, it was 
important to maintain the attention and focus of these local communities who often 
are not committed to long term targets. Consequently, rural development initiatives 
have to be revised to make them consistent to climate change concerns. Fortunately, 
the common features shared with sustainable development, integrated management 
and precautionary principle are not difficult to re-establish in communities where 
the people have complimentary customary practices. It is rewarding when the 
people themselves make the connections and explain the influence of climate 
change locally. 
The Lomani Gau initiative shared in this paper demonstrates the work that 
local communities in Gau have undertaken in engaging climate change, figuring 
out what it means locally and how it can be accommodated and how it changes 
“customary” practices, relations, responsibilities and knowledge. To show the 
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appropriations that have happened in Gau, the chapter will focus on the setting 
on the island, the engagement process to convince people of the need to address 
the issues, the actions that the people have taken to protect their own interests and 
those of future generations, the challenges relating to other societal changes that 
have to be addressed and the lessons from climate change adaptation that should 
be shared to make people better adapt to changing conditions. 
9.2  Gau Island: The Setting
Figure 9.1: Map of the Fiji islands. Courtesy of Joeli Veitayaki and Elisabeth Holland. 
Gau Island lies 80 km east of Fiji’s capital Suva. It is the fifth-largest island in Fiji, 
with an area of 190.1 km2 (Map of Fiji). A rugged mountain range that peaks at around 
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738 m runs along the interior of the island to which coastal lowlands and river plains 
connect. The central highlands are covered with old-growth cloud montane forests 
that are home to the endemic Kacaunigau or Fiji Petrel (Pseudobulweria macgillivrayi), 
some endemic plants and sites of ancient settlements. The forests have not been 
logged, providing the people with clean water and air, wild food, building materials, 
herbal medicine, farming implements, and household goods. The coastal areas, in 
contrast, have been heavily impacted by human activities and, as we will see, must be 
rehabilitated if locals are to successfully adapt to climate change.
A barrier reef system encircles Gau providing the people with: varieties of 
seafood such as finfish, bivalves and echinoderms; sources of income such as fishing, 
shipping, research, live rock and ornamental fish, shark feeding and whale watching; 
as well as building materials such as sand and coral rubble mining, coral sale, gravel 
trading. The coral reef system also protects the 100.3 km coastline from huge storm 
waves and surges. 
Figure 9.2: Gau island. Illustration courtesy of Joeli Veitayaki and Elisabeth Holland.
Gau Island is divided into three administrative units (tikina) that resemble customary 
affiliations that reflected pre historic migrations and settlement. The three districts 
are: Sawaieke, which consists of eight villages of Sawaieke, Somosomo, Nawaikama, 
Nukuloa, Levuka, Lovu, Vadradara and Yadua and three settlements in Nadrodro, 
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Matainaro and Lele; Navukailagi, which has three villages of Navukailagi, Qarani 
and Vione and a Seven Day Adventist’s settlement; and Vanuaso, with five villages of 
Lekanai, Vanuaso, Nacavanadi, Malawai and Lamiti and two settlements in Wailevu 
and Baravi (Map of Gau). All the villages are located in coastal lowlands but the 
villagers have land claims that stretch from the mountains in the interior to the areas 
beyond the outer slopes of the barrier reefs. Most of the villages in Gau are located on 
river banks next to hills near that provide convenient evacuation spots from floods, 
as well as tsunamis. 
Gau Island is home to around 3,000 people. Though traditional livelihoods 
(subsistence farming and fishing) remain crucial, Gau communities are also rapidly 
modernizing. Increasing populations, expanding farms, increasingly intensive 
fishing, greater use of fuel-powered transportation and energy generation, increased 
harvesting of local resources for sale in urban areas, and expanding infrastructure 
have increased local environmental impacts and undermined valuable ecosystem 
services. Sustainable development initiatives are therefore a necessity for the 
continued well-being of Gau Islanders. 
While the scientific discourse on climate change is important in understanding 
humanity’s role in its continually worsening state, it has to be filtered and used 
in a manner that will help convince the people to take action. The engagement 
process is critical because climate change is a relatively new issue that can easily be 
misrepresented if the climate science is emphasised when the issue is discussed with 
local communities. Failure in this delicate phase can wrongly reassure the people, who 
will dismiss the importance of the issue and their own involvement. In addition, the 
people will not realise the urgency of addressing the climate change issues now. The 
demand in developing countries for donors to pay for the adaptation and mitigation, 
demonstrate the failure in local communities to engage. In fact, the dependence on 
western science that focuses on emission figures, provided these developing countries 
false hope that their contribution is negligible and that local communities are not 
responsible and must only follow the lead by developed countries. The emphasis on 
climate science also inhibits the influence of other societal challenges such as ever-
increasing population, poverty and environmental degradation on climate change. 
Ironically, the developing countries can all contribute to climate change adaptation 
and mitigation by better addressing these social challenges. 
Given that local communities in the Pacific region, such as in Fiji, will be amongst 
the first and worst climate change victims, Pacific Islands and Territories need to be 
pragmatic to protect their own interests using all the resources and avenues available 
to them. Local communities such as those in Gau Island need to look for solutions 
that are appropriate for them. Not doing anything to address climate change, is not 
an option. In this case, the Lomani Gau partners from the University of the South 
Pacific and elsewhere adopted a more practical approach emphasising the impacts of 
climate change on the environment. The focus on Gau is on the causes and impacts 
of rapid coastal erosion, pollution and altered coastal habitats that people rely on for 
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their sustenance and income. The local communities also emphasised the important 
threats caused by rapidly increasing population and worsening poverty. These 
distinct but related issues were more relevant to the local people, who agreed to be 
prudent with their use and care of environmental resources. 
The aims of Lomani Gau are to: 
 – make Gau Island a model for climate change adaptation in small islands in 
transition from subsistence to commercial and economically viable rural 
development. 
 – conduct participatory learning and action training workshops and meetings to 
raise climate change awareness and stimulate self-determined climate change 
adaptation responses.
 – formulate and implement Gau Island climate change adaptation and sustainable 
development guidelines.
 – rehabilitate important natural habitats under increasing threat from human 
activities.
 – reduce environmental degradation of natural habitats.
 – use science and appropriate technologies to determine sustainable use of island 
resources. 
 – build capacity and promote good environmental resource use practices within 
Gau.
 – promote integrated resource management and iterative learning.
 – facilitate development of alternative sources of livelihood and income, monitoring 
and enforcement through regular follow-up and applied research activities.
 – publicise the villagers, their flora and fauna, local culture, traditions, and way of 
life in Gau, and their importance.
 – promote project features through publications and the production of visual aids.
With these activities, it is difficult to relate the need for action to the international 
instruments and national legislation and policy because the majority of the people 
have little or no knowledge of these. This is why it is sensible to integrate local 
knowledge and practices to mobilise indigenous, place and community-based 
initiatives to adapt to climate change because this is the logical thing to do. Moreover, 
it makes sense for people to take action using customs and traditions they are familiar 
with rather than rely on conventions and legislations they know little about. Links to 
climate change scientific predictions and theories are only shared once the people 
start to work on their adaptive activities. 
9.3  The Engagement Process
With the need to use appropriate engagement processes in local communities in 
Fiji, the mobilisation of local people to adapt to climate change adaptation on Gau 
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is founded on people’s strong relations to nature (Henocque and Denis, 2001) and to 
each other. The people have customary ownership rights that they need to sustainably 
utilise for their sake and the interests of their future generations. This relationship is 
used to ensure the involvement of local people in the adaptation to climate change 
on Gau. The people are integrating their traditional practices with contemporary 
arrangements and are using social relations and networks to emphasize commitment, 
connections, compliance and collaboration. 
The Gau communities’ response to climate change challenges is packaged 
under the activities of Lomani Gau (“care for” or “deeply treasure”), which was 
established in 2005 to spearhead this community-based resource management 
initiative involving all 16 villages on the island, working towards climate change 
adaptation in the face of burgeoning climate change and the myriad of other 
threats to the livelihood base. Lomani Gau was formed to implement, coordinate, 
lead, monitor and review community-based sustainable rural development on the 
island. The other intention of Lomani Gau is to strengthen the governance at the 
Gau Island Council level so that the rural development issues and initiatives are 
better coordinated.
The initiative emphasises locally deployable solutions that feature contemporary 
sustainable development methods, as well as traditional practices. The use of 
people’s proven and cost-effective traditional methods reduces the uncertainty 
with which resource management is associated, and obviates the need for extensive 
training, as traditional methods are already well-known to the participants.
The most commonly used resource management method in Gau is the tab—a 
prohibition of harvest or use of resources, areas, and/or at particular times. This 
resource stewardship method that is widely practised throughout the Pacific 
(Williams, 1982) demonstrates the commitment amongst these communities 
to make the harsh and tough decisions. Under this arrangement, which works 
better than other contemporary methods because it allows the replenishment of 
the resource by reducing the fishing effort, compliance is ensured through fear of 
divine punishment, respect for the authority of chiefs, and commitment to the well-
being and honour of the group members. This makes costly formal enforcement and 
monitoring measures unnecessary and ensures that the actions agreed to by the 
villagers are respected by all. 
The Lomani Gau initiative was initially trialled in one of the three tikina on 
the Island as Mositi Vanauso, named after the kin-based customary marine tenure 
system that exists. This calculated step to enhance the involvement of all the 
people that have customary right to the fishing ground while ensuring that the 
engagement in Gau was at a small and manageable level that will be assessed by the 
people. Over the three years of the Mositi Vanuaso, the community-based resource 
management activities diffused into the other two districts because the local people 
throughout the island were impressed with the positive outcomes of the trial, which 
included the management of marine resources, management of waste, protection of 
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watershed areas, rehabilitation of coastal habitats, capacity building and securing 
of alternative sources of livelihood. As can be seen from the list, the evolving and 
iterative approach encouraged the people to actively formulate and shape their 
resource use activities and their children’s future utilising their traditional practices, 
available funds and advice without waiting for the national government’s directive, 
guidance and leadership.
Unfortunately, many coastal communities are ill informed of the threats of rural 
development and the consequences of the commercial use of their resources, which 
they are offering in exchange for the money they require for their development 
activities. For this is reason, resource management awareness and education 
workshops and meetings at the levels of villages, districts and island were 
emphasised in these local communities where the majority of the people have never 
lived outside and therefore are oblivious to the rural development challenges and the 
options appropriate to address them. 
The awareness and training covered all important issues to be shared widely 
amongst all the people such as the reasons why they should be managing their 
resources better, resource management plans, project planning and good governance 
practices. The process allowed the involvement of technical experts and the 
introduction of new ideas. Climate change science was not mentioned because it was 
not easy to translate the terms and concepts. Instead, the focus was on the impacts 
such as coastal erosion, coral bleaching and change in biodiversity that the people 
can address. In this way, the villagers’ marine managed areas allowed the coral 
and biodiversity less disturbance and recovery while the management of waste, the 
replanting of tree, protection of water catchment and the ban on bushfires enhance 
the management of the protected area and help the people adapt to climate change. 
Later, the villagers were happy to share that their resource management activities are 
consistent with climate change adaptation measures they were being urged to do. It 
was at this point that some aspects of climate science such as the natural increase 
in world temperature and the maintenance of carbon sinks, was shared with the 
villagers.
This engagement activities allow the people to think, determine and 
systematically plan the rural development activities they can pursue to meet their 
aspirations and maintain their environmental resources. Under Lomani Gau, the 
three districts and 16 village chiefs and their people decided on how their resources 
are utilised while the social institutions offered the line of communication as well 
as the enforcement arrangements. Chiefly decisions are made in consultation with 
members of the community and are then communicated to all those relations that 
need to be informed.
The Lomani Gau approach emphasises the marriage of new ideas and approaches 
with traditional practices under contemporary arrangements. Difficulties arise 
because some traditional methods such as the ownership of fishing grounds and 
institutions such as chiefly authority are inconsistent with national laws and 
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regulations and, in many cases, are waning. On the other hand, the people are 
more familiar with their community-based resource management arrangements but 
are not aware of their responsibilities under national legislation and international 
conventions. The hybrid system being piloted in Gau requires significant education, 
which include the promotion of good practices such as seasonal prohibition (tabu), 
and community initiatives and sustainable technologies such as composting toilets, 
renewable energy targeting pertinent issues that villagers now deal with.
Biological, social and economic surveys and monitoring are undertaken 
to follow up, reinforce and strengthen people’s commitment to their resource 
management initiatives, which are regularly reviewed to see how the people fair 
with their sustainable development commitment in the challenging context they 
operate in. Villagers continuously choose between the immediate incomes from the 
unsustainable use of their resources and the uncertain and intangible long-term 
return from conservation activities. This is why it is important to conduct effective 
consultative meetings, marine awareness and regular follow up activities. It is also 
critical that management actions are provided the time to work, as the positive 
lessons from these resource conservation efforts will inspire the continuation of 
conservation and resource management into the future. 
The partnerships in this project has boosted the iterative method and stressed 
compliance to prove that conservation is more beneficial for the people and 
environment. The commitment to make a difference has ensured that the resource 
management effort on Gau is allowed the time to work and incorporate the new 
areas of development. Gau people have recognised and appropriated the holistic 
interconnecting character of climate change and been able to envision and act upon 
the necessary responses and work. The management system now covers the whole 
island and allows for contemporary approaches such as ecosystem based and ridge 
to reef management while the partners look for cheaper arrangements that are 
appropriate in rural villages. 
Some of the development agencies, institutions and Non-Government 
Organisations (NGOs) partners that have contributed to the management of the 
resources and the rural development initiatives in Gau include the International 
Ocean Institute-Pacific Islands Operational Centre (IOI-PI), the University of the South 
Pacific (USP), Fiji Locally Managed Marine Areas network, the French Embassy, the 
National Trust for Fiji, Nature Fiji Mareqeti Viti, the World Wildlife Fund for Nature 
(WWF), National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, Frontier Fiji, Planetary Coral Reef 
Foundation, Edulink, Conservation International, Global Environment Facility’s 
(GEF) Small Grants at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Mie University and the Fiji Government. 
Financial and technical assistance on fisheries management, aquaculture and 
alternative sources of livelihood dominate the contributions from these partners who 
are united to improve the lives of local communities while protecting the natural 
heritage of Gau. 
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The work on Gau has shown the importance of awareness and capacity building 
to ensure that the root causes of the issues are effectively addressed. In many 
instances, these solutions to local challenges are outside the communities and are 
unknown to local people. This makes awareness and capacity building critical to 
the sharing of new ideas with local communities. 
9.4  The Accomplishments
Gau Island has been transformed over the last ten years since the people started 
focussing on the sustainable use of its natural resources. All of the new resource 
management activities undertaken on Gau are expressions of the care that the people 
are exercising in this new context, form and guise. 
All of the villages are undertaking activities to address the devastation associated 
with climate change. In that time, over US$100,000 has been spent on resource 
management activities on Gau, which has progressed from the marine resource 
management activities to address the threats on land. The villagers have adopted the 
integrated and ecosystem based approaches to formulate 16 resource management 
plans that address the climate change problems the villages want to fix, declare more 
than 16 no-take zones within the customary fishing areas, ban wild fires and reduce 
deforestation, promote sustainable technologies and rehabilitate coastal habitats. 
Some of the villages on Gau are now operating income generating ventures to buy 
and sell copra, kava (yaqona), artifacts, village stores, and cattle farms while others 
have become honorary fish wardens, research assistants and community leaders who 
are leading by charting the sustainable use of the island’s environmental resources. 
The evolving activities of Lomani Gau reflect the iterative methods used to 
balance the villagers’ development activities and the implementation of their climate 
change adaptation measures. These also reflect the achievements of parts of the 
village resource management plans over the years and the wide variety of issues 
that the people can undertake to prepare for climate change. The current aim is 
to declare a forest reserve over the island’s montane cloud forest to be the basis of 
ecotourism on Gau and to improve farming practices by encouraging the villagers to 
farm on the lowland areas that are already cleared. This initiative has been agreed to 
by the Gau Island Council, which in the 1990s agreed to protect the island’s forests 
and biodiversity to conserve the habitat of the iconic Fiji Petrel. The protection of 
the forests is now supported by activities to reduce deforestation and establish farm 
access roads.
Lomani Gau is organising regular meetings and training activities to promote the 
appropriate land-use guidelines recommended to protect water catchments, avoid 
the contamination of drinking water and reduce soil erosion and loss on Gau. The 
importance of protecting the forest to safeguard its ecological services are explained 
to the people who are encouraged to protect their natural cloud mountane forests, 
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protect their water catchments as well as allow for thick vegetation as buffer zones 
along their rivers and coastal habitats. The people are advised not to farm right up 
to river and waterways to minimise soil loss and erosion to the water ways and to 
take precautions to ensure that their use of chemicals is not posing threats to their 
environment and themselves. The villagers are encouraged with incentives to plant 
trees in their villages and surrounding degraded areas that are commonly burned 
while disposal of village waste through better sorting, proper disposal methods 
such as the use of designated rubbish pits and the care of pigs to lessen their 
destructive influence in the villages and surrounding areas. Composting toilets and 
the maintenance of healthy and clean living environment are now pursued in all the 
villages and supported through a yearly Most Beautiful Village in Gau Competition in 
which all the villages participate. 
Surveys of the ecological, social and economic issues on the island have been 
undertaken and used to determine the development activities undertaken by Lomani 
Gau in each village. These surveys and methods strengthen people’s commitment and 
are key moments of cultural translation where scientific information and people’s 
traditional resource use practices reinforce each other. The work in Gau nicely 
demonstrates the global connections that climate change provides in linking near 
and distant places together as part of a single issue. 
Lomani Gau has collaborated with the villagers to set up fish aggregation devises 
(FAD), or artificial structures to stimulate the aggregation of pelagic fish, in three 
parts of the island where the fishing is best, and three village cattle farms. The FADs 
support the recovery of reef based fisheries and target the pelagic stocks rather 
than the demersal species that are normally targeted while the cattle farms are to 
demonstrate the proper animal husbandry practices. Training workshops and follow 
up activities are organised in villages, districts and island levels to formulate and 
endorse activities that are consistent with a Code of Conduct for Sustainable Living 
on Gau Island that is being negotiated with the villagers. 
Frontier Fiji, a subsidiary of the United Kingdom registered Society for 
Environmental Explorations, was in Gau between 2006 and 2012 conducting 
biological surveys of the coastal habitats and sharing their findings with villagers 
in Sawaieke and Navukailagi districts. The Reseach Assistants and Frontier Staff 
Members provided a volunteer/tourist workforce to assist the local villagers with their 
resource management initiatives. The group endured hardship and trying conditions 
to produce some of the first reports on the state of the coastal habitats and marine 
resources on the island. The visitors stayed for two to ten weeks while staff stayed for 
a year and represented the type of intrepid adventurous tourism that can be enticed 
to visit remote tourist destinations such as Gau.
New ideas that have been introduced to people in Gau include participatory 
decision making that is more inclusive and allow the involvement of youth and 
women in decision making; the use of the integrated resource management approach 
that emphasise the involvement of all stakeholders in addressing all of the issues 
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that people need to deal with to adapt to climate change and the implementation 
of appropriate alternative sources of livelihood that the people will succeed in and 
benefit from. Women, youth and children are using their opportunities and are 
undertaking community initiatives that are consistent with Lomani Gau aims. FADs 
are innovative methods that are welcomed by local villagers who are catching yellow 
fin tuna, trevally and Spanish mackerel from these devices. In addition, the cultivation 
of pandanus, and the weaving and selling of Gau mats in Suva, has opened a new 
market for this traditional item and involved men and women who are bringing into 
Gau around F$1,000 per month—money that has supported better living standards 
on the island.
Lomani Gau seeks and secures the funding to conduct training and follow up 
activities such as meeting the costs of transportation to the Gau Island Council 
meetings. The network supports strengthening of governance at all levels of 
administration on the island. It is assisting the Gau Island Council to coordinate 
local government activities and has set up Lomani Gau Tikina Committees to lead 
community work in the three districts. Over the last three years, Lomani Gau has 
collaborated with the village nurses and the Fiji Health Department on the island 
to organise “Gau’s Beautiful Village” competition (Koro Vakasakiti e Gau), where the 
three villages judged best in addressing all the sustainable rural development issues 
are rewarded.
Some of the initiatives currently undertaken in Gau to appropriate climate change 
impacts include: reducing the deforestation associated with the customary shifting 
cultivation method where people farm a piece of land for around three to five years 
before they move to clear a new farming spot where they practice multiple cropping; 
minimising the indiscriminate and careless burning of secondary vegetation on 
coastal slopes which threatens biodiversity including the Fiji Petrel, lizards, snakes, 
and natural forests; protecting watersheds and drinking water sources by declaring 
forest reserves and reducing deforestation and farming activities in water catchment 
areas to assure continued water supply; minimising hillside cultivation to reduce 
soil loss and erosion; rehabilitating degraded coastal habitats such as coral reefs 
and mangrove forests by declaring marine managed areas and replanting coastal 
vegetation such as mangrove forests to enhance their health and integrity; and the 
sustainable use and management of coastal resources such as fisheries and coastal 
lowlands to provide the needs of future generations. 
Appropriating the locally observed impacts of climate change made it easier to 
convince the people of the actions they need to take to adapt to climate change. This 
appropriation of climate change impacts means that the people use the “climate 
change” label to mobilise all necessary community-based sustainable development 
schemes that they would have wanted to do anyway, even without climate change. 
Between 2011 and 2013, Gau villagers have implemented a coastal vegetation 
rehabilitation initiative funded by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) Small 
Grants and the UNDP. The villagers planted over 100,000 trees during the project 
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period and were awarded the 2013 Prime Minister’s Forest Conservationist of the Year 
award by the Ministries of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests, which have promised 
training assistance, seedlings and technical advice on the reserve and heritage site 
that the people of Gau are currently discussing. Tree planting on the island is now used 
to maintain environment health by ensuring that the vegetative cover is maintained 
to reduce soil erosion and loss, prepare for climate change, enhance the inshore or 
reef-based fisheries resources by diverting some of the fishing effort elsewhere and 
provide an alternative source of income. 
The success of this coastal rehabilitation initiative is strengthening the 
commitment in Gau to protect the old-growth forest and pursue alternative uses of 
the forested lands. There is growing interest in Gau to declare the island a heritage 
site where people can live full lives in harmony with nature. The Gau Island Council 
has endorsed moves to declare the cloud forest a reserve, partly to boost the potential 
for ecotourism. With the marine protected areas, cultural sites and natural and 
geographical features such as the shark nursery and submerged offshore reefs, Gau 
people should have enough attractions to entice ecotourism which can be hosted by 
local landowning groups. This would promote Gau as an ecotourism destination and 
offer new income sources to local people. 
In 2013, Mie University in Japan, the Department of the Environment in Fiji, IOI-PI 
and USP agreed to collaborate with the local villagers on a Sustainable Development 
and Governance in Gau project to make resource management beneficial to local 
communities. Some of the activities that are being pursued include the introduction 
of new agricultural and fishing practices including the provision of three village pig 
fences where all the village households will build their individual pens inside a well 
fenced area, another cattle farm where the people of three neighbouring villages will 
raise their animals and three bakeries that the villagers can use to make bread from 
local food crops and provide sources of income. The establishment of the village pig 
farms is the first phase to the production of biogas, which can be regarded a climate 
change mitigation activity. The proposal was shared with all the villagers in the island 
who were then asked to submit their proposal to be involved, which needs to include 
the offer of the land where the farm is to be located, the promise to provide the posts 
from local surroundings and the undertaking to provide labour for the venture. Pig 
waste for the time being will be mixed with dried grass from the villages to produce 
organic manure that the farmers can use. The next phase will be to cement the fenced 
area and build the chamber to allow the production of the biogas. 
There is also an attempt to construct farm roads and permanent farms in the 
lowland areas of a few of the villages. These farmlands will have the designated 
forested buffer zones to protect the land, rivers, forests and the coral reefs. The 
villagers are planting sandalwood and plantation timber trees in areas of secondary 
growth that are commonly burnt. A model farm is now being set up to illustrate many 
of the farming practices mentioned above. In addition, waste management including 
the use of composting toilets, biogas production chambers, renewable energy 
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sources and building architecture to maximise the use of local natural materials and 
techniques will all be demonstrated. 
At sea, a bêche-de-mer enclosure has been erected in Vione to protect and raise 
these animals to their optimum size where they can attract their highest process. 
Seaweed farming is being promoted as an alternative source of income to more 
villages that can enhance the recovery of inshore fisheries. Solar lights have been 
introduced as people search for more renewable energy sources. There is now no 
longer any import of expensive kerosene, shell light and diesel as the people are 
quickly adopting the renewable sources. A youth leader from the island will spend 
three months in Mie University and Okinawa in Japan to learn the type of appropriate 
technologies that can be implemented in Gau.
This section has shared some examples of what the people in Gau have done 
in response to climate change impacts they now face. With the advice from their 
outside partners, including the authors, the people have taken actions to show their 
commitment to improving their lives and adapt to threats such as climate change. We 
now highlight some of the challenges witnessed so far. 
9.5  The Challenges
The challenges in Gau Island are to get the local people to commit to and articulate 
sustainable development in all their resources management and development 
activities and practices. For the majority of people in rural areas, including those 
on Gau, these environment-friendly requirements are regarded as impediments to 
people’s development aspirations and their rights to benefit from the exploitation of 
their natural resources. With the benefit of hindsight after a decade of continuous 
engagement with local communities, it is now easier to justify the adoption of 
precautionary approach given the many instances where people rush to develop their 
resources only to lose them to partners who were interested in the resources and not 
the welfare of their local partners. Such examples and lessons have forced people to 
reconsider their development choices. The situation has made it critical that people 
conduct exhaustive consultation and awareness as they plan their development 
activities. After a decade of working with the people in all the villages in Gau and 
building their capacity, sustainable development principles seem to be much better 
accepted and people are beginning to relate to the interrelations amongst the elements 
of the ecosystem that can be impacted by their development activities. 
Mobilising local action in rural villages is dependent on a number of factors that 
include awareness level, connectivity, capacity, conviction and funding. Of these 
factors, awareness, capacity building and funding cannot be addressed through 
the traditional systems that the villagers use. Rural communities do not have these 
capacities because issues such as climate change are being explained in scientific 
terms that are new to the people. In fact, emphasis on emissions makes climate 
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change adaptation and mitigation only remotely relevant to rural villages where 
the only machineries used are the diesel generators, brush cutters and outboard 
engines. The general feeling then is that the developed countries are responsible for 
the problem and thus should be required to address it. These methods also ignore 
the many adaptive actions that people in rural areas can undertake to prepare for 
the future. As the work on Gau demonstrates, capacity building is important to 
convince the people of the part they have to play. Outside advisers have to create 
awareness, build capacity and provide advice on appropriate technologies for which 
funding has to be sought and secured. Local people live in semi subsistent societies 
where money is required to meet the costs of transport, experts and materials for 
organising community activities. This is why the Global Environment Facility and the 
UNDP established its Small Grants scheme. Sadly, the requirements for accessing this 
financial assistance many times still isolate local communities in rural areas such as 
Gau.
The lack of government support for community development is hindering many 
community driven initiatives. Government ministries should ensure that people 
in local communities are not responsible for enforcement and surveillance. In 
fact, government agencies should establish the guidelines, funds and rewards for 
those that succeed in attaining their community-based objectives. The people of 
Gau have over the last decade shown their commitment and support for resource 
management and are assisting the Government in meeting its commitments to 
sustainable development.
Technical advice from external partners on issues that are new to local 
communities have benefited the people. Fish aggregation devices, composting toilets, 
smokeless stoves and renewable energy are new technologies that are being tried in 
Gau to adapt to climate change. Human and pig waste is being managed to realise 
the monetary implications that such innovations offer. External partners are assisting 
with these new initiatives. 
The enforcement of management decisions agreed to at local levels remains 
a challenge because of the erosion of traditional authority and the reliance on 
legislations people know little about. Traditional authority and institutions 
that used to uphold local decisions and banish people who do not adhere to 
the community’s wishes in the past are still useful at the local level today but 
must be supported by the Government when local communities are dealing with 
the activities of people from outside the communities. This is the reason why 
the main threats to local resources management activities come from outside 
the communities. For this reason, locally managed marine areas are targeted 
by commercial fishers who regard these as prime fishing areas that they have 
the resources to access whenever they wish. The Fiji Fisheries Department, as 
the licensing authority responsible for developing and managing the fisheries 
resources, must address poaching from local communities where the people are 
least prepared to deal with these external threats. 
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9.6  The Lessons Learned and Way Forward
Small islands such as Gau offer useful lessons on how local people are living with 
the impacts of climate change and are adopting resource management initiatives to 
improve their living standards. The villagers have declared marine managed areas, 
planted mangrove forests, seaweed and trees, and are now pursuing the use of 
renewable energy and the management of their waste to ensure that the ecological 
services offered by their environment will provide for them in the future. The 
resource management and development activities undertaken in Gau over the last 
decade highlight the contribution of local communities to the management of their 
environmental resources. The interventions have shown what the people in these 
communities can do to utilise their own resources, including traditional knowledge 
and practices, to improve their living conditions. The experience in Gau has proven 
that local communities can lead the drive to adapt to climate change.
The engagement of people in Gau took advantage of the local people’s social 
units such as traditional practices and relations. Close-knit social units such 
as extended families, villages and districts enhance the participation of local 
communities and the implementation and enforcement of the people’s resource 
management decisions. Community-based climate change adaptations are easy to 
organise and produce quick results but need to be maintained over the long term to 
allow for the desired recovery. Long term engagements are challenging as external 
inputs are required to maintain the focus of local people in the management of their 
resources. The people normally are ready to commit to resource management but 
are uncertain about the duration of the management period because they depend 
on the use of their resources. Interestingly, more and more community groups are 
actively managing their natural resources because the future of their children in a 
climate change ravaged island is at stake. 
Training and community workshops are required to engage, mobilise and 
maintain local initiatives. Local engagement processes require that capacities 
are built to enhance people’s understanding of climate change issues and their 
personal role in addressing these. Capacity building processes are necessary as 
much of the climate change science is new to local communities, which need to be 
informed on how they can use their arrangements to adapt to climate change issues. 
Innovative and regular follow-up activities are necessary to introduce and maintain 
new adaptive techniques that can be assimilated by local communities and also to 
check on progress made. 
The search for alternative sources of income has been significant in Gau because 
of the need to relate to climate change adaptation while providing much needed 
income in rural areas, where people are paying higher prices for goods and services. 
Alternative sources of livelihood are chosen carefully in accordance with people’s 
resources, skills and needs and their natural resources endowment. For the Lomani 
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Gau initiative, the protection of food sources is the foundation for climate change 
adaptation, resource management and poverty alleviation. 
Women and youth are specifically targeted in Gau because they constitute the 
largest community groups who have not previously been given leadership roles. 
The village store in Vanuaso has been operating for the last decade since it was 
established under Mositi Vanuaso and is run by the village youth. In Malawai, 
the women have been selling mats in Suva for the last decade and have created 
an urban market for this traditional skill, which has strengthened this traditional 
art and provides a welcome source of income. In Lamiti, the youth is buying kava 
(yaqona) from the members so that they are spared the time-consuming marketing 
trip to Suva where some of the young farmers have lost all of their hard-earned 
income. In Malawai, Lekanai and Vadravadra, the youth groups are looking after 
their community cattle farms. Lomani Gau is now well represented in the Gau 
Island Council where all the 16 Turaga ni Koro (village headman) who are using the 
network to better coordinate the climate change adaptation work in their villages. 
This empowerment has improved community-based resource management in the 
villages. 
Poaching from community-based resource management areas remains a 
stumbling block to resource management at the local level and is a source of social 
and cultural pressure and conflicts. The problem is tied to the commercial trade of 
food sources by increasing number of villagers that want to improve their income. 
Fishing is the most attractive way to make money in coastal communities but 
overfishing eventually leads to food insecurity for the local people. Moreover, the 
lack of funds and income generating activities in these rural communities force the 
people to sell their environment resources at any cost when they have the chance. 
These issues make resource management both critical and difficult because the 
effectiveness of these activities will always be skewed.
Villagers are pragmatists; they will adopt new ideas and practices if they are 
convinced that these will benefit them. The villagers in Gau are convinced that a 
healthy environment is the best way of appropriating climate change. They are 
demonstrating great resilience and adaptability in accommodating climate change 
conditions. However, the villagers require advice, human capacity, and finance to 
better articulate sustainable development in their context. Given what has been 
achieved in Gau over the last decade with limited financial resources, it will be 
interesting to imagine the outcome at the national, regional and global levels if there 
is a concerted effort to engage and support local community groups in sustainable 
development and climate change adaptation.
The future looks bright if the small steps that have been taken in the rural 
communities in Gau are an indication of what can be accomplished if the same 
approach is adopted in other areas. Once the momentum is attained, social 
transformation can be widespread. This is why local case studies need to be 
promoted widely to share the lessons and changes globally. In Gau Island, care of 
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their environment is now the basis of climate change adaptation and sustainable 
development activities that the people hope will enable them to move away from 
their present environmentally exploitative positions towards one that protects their 
natural environment while supporting their development activities.
Nalau Bingeding
10  Papua New Guinea’s Response to Climate 
Change: Challenges and Ways Forward
10.1  Introduction
The developing nations of the Pacific are already affected by climate change, as 
evidenced by the impact of rising sea levels and the increasing intensity of cyclonic 
events in the region in the past few years (Walsh et al, 2012). These phenomena are 
intensifying within the region and are likely to continue intensifying for many decades 
to come unless serious action is taken by the international community to combat 
climate change. Therefore, every country in the Pacific should build resilience to the 
adverse effects of climate change and contribute to the international effort to combat 
climate change. This chapter details the responses of the government of Papua New 
Guinea (PNG), and its endeavours to match domestic implementation to international 
initiatives.
Climate change has posed specific and significant challenges for Pacific 
governments, and has had important impacts on a range of national contexts. In 
particular this chapter describes the gaps between the way Papua New Guinea has 
responded to international rationales that provide and incentivise funding for climate 
change in certain ways, and the weaker rationales and successes in implementing 
processes internally as a nation. By presenting the details and realities of one Pacific 
government’s endeavour to respond to climate change through the policy process, 
the chapter portrays the limitations of taking climate change as a small set of simple 
issues, and instead exposes the required groundwork and the real interface of 
matching international and grassroots perspectives. 
PNG, the biggest country in terms of land area and population in the Pacific, is a 
recognized leader on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD and REDD+103) on the international stage. The broad form of the REDD 
concept (Costa Rica and PNG, 2005) was masterminded by PNG and Costa Rica 
and presented at the 11th annual Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 11) in Montreal in 2005. The former 
103 REDD+ includes reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, sustainable fo-
rest management; and the role of forest conservation and carbon stock enhancement.
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Prime Minister of PNG, Sir Michael Somare, has been a staunch advocate of REDD 
and has appeared in many international forums to present PNG’s position on its 
implementation. At COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia, PNG’s Climate Change Ambassador, 
His Excellency Kevin Conrad, told the world’s largest economy, the US, to take the 
lead or to get out of the way, contributing to the eventual endorsement of REDD by 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Revkin, 
2008). Despite being recognized as a world leader on REDD+, PNG has not adequately 
addressed climate change adaptation and mitigation issues at both the international 
and national levels. Much of the hype on climate change by PNG at the national and 
international levels has been rhetorical, while little to nothing constructive has been 
done to date to address critical climate change issues. Alongside the physical impacts 
of climate change, and the social impacts of adaptation and mediation, then, this 
chapter shows that climate change has also had profound impacts on the political 
economy of PNG: this chapter discusses these impacts in terms of the way a Pacific 
government has appropriated the science, funding and international views of itself, 
and of the issues PNG faces, and the way it has responded in terms that whilst geared 
to the external views and expectations, operates through some awkward relations 
with other policies, with the realities on the ground, and of course with landowners. 
Such impacts suggest that these important national interfaces have been eclipsed by 
the international interfaces. 
10.2  Challenges and Ways Forward
This section takes up a series of twelve issues, and firstly, outlines each challenge and 
secondly, comments in italics on suggested ways forward. 
10.2.1  Adaptation Issues are Sidelined 
Since 2008 I have attended most seminars, workshops and conferences on climate 
change in PNG. However, most of these gatherings were about mitigation issues such 
as REDD+ and carbon trade, while few have been about adaptation issues. 
The Carteret Islanders of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in PNG have 
been affected by sea level rise since the 1980s, which now threatens to displace 
many of the inhabitants. However, very little has been done by the PNG government 
(GoPNG) to address this problem. The only help accorded the Carteret Islanders by 
GoPNG has been an injection of K2 million (about USD 720,000) to the Autonomous 
Regional Government of Bougainville in 2007 (Legatis, 2011). In the absence of 
substantial help from above, the Carteret Islanders have had to take matters into their 
own hands through a local association known as Tulele Peisa, which (appropriately) 
means “sailing the waves on our own.”
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A nationwide assessment needs to be carried out to identify risks and vulnerabilities 
of people, property and public infrastructure to the potential adverse impacts of climate 
change. Then the documented information can be used to develop policies and strategies 
to counteract the potential adverse impacts of climate change.
10.2.2  Climate Change Efforts Lack Coordination
The Office of Climate Change & Development (OCCD) is the coordinating agency 
for climate change work in PNG (OCCD, 2013). But judging by the way the office is 
handling climate change issues, it seems OCCD is the ultimate authority on climate 
change in PNG. OCCD had set up several technical working groups on adaptation and 
mitigation under its structure, and people from stakeholder groups were invited to 
join the various technical working groups. Forums are regularly held by OCCD with 
the agendas set by the office, while stakeholder representatives are expected to attend 
and provide the input of their respective organizations.
As the coordinating agency for climate change work in PNG, the OCCD has failed 
to define “who is to do what” in terms of climate change. The OCCD continues to 
handle all climate change issues, while other government departments and NGOs act 
as data collectors and have done little to address climate change issues within their 
respective areas. In terms of training needs and capacity building, the OCCD seems 
to have training for its own staff while other government departments and NGOs 
have been left to their own devices. Training and capacity building for stakeholders 
through a coordinated effort by the OCCD is non-existent at the moment.
The OCCD needs to define its role as the climate change coordinator and stick to the 
responsibility of coordination, while other stakeholders should be given climate change 
activities that fall within their jurisdictions to deal with. OCCD should identify the roles 
of the other stakeholders and delegate their responsibilities to deal with; the delegation 
of climate change responsibilities to different stakeholders will facilitate PNG’s climate 
change endeavour.
10.2.3  Key Climate Change Documents are Biased and Ineffective 
McKinsey & Company, an international consulting firm, was brought in by GoPNG to 
draft several key climate change documents for the country. These key documents 
were drafted with local expertise sought from within the OCCD. Consultation with 
other stakeholders was minimal, so McKinsey and OCCD were criticized by civil 
society organizations and other government departments on the manner in which 
these key climate change documents were drafted. NGO and civil society groups 
have claimed that the legislation and policy drafted by OCCD were carried out with 
influence from foreigners with vested interest in climate change activities in PNG. 
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Consequently, McKinsey exited from PNG on a low key and the OCCD now handles 
the drafting of all key climate change documents for the country. 
While employed to draft key climate change documents for PNG, McKinsey 
was paid millions of PNG Kina by GoPNG; in September 2010, McKinsey was 
paid K1.37 million (about USD 500,000) by GoPNG in addition to another K2.2 
million (about USD 800,000) that was paid earlier to the company (PNGexposed 
Blog, 2011). Although substantial amounts of PNG tax payers’ and donor money 
was paid to McKinsey, these key climate change documents have not made any 
difference for PNG at the national and international levels. Presentations made to 
the Norwegian Government and the UN-REDD Program for REDD+ funding using 
some of these key documents have not secured much REDD+ funding or technical 
assistance for PNG as yet. 
Commercial logging, subsistence agriculture, mining, plantations (mainly 
palm oil) and forest fires are the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in 
PNG, with commercial logging (48.2%) and subsistence agriculture (45.6%) being 
the major drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (Shearman et al, 2008). 
Despite GoPNG’s commitment on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation at the international level, some of the key climate change documents 
produced so far have advocated for Reduced Impact Logging as a mitigation measure 
for the logging industry while nothing has been done to place a moratorium on log 
exports (Babon, 2011). New timber permits continue to be issued for logging while 
Forest Clearance Authorities (aka FCAs) for Special Purpose Agriculture Business 
Leases (aka SABLs), which are more or less logging activities in the guise of agriculture 
projects, continue to be issued by GoPNG. This is a case of the left hand not knowing 
what the right hand is doing.
The OCCD should mobilize stakeholders to define the Terms of Reference for climate 
change activities in PNG. Then these activities will have to be evaluated and the critical 
ones should be identified and relevant documents developed to address them. Wider 
stakeholder participation should be encouraged, with a level playing field developed for 
all stakeholders to be involved.
10.2.4  Participation in International Negotiations Fails to Deliver Results 
PNG is by far the biggest nation in the Pacific in terms of land area and population. 
Besides Australia and New Zealand, many island nations in the Pacific look up to 
PNG as the big brother when it comes to regional issues. However, in terms of climate 
change issues there is a great divide between PNG and the other island nations of the 
Pacific. At international forums on climate change, the smaller island nations in the 
Pacific are addressing climate change as part of the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) with their main focus being on adaptation issues while GoPNG seems to be 
more interested in the mitigation issue of REDD. What is ironic about this is the fact 
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that arguably the world’s first climate change refugees are from the Carteret Islands in 
PNG (IRIN, 2008; Morton, 2009). 
At international negotiations there seem to be two groups of people representing 
PNG. One group is usually led by the foreign-born PNG citizen Kevin Conrad and his 
foreign entourage, while another group is usually led by indigenous PNG citizens. 
One of the country’s daily newspapers reported that at the COP 15 meeting the PNG 
delegates were pushed aside, with Kevin Conrad and his Italian advisers, lawyers, 
and support staff running the show (The National, 18 December 2009; cf. Babon et al, 
2012). 
Millions of PNG Kina has been spent on sending large delegations to 
international forums on climate change since 2005; in 2009, it cost GoPNG K2 
million (about USD 720,000) to send 30 delegates to COP 17 in Copenhagen (Tanos, 
2009). However, the presence of large delegations from PNG at international 
forums on climate change has not made much difference in terms of securing 
climate change funding and technical assistance for PNG to date. Moreover, it is 
not known what these large delegations at international forums are there to do in 
terms of climate negotiations. 
The use of foreigners to negotiate for PNG and sending large delegations to 
international climate change forums has proven to be futile so far. PNG has to change 
the trend and send a small delegation of highly qualified Papua New Guineans to 
negotiate for PNG at international forums on climate change. Moreover, experiences 
from past negotiations should be used to fast-track issues and activities that PNG wants 
to be negotiated at international forums. In the past PNG more or less negotiated on its 
own, but this time around PNG should work in concert with the smaller island nations of 
the Pacific and push for adaptation and mitigation issues relevant to the Pacific.
10.2.5  REDD Projects Fail to Achieve Additionality 
Four REDD+ demonstration sites for PNG have now been selected (Babon, 2011). The 
Papua New Guinea Forest Authority (PNGFA) is responsible for the development of 
these 4 REDD+ projects. The object of any carbon project is to benefit the environment 
and the climate. Therefore, any REDD+ project must be established with the intention 
of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and alleviating 
climate change, and as such, REDD+ projects should conform to the definition of the 
term “additionality.” That is to say, any REDD+ project that is to be implemented must 
not constitute “business as usual”; it must not be an action that would have been 
implemented anyway without the use of REDD+ funding. For any REDD+ project to 
be implemented within a Forest Management Agreement (FMA), the tool that is to be 
used to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation must meet this 
definition of “additionality” so that there is additional benefit for the environment 
and climate.
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The PNG Forest Policy 1991 (Ministry of Forests, 1991), PNG Logging Code of 
Practice (Government of Papua New Guinea, 1996), ITTO Target and Indicators for 
Sustainable Forest Management (ITTO, 2005) and Convention on Biodiversity (CBD 
Secretariat, 2013) are tools that have been adopted for Sustainable Forest Management 
by GoPNG. However, what is contained in these different policy documents is 
“business as usual” for PNG in terms of sustainable forest management. Therefore, 
what is additional about these 4 REDD+ projects? 
Reduced Impact Logging (RIL) has been suggested as an “additional” activity for 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in PNG (Government of 
Papua New Guinea, 2010: p. 18). However, there is no definition given for the term RIL 
within the context of PNG. Therefore, what is meant by RIL is vague because sustainable 
forest management practices contained in the different policy documents adopted by 
the GoPNG already cater to RIL. So what sort of practice(s) other than crawler tractor 
logging and the requirements for sustainable forest management already contained in 
the different policy documents would be additional in a REDD+ project within an FMA?
The country’s Sustainable Forest Management policies and practices should be 
reviewed to determine what is additional and what is not additional under REDD+. 
RIL has been identified as a climate change mitigation measure in PNG, but the term 
remains undefined within the PNG context. Precisely defining the term would facilitate 
the design and development of forestry projects that would truly reduce the contribution 
of logging to climate change. 
10.2.6  Subsistence Agriculture Complicates REDD Efforts 
Subsistence agriculture is the second highest driver of deforestation and forest 
degradation in PNG, accounting for 45.6% of forest change (Shearman et al, 2008). 
However, the regulation of subsistence agriculture in PNG is a complex issue for 
several reasons. Firstly, subsistence agriculture is practiced on customary land 
and the government has no direct legal control over these lands and the forms of 
forest changes that may be taking place there. Secondly, rural people generally lack 
government services and need their land to sustain themselves
Therefore, if the government is to place large areas of customary land under 
REDD+ and carbon trade without the people’s consent, this would be an injustice 
to the customary landowners. The idea of implementing REDD+ on a national scale 
in PNG (GoPNG, 2010) without the free, prior and informed consent of customary 
landowners is an action that can be seen to have breached basic human rights and 
should be condemned. 
Several NGO groups in PNG work with customary landowners on Land Use 
Planning (LUP). One of these NGO groups is The Nature Conservancy (TNC), which 
has developed LUPs for several land owning groups in a district in the Madang 
Province (The REDD Desk, 2013). TNC intends to upscale its LUP work to a provincial 
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level and wants to develop a provincial LUP for the Madang Province (US Aid and 
LEAF, 2012). 
TNC has contributed to only a few small-scale projects in PNG, and in order to 
upscale its work it would need more financial support from GoPNG. At present GoPNG 
does not provide direct funding to NGO groups for community development work, 
and there is anecdotal evidence that some politicians and government officials view 
NGO groups as being anti-development.
The implementation of LUPs at the community level therefore offers a legal and 
justifiable means by which subsistence agriculture can be controlled to some extent 
to alleviate deforestation and forest degradation in PNG. These community LUPs 
are developed with input “by the people, for the people.” Under a community LUP, 
land would be allocated for gardening, forest biodiversity conservation, small-scale 
agriculture, commercial agriculture, settlements and other land uses. And as such, 
subsistence agriculture would be practiced in the area designated for gardening 
and not carried out on an ad hoc basis. Thus, deforestation and forest degradation 
through subsistence agriculture can be limited to some extent.
In order to further limit deforestation and forest degradation from subsistence 
agriculture, the use of genetically improved crop cultivars with high yields (from 
conventional breeding), the use of improved fallow systems, and allocation of 
sufficient land for gardening should be used in conjunction with subsistence 
agriculture practices (Bingeding, 2012b). By using improved fallow systems customary 
landowners continue to reuse the same piece of land without the need to clear more 
primary forest areas for gardening. In using genetically improved crop cultivars with 
high yields, customary landowners would produce a much higher yield of crop on 
a small piece of land in contrast to using a low-yielding crop cultivar that would 
produce the same amount of yield on a much larger piece of land. By gardening on the 
piece of land designated for subsistence agriculture through the community LUP and 
utilizing sustainable land use practices such as improve fallow systems, customary 
landowners do not have to clear more primary forest land on an ad hoc basis and 
would therefore contribute to the alleviation of deforestation and forest degradation. 
As far as climate change work is concerned in PNG, nothing has been put forward 
in terms of policy by GoPNG on LUP at the community level and how subsistence 
gardening could be controlled to reduce deforestation and forest degradation in the 
country. It seems the country does not know where subsistence agriculture fits into 
the REDD+ domain in terms of climate change mitigation.
The Nature Conservancy project in Madang Province has proven that the concept 
of community LUP is a viable option for limiting deforestation and forest degradation to 
some extent on customary land in PNG. This approach should be adopted throughout 
the country. The use of sustainable land use practices such as improved fallow systems 
and genetically improved crop cultivars with high yields should complement community 
LUP to enhance the country’s capability to reduce emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation. 
146   Papua New Guinea’s Response to Climate Change
10.2.7  Logging Concessions May Not Generate Significant REDD Credits 
PNG has a land area of 46.17 million hectares, of which 71% of the land was covered 
by forest in 2002 (Shearman et al, 2008). However, in terms of commercial logging, 
15.0 million hectares are considered production forests (Ministry of Forests, 2009). 
Of the 15.0 million hectares of production forests, the PNG Forest Authority is 
currently dealing with some 4-5 million hectares while another 2.5 million is yet to 
be allocated (Bingeding, 2012b), with another 6-7 million hectares logged out and 
the lands already returned to its customary owners. 
Commercial logging is one of the major drivers of deforestation and forest 
degradation in PNG, accounting for 48.2% of forest change (Shearman et al, 
2008). Little reforestation has been carried out in logging concessions in PNG to 
date, making carbon stock replenishment for the logged-over concessions largely 
unknown. Although the Forest Policy 1991 calls for reforestation to be carried out 
as a means to maintain a permanent forest estate to supply existing and new forest 
industries (Ministry of Forests, 1991), little reforestation has been carried out to 
date because it is much easier for companies to pay reforestation levies into trust 
accounts and move on than to engage in reforestation exercises (Bingeding, 2008). 
Deforestation and forest degradation within timber concessions is envisaged 
as an an avenue from which much of PNG’s REDD+ credits will come. GoPNG has 
legal jurisdictions over timber concessions; therefore, the government sees timber 
concessions as being an opportunity area for REDD+ revenue that will end up in the 
national purse. However, much of the timber concessions have been logged out and 
the lands have been returned to customary landowners, meaning that GoPNG no 
longer has jurisdiction over these timber concessions. Moreover, some of the current 
timber concessions were acquired prior to 1990—the baseline year for CO2 emissions 
under the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2013)—meaning that only timber concessions acquired 
after 1989 are eligible for REDD+. Therefore, how many current timber concessions 
are eligible for REDD+ and the number of REDD+ credits that can be generated from 
these concessions are unknown quantities; and the number of REDD+ credits that 
could be generated from timber concessions may be minimal.
PNG needs to evaluate its current logging concessions and determine how many 
of them are eligible for REDD+ schemes. In this way, it would be possible to determine 
how many REDD+ credits will come out from current logging concessions rather than 
work on assumptions when the actual REDD+ credits from current logging concessions 
may be minimal. 
10.2.8  Stakeholders Lack Interest in Forest Plantation Development 
PNG currently has 69,000 hectares of forest plantations, but forest plantation 
development has been erratic. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, GoPNG 
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collects a large amount of revenue from log export but allocates very little money 
for forest plantation development. Secondly, the land rent paid to customary 
landowners for the use of their land for forest plantation development is low, which 
probably contributes to customary landowners’ unwillingness to lease more of 
their land for this type of development. Thirdly, land disputes between rival clans 
or tribes, and between the state and customary landowners, have stalled forest 
plantation development in some areas of the country. Fourthly, there is lack of 
incentives such as business partnerships or shareholdings by landowners in forest 
plantations and timber processing mills, further reducing landowners’ interest in 
leasing more of their land for forest plantation development. Lastly, for most forest 
tree species customary landowners have to wait for more than six years (Ochroma 
lagopus [Balsa] is the only tree species harvested at 4-6 years of age) before they 
see any substantial monetary gains from development of forest plantations on their 
land. Customary landowners would rather lease their land for activities that derive 
annual economic turnover than to give it away for long-term tree crops.
In the past forest plantations were developed for timber production and to 
rehabilitate degraded grasslands in some lowlands and highlands provinces of 
PNG (Srivastava, n.d.). While some forest plantations in the country are used for 
sawn timber, woodchip and veneer production, forest plantation resources are 
insignificant in comparison to natural forest resources (PNGFA, 1997). Moreover, 
some of the current plantations may be uneconomical due to a lack of demand for 
the log sizes available from a plantation in its early age; some of the plantations 
may have low timber yields because successive thinnings have not been carried out 
on time due to lack of markets for sizable logs. 
Forest plantations can now be managed for timber production as well as 
for carbon sequestration. Therefore, forest plantation owners can now benefit 
from the sale of timber, carbon credits and the provision of other environmental 
services. The Clean Development Mechanism now provide opportunities for 
landowners and businesses to develop forest plantations on degraded grasslands 
and other degraded landscape for the sale of timber, fuel wood, carbon credits or 
the provision of other ecosystem services. The management of forest plantations 
on degraded grasslands for production of timber, fuel wood, carbon credits and 
the provision of other ecosystem services is actually killing many birds with 
one stone. Consequently, forest plantation development in PNG seems more 
economical now than in the past.
PNG has 6.7 million hectares (Shearman et al, 2008) of degraded grasslands, of 
which some of these areas can be developed into forest plantations. Nevertheless, 
there is lack of enthusiasm in developing forest plantations in PNG at the moment. 
This is despite the fact that forest plantations are more economical now than in the 
past due to the fact that carbon trade offers the opportunity to grow trees for the 
sale of timber, fuel wood and carbon credits. 
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The PNGFA, as the government agency responsible for forest plantations should 
take the lead in venturing into large scale forest plantations on degraded grasslands 
throughout the country to enhance the country’s forest areas and carbon stock. 
Moreover, the government should also facilitate forest plantation development in the 
country and encourage local companies, multinational corporations, super funds and 
customary land owners to venture into forest plantation development. 
10.2.9  The Role of Conservation under REDD Is Underappreciated 
In an area less than 1% of the world’s total landmass, PNG harbors 5% of the world’s 
biodiversity (Wikimedia, 2013) and is therefore regarded as one of the world’s 
biodiversity “hotspots.” Conservation of terrestrial biodiversity has been carried 
out in PNG since colonial times through the different acts required for Protected 
Area establishments (e.g., Fauna (Protection and Control) Act (1966)). However, 
to date, only around 2% of PNG’s landmass has been placed under some form of 
conservation (Wikimedia, 2013). This achievement is well below the internationally 
accepted target of 10% and the 16.8% recommended by Faith et al (2001). 
Conservation of forest biodiversity is a land-use activity that has been 
competing with mining, logging and commercial agriculture in PNG for some time 
now. However, the success of forest biodiversity conservation has been minimal 
possibly because conservation activities cannot put up incentive packages that 
can compete with mining, logging and commercial agriculture. When funding is 
available for conservation activities and a conservation organization is present 
in an area, landowners buy into the concept. But as soon as conservation funds 
cease and a conservation organization moves out of an area, landowners abandon 
conservation and return to their previous ways of life. While no major economic 
activity is present in an area that is under conservation the concept is embraced 
by the people, but as soon as an economic activity like logging turns up within the 
vicinity of the area people easily switch sides because they see better incentives 
in logging than in forest biodiversity conservation. Consequently, the biggest issue 
with the success of biodiversity conservation in PNG has been the lack of economic 
incentives. 
Today, however, forest conservation is included under REDD+. Thus, there are 
now economic and non-economic incentives, and so forest biodiversity conservation 
activities can put together packages that can compete with logging and commercial 
agriculture; the opportunity cost of mining, however, may be greater than that of 
forest biodiversity conservation. However, the tools that have to be used for forest 
biodiversity conservation under REDD+ must be additional so that they benefit the 
environment and climate—forest biodiversity conservation activities must not be 
business as usual.
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Conservation under REDD+ is not additional for the different conservation tools 
under Protected Areas (e.g. Wild Life Management Areas). This is because these tools 
for forest biodiversity conservation are already required by the country’s laws to be 
established and would have been established anyway without funding from REDD+. 
These forest biodiversity conservation activities would be business as usual and 
would not have additional benefit for the environment and climate, thus innovation 
is needed to enhance these activities. However, due to the lack of knowledge on 
where forest biodiversity conservation in PNG fits into the REDD+ domain, there has 
been little effort put in by the government to use forest biodiversity conservation 
activities as tools for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.
In order to enhance forest biodiversity conservation in PNG and tap into the 
economic and non-economic incentives provided under REDD+, the country needs 
to determine the role of forest biodiversity conservation within the REDD+ domain 
in PNG and how it can meaningfully contribute to national development as well as 
the international effort to mitigate climate change. Only then can forest biodiversity 
conservation be seen by customary landowners and other stakeholders to be a socio-
economic activity that is viable and can sustain the socio-economy of the country as 
well as the environment and contribute to climate change mitigation.
10.2.10  Payment for Ecosystem Services 
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) requires imminent threat(s) to an 
environmental service before a service buyer would be willing to pay a service 
provider to forego an economic or social opportunity so that the targeted 
environmental service is maintained or enhanced. In addition to that, a market 
must be established for the targeted environmental service to be traded.
PES has been advocated for in PNG for some time now, but due to lack of 
knowledge on PES little effort has been put into defining environmental services and 
establishing markets for them to be traded. One environmental service that already 
has the potential for a PES market to be established in PNG is water. For example, in 
2010 the World Bank and PNG Pawa Limited (PPL), the state-owned power supplier, 
collaborated on a project to increase power supply to the city of Port Moresby. The 
World Bank provided the technical input while PPL did the ground work. In one of 
the meetings with landowners from where the dam for an 80MW turbine was going 
to be built, landowners from the watershed area also turned up for the meeting 
and surprised the PPL and World Bank delegates. The dam was going to be built 
on Koiari people’s land in the Central Province, while the watershed area was on 
Efogi people’s land in the Oro Province. Thus, the customary landowners from Efogi 
wanted to know if they would also be paid for the water that their watershed would 
provide for the dam. This example shows that customary landowners are now 
aware of environmental services that their lands and forests can provide and what 
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would be the economic benefits for them. Therefore, under the PES system, the 
customary landowners from the watershed area can forgo subsistence agriculture 
to conserve their watershed area. In order for the watershed area to be conserved for 
water supply to the dam, PPL could incorporate the opportunity cost of subsistence 
agriculture into the cost of electricity so that power users in Port Moresby pay for it. 
In return, PPL can then use power rents to pay the Efogi landowners for conserving 
their watershed and supplying water to the dam for electricity production.
Water already has a market in terms of PES in PNG, and this potential needs to be 
harnessed now for the conservation of the terrestrial environment and climate change 
mitigation. However, a nationwide assessment should be carried out to determine 
other potential markets for terrestrial PES that may exist in PNG so that these too 
could be harness for the benefit of the environment and climate. 
10.2.11  Lack of Will to Reduce the Adverse Impact of Mining on Terrestrial and 
Marine Environments 
The mining sector contributes only 0.6% of the deforestation and forest degradation 
in PNG and is only a minor driver (Shearman et al, 2008). However, this figure is 
an underestimate because mining developments contribute to increase in forest 
clearance for gardening to feed mine townships and associated communities 
(Dambacher et al, 2007: cf. Shearman et al, 2008), and 150,000 hectares of forest 
die-back along the Fly River is associated with mine discharge from the Ok Tedi 
Mine (Higgins, 2002: cf. Shearman et al, 2008). 
Despite the adverse impact of land based mines on terrestrial and marine 
ecosystems and the loss of the country’s forest carbon stocks due to deforestation 
and forest degradation by large scale mining in PNG, the government continues 
to issue licenses for more exploration and mining in PNG. There are already some 
ten large scale mines in PNG, but some 7.0 million ordinary people in PNG struggle 
to make a living on a daily basis while the government struggles amidst plenty of 
money to deliver the much-needed services to the people. Therefore, what is the 
rationale behind destroying more of the country’s forest and biodiversity through 
mining activities when mining has little positive impact on the lives of the ordinary 
people at large?
In recent years GoPNG licenced Canadian company Nautilus Minerals Limited 
(Nautilus) to explore the sea beds of the Bismarck and Milne Bay waters for sulphide 
deposits. Then in the year 2012 GoPNG licensed the company to begin mining the 
country’s sea beds for minerals (The Guardian, 2012), but due to opposition from 
NGOs and other stakeholders the operations of Nautilus were scaled back. However, 
GoPNG has now acquired 15% share in Nautilus (Sukman, 25 April 2014), and is a 
partner in the development of the deepsea mining; therefore, the project will go 
ahead soon. 
 Challenges and Ways Forward   151
Sea grass, seaweed and coral reefs take in carbon dioxide from sea water and 
use that with sunlight to photosynthesize and store carbon in their tissues. However, 
with the build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere it is now known that the 
oceans are taking in about one-quarter of the atmospheric carbon dioxide (Great 
Barrier Reef Foundation, 2013). Therefore, the oceans are now acidifying due to 
build-up of carbonic acid in seawater, and as a result coral reefs are being bleached. 
Moreover, increased ocean surface temperatures due to global warming have also 
bleached coral reefs (Stanford University, 2012). 
The protection of marine carbon sinks for mitigation of climate change is very 
important because sea grass, seaweed and coral reefs have the potential to be 
used for carbon sequestration. Mining the sea beds of the Bismarck and Milne Bay 
waters poses further threats to PNG’s coral reefs and the marine ecosystems through 
sedimentation and further acidification of the seas (Bingeding, 2012). Despite the 
threats posed by deep sea mining, there seems to be little concern by GoPNG for the 
protection of coral reefs and other photosynthesizing marine organisms for carbon 
sequestration and climate change mitigation in PNG.
If the mining industry is to contribute meaningfully to the sustainable development 
of PNG and the international effort to mitigate climate change, the role of the mining 
sector within the context of REDD+ should be determined for PNG. In determining the 
role of the mining sector within the REDD+ context in PNG, the country can implement 
mining activities on a sustainable scale so that there is minimal adverse impact of 
mining on the people and the environment while the sector contributes to sustainable 
development of PNG and climate change mitigation. 
10.2.12  Lack of Vision to Reduce Fossil Fuel Emissions and Develop Clean, 
Renewable Energy
Diesel and gas generators make up about 50% of PNG’s power generation capacity 
(www.reegle.info/actors/3922/department-of-petroleum-and-energy.htm). Diesel 
generators produce 710 GWh of electricity annually, while natural gas generators 
produce another 400 GWh of electricity annually (Table 10.1). However, the 
government now intends to increase the capacity for natural gas power generation 
to 390 MW and slightly increase diesel power generation by the year 2030 (Oxford 
Business Group, 2012). 
In terms of annual greenhouse gas emissions diesel and gas generators would 
emit 0.466 MtCO2e and 0.132 MtCO2e respectively (Table 10.1). However, since 
PNG endeavors to be carbon neutral by the year 2050 (GoPNG, 2010), innovations 
must be sought to reduce the country’s fossil fuel emissions. This can be done by 
developing renewable energy sources that would have minimal adverse impact on 
the environment and people. 
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Table 10.1: Diesel and natural gas power generation and greenhouse gas emissions
Fossil fuel Installed power generation 
capacity (MW)
Annual electricity
generation (GWh)
Annual greenhouse
gas emission (MtCO2e)
Diesel 217.09 710 0.466
Natural gas 82.06 400 0.132
Currently PNG faces a chronic power shortage problem. And in order to meet the 
country’s demand for more power, the government plans to build more gas power 
stations and hydropower dams to generate enough electricity. 
Nevertheless, there are several issues with gas power stations and hydropower 
dams regarding climate change. Firstly, natural gas is a fossil fuel and does emit 
greenhouse gases and volatile organic compounds that are dangerous to human 
health and the environment. Secondly, hydropower can be a form of clean, renewable 
energy if grassland areas are flooded to produce electricity or water from the spillway 
of an existing dam is reused to produce electricity. However, if substantial areas of 
forested land are going to be flooded for power generation this could lead to more 
deforestation and forest degradation and other environmental and social problems, 
and the power produced may not be regarded as clean energy. 
There is now an ambitious plan by the PNG and Queensland (Australia) 
governments to dam the Purari River in the Gulf Province to generate 1800 MW of 
power for both Queensland (Australia) and PNG (Reegle, 2013). It is claimed that 
this hydropower dam will generate enough renewable energy for use and create job 
opportunities for both PNG and Queensland. Nevertheless, nothing has been said 
about the environmental impact the dam will have on the forest that is going to be 
flooded, large wetland ecosystems that lie below the dam, and the rich fish stocks in 
the Gulf of Papua. But in terms of climate change the adverse social and environmental 
impacts of renewable energy generation must also be taken into consideration when 
attempting to generate clean electricity.
The potential to generate electricity from renewable energy sources in PNG is 
enormous (Table 10.2). However, despite the availability of these renewable energy 
sources and the tradability under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto 
Protocol, little has been done to tap into clean, renewable energy sources in PNG to 
date. This is due to lack of vision by GoPNG to reduce emissions from fossil fuels and 
to develop clean, renewable energy for the country.
PNG must evaluate all of its renewable energy sources to determine their social, 
economic and environmental impacts on the people and the environment. Once this 
evaluation is done, those renewable energy sources that have minimal social and 
environmental impact on people and the environment should be developed for the 
country’s clean energy needs as well as to contribute to a carbon neutral economy by 
the year 2050. 
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Table 10.2. Renewable energy sources in PNG
Type of Energy Source(s)
Solar Sun
Wind Wind
Tidal Sea
Biogas Municipal effluent, palm oil mill effluent, animal manure (pigs, cattle and 
goats), spent oil palm fruit bunches, municipal solid waste, and coffee mill 
biomass (pulp) and effluent
Hydropower Rivers, streams
Geothermal Volcanic springs
Biomass Fuel wood, thinnings from forest plantations, waste wood from timber mills (off-
cuts and sawdust)
Biodiesel Coconut trees, Jatropha trees, seaweed, waste oil from restaurants and food 
bars
10.3  Key Points and Conclusions
This chapter has discussed a series of important issues, contexts and initiatives that 
have directly impacted upon PNG’s endeavors to address climate change at both the 
international and national levels. Several key points of the impacts that have been 
brought about by PNG’s appropriations of climate change were discussed: although 
PNG had the world’s first climate change refugees, the country tends to focus more on 
REDD+; although PNG has established an office to coordinate climate change issues 
in the country, this has led to uncertainties in the delegation of responsibilities and 
action; although PNG has developed several key climate change documents, neither 
climate change legislation or policy have been endorsed by the government; although 
PNG has been represented (often by foreign advisors) at international climate change 
forums since COP 11, this has not led to securing funding or technical assistance for 
climate change work in the country.
Subsistence agriculture is the second highest driver of deforestation and forest 
degradation in PNG, but the key climate change documents put out so far by the 
office of climate change have not proposed an integrated policy for the community or 
national level. GoPNG envisages that logging concessions provide an avenue where 
much of PNG’s REDD+ credits will come from, but most of the timber concessions 
have been logged out and the lands have been returned to its customary landowners—
consequently, REDD+ credits from current timber concessions are unknown and 
could be minimal. 
Biodiversity conservation has been lacking in PNG in the past due to lack of 
economic incentives, but REDD+ and PES now provide both economic and non-
economic incentives for biodiversity conservation and other ecosystem services. 
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However, due to lack of knowledge on the role of biodiversity conservation and other 
ecosystem services under REDD+ and PES, there has been little effort put into using 
biodiversity conservation for climate change mitigation in PNG. Forest plantations 
can be developed for carbon sequestration and for timber and fuel wood production, 
thus forest plantation development in PNG is now more economical than in the past. 
However, less attention has been given to forest plantation development as a tool for 
mitigating the adverse effects of climate change in PNG. 
Mining activities pose threats to PNG’s terrestrial and marine carbon sinks. 
However, the government continues to issue exploration and mining licenses and 
seems to have little concern for its terrestrial and marine carbon sinks and the need 
to mitigate climate change. About half of PNG’s power supply is generated from fossil 
fuels. Nevertheless, due to lack of vision to reduce fossil fuel emissions and exploit 
the country’s enormous sources of renewable energy for the development of clean 
energy, there are now plans to increase the country’s future power supply using 
more gas power stations and hydropower dams. This is likely to increase fossil fuel 
emissions and the rate of deforestation and forest degradation respectively. In setting 
out the detail and pragmatics of the policy context, and a vivid picture of the PNG 
state’s capacities, interests and responses, the chapter has also discussed a series 
of limitations. The picture which emerges disrupts the wishful thinking character of 
much international discourse about climate change, and shows that as much as PNG 
has appropriated, and made appeals to, this sphere, it has also paid less attention to 
turning international expectations into an equally energetic internal process.
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Afterword
Think Like a Fish: Pacific Philosophies and Climate Change
His Highness Tui Atua Tupua Tamasese Ta’isi Efi, the head of state of Samoa, opened 
this book by urging his readers to adopt a perspective based on va tapuia—“sacred 
relations between humans, animals, cosmos and the gods.” He suggested we might 
think about climate change from the vantage-point of other life forms—a dog, perhaps, 
the ocean, the stars, trees, a bird or a fish; and explore Pacific worlds patterned by 
existential interlocks between people and other beings. 
In these ways of being, balanced exchanges between different life-forms generate 
health, peace and prosperity, while arrogance and greed breed ill-health, poverty and 
conflict. While equilibrium is highly prized, it is always fragile. According to Maori 
ancestral chants, for instance, cosmic order is established in two main ways—by affinity 
and alliance, when different powers come together to create new forms of life; and by 
contestation and quarrelling, in which different beings separate (or are separated) from 
each other. 
According to the Te Arawa scribe Te Rangikaheke, for instance, at the beginning 
of the world there was just one founding ancestor, Rangi-nui the Sky Father and Papa-
tuānuku the Earth Mother, a single being. For many pō (era of darkness) their children 
lived between them, cramped and frustrated. Weary of their confinement, they began 
to talk about separating their parents so that light could enter the world. Although the 
wind-ancestor Tāwhiri-matea disagreed with this idea, his older brothers ignored him. 
After many unsuccessful attempts, Tāne, ancestor of the forests, lay on his back and 
pushed up with his legs, forcing earth and sky apart.
As Rangi wept for Papa, his tears became rivers and lakes, and she sent up mists 
to greet him. Tormented by their grief, Tāwhiri-matea flew into a fury and attacked his 
brothers with whirlwinds and tornadoes, smashing Tāne’s trees to splinters, driving 
Rongo and Haumia’s root crops underground and lashing Tangaroa, the sea god into 
submission. In the midst of this chaos, Tangaroa’s children fought with each other. 
When Ika-tere, the ancestor of fish, taunted his brother Tū-te-wanawana, the ancestor 
of lizards, saying, “You go inland, and be heaped up after fires in the fern!” Tū-te-
wanawana replied, “You go to sea, and be hung up in baskets of cooked food!” (Te 
Rangikaheke in Curnow 1983: 254). After this quarrel, they went their separate ways.
Only Tū, the ancestor of people, stood tall in the face of Tāwhiri-matea’s onslaught. 
For his bravery, he earned for his descendants the right to harvest his brothers’ 
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offspring—birds, root crops, forest foods and trees, crayfish, shellfish and fish, although 
they had to ask the ancestors for permission. In Te Ao Māori, as in Samoan and other 
ancestral Pacific ways of living, the fundamental kinship between people and other life 
forms is never forgotten.
According to the Tainui scholar Pei te Hurinui Jones, the double spiral in Maori 
carving, painting and tattoo embodies this swirling emergence of the cosmos (Jones 
1959: 232). Unlike the linear arrow of modernist time, Maori space-time spins in and out 
from an ancestral source. When the sea ancestor Tangaroa breathes in, for instance, the 
sea spirals down his throat, forming a great vortex (Te Parata) at the heart of the ocean; 
the tide goes out and people die. As he breathes out, the tide flows and children are 
born into the world. When Tāwhiri flies up to the highest heaven to fetch the baskets of 
knowledge, he ascends on a whirlwind. The spiral of space-time is at once destructive 
and creative.
To think like a fish, then, is to understand that apocalyptic storms may herald 
conflict and confusion, but also new forms of life. After millennia of sea living, Pacific 
Islanders—especially fishers and navigators—are closely attuned to climatic shifts and 
changes. While “movements on the ocean are often unpredictable and surprising,” 
(Robertson, this volume) their ancestors had the power to calm or raise particular winds, 
to smooth the sea or summon up waves to swamp the fleets of their enemies. In New 
Zealand, for instance, the early missionary Samuel Marsden spoke with a tohunga who 
controlled the winds and waters in the Hokianga harbour, and reported that according 
to the warrior chief Hongi Hika, the sea god Tangaroa lived in his forehead (Salmond, 
2017). When Marsden boarded a ship in the Bay of Islands, intending to take the errant 
missionary Thomas Kendall back to Port Jackson in defiance of Hongi’s wishes, the 
ship was wrecked before it left the Bay. It was a fine, calm day, and Marsden could not 
understand what had happened. He had recently been told, however, about the wreck 
of another ship in the Hokianga, where the mate attacked some sacred rocks with a 
hammer, and the local taniwha (powerful water being) picked up his ship and smashed 
it on the rocks as he tried to sail out of the harbour (Salmond, 2017).
In this book, Maria Robertson describes exchanges with an elderly female navigator 
from Kiribati, Teueroa, and her existential interlock with the ocean. In a deep sense, 
she and the sea are one. When Teueroa was born, her father took her umbilical cord 
out to sea and dropped it into deep water, and in her early teens, she was initiated as 
a navigator when her father sailed out of sight of land, tossed her into the water and 
sailed away. When he returned to pick her up, he asked her to point out the direction 
of the land. Later, he taught her how to predict the weather from the winds and stars. 
According to Teueroa, droughts that are explained by scientists as due to climate change 
have already been foretold by the stars. As Robertson remarks, given the notion that 
the world is made of relationships, engaging in known and unknown ways, fixing and 
unfixing, always struggling and co-operating, the world emerges in these connections. 
And the notion of organised exchanges of energy allows individuals to engage with 
systems and correct imbalances that could otherwise be said to be out of their control.
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These exchanges of energy may include songs, as well as ritual knowledge and 
other artistic interventions. As Elfriede Hermann and Wolfgang Kempf report, many 
Kiribati people address the prospect of catastrophic climate change with a prophetic 
song that exhorts them to “rise up” and take practical action to avert the loss of their 
islands. For New Guinea, Marian Strucke-Garbe describes powerful artistic responses. 
Other examples include “Moana: The Rising of the Sea,” a performance created by 
Vilsoni Hereniko at the University of Hawai’i that has featured at many international 
gatherings focused on climate change (Steiner, 2015).
In her account of Cyclone Pam in the Cook Islands, Cecile Rubow suggests that 
such storms (“naturalcultural whirls”) may be reflected in “giant rotating, intensifying 
discursive systems” that gather momentum across large networks, bringing together 
different knowledges and voices in ways that make different kinds of sense to different 
people. She suggests that “climate change” is one of these spinning assemblages, 
sweeping across the islands and spinning together ancestral, Christian and scientific 
ideas, generating fear and vulnerability, practical responses and creative power.
This sense of being caught in relational vortices and yet having the power to 
strike new balances also emerges in John Connell’s account of the Carteret Islanders, 
a population of fewer than 1000 people who inhabit a cluster of six small atolls off 
Bougainville. While these people have been described by the global press as the first 
climate refugees—“frontline victims of the excesses of capitalism”—they have suffered 
food, cash and timber shortages for at least half a century. At the same time, tectonic 
shifts, seismic events, and local interventions such as dynamiting the reefs and building 
sea walls amplify their difficulties. Nevertheless, the discourse of climate change serves 
as a “weapon of the weak,” giving them chances to build new lives in other places.
In this swirl of ideas, Pacific peoples have also been powerfully influenced by 
Christian narratives. As Jennifer Newell describes for Samoa and Emilie Nolet for Fiji, 
Biblical stories about God driving Adam and Eve out of the Garden of Eden for their 
sin of eating forbidden fruit; Noah building the Ark to survive the Great Flood; and the 
Apocaplyse, when the sun scorches the earth, the rivers dry up and there is darkness 
and pain in the land are echoed in local debates around climate change.
These mythic narratives also underpin metropolitan accounts of climatic change. 
Ideas such as “the Anthropocene,” “anthropogenic impacts,” “ecosystem services” and 
“resource management” all reflect Biblical stories in which God gives Adam and Eve 
“dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, 
and over all the earth,” (Genesis, 1: 28) putting people in control of the cosmos. An 
onto-logic in which all other beings are created for human purposes fosters a sense 
of exceptionalism that helps to drive climate change, biodiversity losses and related 
phenomena, alongside fears of Armageddon or being driven out of Paradise. It is also 
very different from ancestral Pacific accounts in which all living phenomena including 
earth, sky, winds, rivers, birds, fish and people are linked together in kin networks, 
powered by reciprocal exchanges.
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These kin-based philosophies have more in common with other strands in Western 
thought, for instance those that trace back to vitalist philosophies in the Enlightenment, 
and ideas about the “tree of life” or the “web of life” elaborated by scientists including 
Alexander Humboldt or Charles Darwin (Reill, 2005; Normandin and Wolfe, 2013; Lash, 
2016). Ideas about complex networks and systems, symbiosis and “holobionts” in the 
contemporary biological sciences (Gilbert, Sapp and Tauber 2012: 326) all resonate 
closely with Pacific ideas. 
In these kinds of framings, it makes sense to “think like a fish”—to consider the 
vantage-points of life forms other than human beings on planetary processes. In the 
context of attempts to sustainably manage the Pacific Ocean, for instance, whether 
through exclusive economic zones or marine reserves, these perspectives might allow 
us to see that fish do not register such boundaries, and to come up with devices that do 
not allow them to be harvested to extinction. 
If people and environment, culture and nature are not divided in ancestral ways 
of being in the Pacific, neither are mind and matter, theory and practice. Engagements 
with Pacific forms of order are not just thought experiments, but also inform legal 
frameworks and practical action. In New Zealand, for instance, as part of the Treaty of 
Waitangi settlement process, both the Urewera, the ancestral territory of Tūhoe people, 
and the Whanganui River have recently been recognised as legal beings in their own 
right, with their own entitlements to health and well-being. 
These laws have many practical implications, and not just for Maori people. While 
they place obligations of care on the iwi concerned, they also fundamentally reshape 
relationships between all people and these ancestral beings. For the Whanganui river, 
its restoration becomes a right, not an optional extra; and for the Urewera, once a major 
national park, the iwi has initiated a regime that seeks to manage people, rather than 
communities of plants and animals. Once issued with tramping, hunting and fishing 
permits, visitors now enter into “friendship agreements” with the Urewera, and are 
guided by young Tūhoe who introduce them to new ways of understanding this place 
that is an ancestor (for more detailed accounts of these experiments, see Salmond, 2017).
Such philosophical experiments can also inform scientific projects. In the Te 
Awaroa project, for instance, funded by the University of Auckland, teams of scientists 
and local experts draw on mātauranga Maori (ancestral knowledge) along with an array 
of natural and social sciences to listen to the “voice of the river” in different parts of the 
country, studying rivers as living systems through time, with their plants, animals and 
people, to inform healthier futures. In the wider Pacific, too, star navigators are again 
sailing across the ocean, carrying out scientific research and raising urgent concerns 
about the state of this great sea with its dying reefs, depleted fish stocks, gyres of 
rubbish and drowning islands. 
In relation to climate change, Maori ancestral perspectives suggest that this is one of 
an array of symptoms that show interlinked living systems moving away from a state of 
ora (health, well-being and abundance) towards a state of mate (ill-health, dysfunction, 
degradation and failure). Such shifts have many manifestations. Intensive agriculture 
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that over-tills or over-grazes the land while using many imported inputs (diesel for 
machinery, chemical sprays and palm kernels as feed, in the case of intensive dairying), 
for instance, may also degrade aquifers, rivers, estuaries and harbours, contribute to 
biodiversity losses through mono-cropping and deforestation, and drive climate change 
through animal methane emissions, deforestation and the use of fossil fuels. 
To “think like a fish,” then, is to recognise that aspects of modernist science may 
be non-adaptive. In order to understand these interconnected processes, the separation 
of the social from the natural sciences and the fragmentation of the disciplines are 
profoundly unhelpful. If we are to deal intelligently with climate change, new paradigms 
that foster intelligent inquiry into an array of intricate relational networks and patterns 
of exchange among planetary systems at different scales are urgently needed. 
As Tui Atua Tupua Tamasese Ta’isi Efi suggests, there is also a need to live 
differently—to confront human greed and the urge to exploit “natural resources” for 
short term profit by considering the interests of future generations, and to pursue 
reciprocal exchanges that seek balance with other life forms, however elusive. The 
gravity of this challenge is highlighted by Nalau Bingeding’s account of a disjuncture in 
Papua New Guinea between the government’s powerful rhetoric about climate change 
in international fora and a lack of practical action at home. On the island of Gau in Fiji, 
on the other hand, according to Veitayaki and Holland, the inhabitants are tackling 
climate change on many fronts through the Lomani Gau project, informed by rigorous 
inquiry and ancestral precedents. 
Across the contemporary Pacific, many thinkers are seeking to engage with climate 
change and related existential challenges by weaving together ancestral ideas with 
insights from the contemporary sciences, and activating these through innovative 
artistic, political and legal devices. In the face of apocalyptic visions that engender 
helplessness and despair, these offer new ways of thinking, a sense of resilience and 
hope, and a will to take practical action: 
As my mentor Eruera Stirling used to chant: 
Whakarongo! Whakarongo! Whakarongo!  Listen! Listen! Listen!
Ki te tangi a te manu e karanga nei To the cry of the bird calling
Tui, tui, tuituiā! Bind, join, be one!
Tuia i runga, tuia i raro, Bind above, bind below
Tuia i roto, tuia i waho, Bind within, bind without
Tuia i te here tangata Tie the knot of humankind
Ka rongo te pō, ka rongo te pō The night hears, the night hears
Tuia i te kāwai tangata i heke mai Bind the lines of people coming down
I Hawaiki nui, i Hawaiki roa, From great Hawaiki, from long Hawaiki 
I Hawaiki pāmamao From Hawaiki far away
I hono ki te wairua, ki te whai ao Bind to the spirit, to the day light
Ki te Ao Mārama! To the World of Light! 
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